Personality Psychology and Economics

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1. Introduction

- The power of cognitive ability in predicting social and economic success is well documented.

- Economists, psychologists, and sociologists now actively examine determinants of social and economic success beyond those captured by cognitive ability.

- However, there remains a substantial imbalance in the scholarly and policy literatures in the emphasis placed on cognitive ability compared to other traits.

- This chapter aims to correct this imbalance.

- It considers how personality psychology informs economics and how economics can inform personality psychology.
The causal power of traits other than those measured by IQ and achievement tests in determining life outcomes is demonstrated in a recent analysis of the Perry Preschool Program.

This experimental intervention enriched the early social and emotional environments of disadvantaged children ages 3 and 4 with subnormal IQs.

It primarily focused on fostering the ability of participants to plan tasks, to execute their plans, and to review their work in social groups.

In addition, it taught reading and math skills, although this was not its main focus.

Both treatment and control group members were followed into their 40s.
Figure 1 shows that, by age ten, treatment group mean IQs were the same as control group mean IQs.

Many critics of early childhood programs seize on this and related evidence to dismiss the value of early intervention studies.

Yet on a variety of measures of socioeconomic achievement, the treatment group was far more successful than the control group.
The annual rate of return to the Perry Program was in the range 6-10% for boys and girls separately.

These rates of return are statistically significant and above the returns to the US stock market over the post-war period.

Something besides IQ was changed by the intervention.

Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010] show that the personality traits of the participants were beneficially improved in a lasting way.

This chapter is about those traits.
Figure 1: Perry Preschool Program: IQ, by Age and Treatment Group

Notes: IQ measured on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (Terman and Merrill [1960]). Test was administered at program entry and each of the ages indicated.
Source: Cunha, Heckman, Lochner et al. [2006] and Heckman and Masterov [2007] based on data provided by the High Scope Foundation.
• Personality psychologists mainly focus on empirical associations between their measures of personality traits and a variety of life outcomes.

• Yet for policy purposes, it is important to know mechanisms of causation to explore the viability of alternative policies.

• We use economic theory to formalize the insights of personality psychology and to craft models that are useful for exploring the causal mechanisms that are needed for policy analysis.
We interpret personality as a strategy function for responding to life situations.

Personality traits, along with other influences, produce measured personality as the output of personality strategy functions.

We discuss how psychologists use measurements of the performance of persons on tasks or in taking actions to identify personality traits and cognitive traits.

We discuss fundamental identification problems that arise in applying their procedures to infer traits.
Many economists, especially behavioral economists, are not convinced about the predictive validity, stability, or causal status of economic preference parameters or personality traits. They believe, instead, that behavior is almost entirely determined by the constraints and incentives in situations.

This once popular extreme situationist view is no longer generally accepted in psychology.

Most psychologists now accept the notion of a stable personality as defined in this chapter.

Measured personality exhibits both stability and variation across situations.

The influence of the situationist debate lingers on in behavioral economics.
Although personality traits are not merely situation-driven ephemera, they are also not set in stone.

We present evidence that both cognitive and personality traits evolve over the life cycle but at different rates at different stages.

Recently developed economic models of parental and environmental investment in children help to explain the evolution of these traits.
This chapter addresses the following specific questions, which we pose here and answer in the concluding section:

(1) How can we fit psychological constructs of personality into an economic framework? Can conventional models of preferences in economics characterize the main theories in personality psychology?

(2) What are the main measurement systems used in psychology for representing personality and personality traits, and how are they validated? How are different systems related to each other? What is the relationship between standard measures of personality and measures of psychopathology and child temperament?

(3) What is the relationship between economic preference parameters and psychological measurements?
(4) How stable across situations and over the life cycle are preference parameters and personality traits?

(5) What is the evidence on the predictive power of cognitive and personality traits?

(6) What is the evidence on the causal power of personality on behavioral outcomes?

(7) Can personality be altered across the life cycle? Are interventions that change personality traits likely fruitful avenues for policy?

(8) Do the findings from psychology suggest that conventional economic theory should be enriched?
The plan of the paper is as follows.

Section 2 presents a definition of personality that captures central ideas in the literature on personality psychology.

It also presents a brief history of personality psychology and the person-situation debate that paralyzed the field for 20 years and that still influences behavioral economics.

Section 3 defines measured personality as a strategy response function using an economic model of preferences, expectations, and constraints.
Our model distinguishes measured personality from personality traits.

It interprets personality as a strategy response function mapping variables that characterize traits and situations to manifest (measured) personality.

Our definition formalizes various definitions of personality used in the literature on personality psychology and facilitates the analysis of personality using the tools of economics.

We also sketch a dynamic model of trait formation.
Section 4 discusses alternative criteria that psychologists use to define traits.

It examines the strengths and limitations of each approach.

We link our abstract definition to linear factor models that are commonly used to identify personality and cognitive traits.
Section 5 presents the main systems used to measure personality and cognition and discusses the relationship among the systems.

We illustrate a nonidentification result developed in Section 3 by showing how scores on IQ tests are greatly affected by incentives and context.

We present additional evidence showing that the scores on achievement tests depend on cognitive and personality measurements, with a substantial predictive role for personality measures.

Measures of “IQ” commonly used in economics and social science conflate measures of cognition and personality.
Section 6 discusses economic preferences and examines the evidence relating economic preference parameters to psychological parameters.

Section 7 surveys the evidence on the predictive validity of personality measures for education, crime, health, and labor market outcomes.

The material presented in the main text summarizes a large and growing empirical literature.

A Web Appendix presents additional detail on the literature relating cognition and personality in each of these areas of economic and social life.
Section 8 presents evidence on the causal impact of personality on outcomes, as well as evidence on the stability and malleability of personality traits and preferences.

We extend the theoretical framework for trait formation introduced in Section 3 and discuss a corresponding measurement system.

We discuss the evidence from intervention studies.

Section 9 concludes with provisional answers to the eight questions.
2. Personality and Personality Traits: Definitions and a Brief History of Personality Psychology

- Personality psychology considers the whole person.
- It considers human universals, individual differences and how and why people are unique.
- As a sign of its breadth, personality psychology considers cognitive functioning as one aspect of personality.
It is helpful to distinguish personality traits, personality as a strategy response function, and measured personality.

Personality is a strategy response function that maps personality traits to measured (manifest) personality.
One leading personality psychologist defines personality traits in the following way: “Personality traits are the relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that reflect the tendency to respond in certain ways under certain circumstances.” (Roberts [2009, p. 140])

This definition, or closely related versions, are used throughout personality psychology.

We formalize these notions in Section 3.
Roberts’ definition of personality traits refers to the stability of certain patterns of behavior or actions or responses to situations that people take, including patterns of thoughts or feelings.

Perceptions, expectations of future events and preferences may shape behavior, feelings and thoughts.

They are products of cognitive activities that help to determine measured personality.

Many personality traits specify tendencies to perceive or process information in particular ways.
There are many different models of personality.

A specimen model is one due to Roberts [2006], who presents the schematic displayed in Figure 2 to relate personality traits to behavior.

He distinguishes mental abilities from personality traits (the items in the boxes will be discussed in later sections of this chapter).
These, along with preferences (motives, interests, and values) and narratives (the stories people tell themselves in organizing their lives and making meanings of them), shape one’s identity and reputation, including the views of the person by others and the person’s perception of how others perceive him.

Identity and reputation in turn shape the roles of individuals in the economy and the society and the larger culture to which they belong.

Personality is the system of relationships that map traits and other determinants of behavior into measured actions.
In Roberts’ vision of personality, feedback processes operate among all components of Figure 2.

Thus his conception of personality is broad enough to include the possibility that identity shapes traits and abilities, perhaps through a mechanism such as epigenetics, in which environment affects gene expression.

Measured personality is the outcome of interacting components of the system.

Personality traits are one component of personality and need to be carefully distinguished from the full expression of personality, which is much more than the traits.

Personality is seen as a system of behaviors, thoughts, and feelings that emerge from the interacting components.
Figure 2: Roberts’s Model of Personality as the Output of a System

Source: Roberts [2006].
In Section 3, we formalize aspects of Roberts’ framework for personality within an economic framework of production, choice, and information.

Figure 2 presages our discussion of a basic identification problem discussed in Section 3.

Measurements and behaviors that arise from responses to incentives and interactions with culture are used to infer personality traits and abilities.

It is the personality traits and cognitive abilities along with the other “units of analysis” in Figure 2 that produce the observed behaviors that are used to infer the generating traits.
To infer traits from behaviors requires that one parse out or standardize for all of the other contributing factors that produce the observed behaviors, a challenging task.

The inability to parse and localize behaviors that depend on a single trait or ability gives rise to a fundamental identification problem.

Behavior changes in response to incentives created by situations.

One has to standardize for the incentive effects of situations to accurately measure personality traits.
2.A. A Brief History of Personality Psychology

- Interest in how individuals differ from one another in their responses to a common situation is as old as human history.
- The importance of personality traits for determining educational outcomes was recognized by the creators of the first IQ tests.
- Alfred Binet, architect of the first modern intelligence test that became the Stanford-Binet IQ test, noted that performance in school “...admits of other things than intelligence; to succeed in his studies, one must have qualities which depend on attention, will, and character; for example a certain docility, a regularity of habits, and especially continuity of effort.
- A child, even if intelligent, will learn little in class if he never listens, if he spends his time in playing tricks, in giggling, in playing truant.” (Binet [1916, p. 254])
At about the same time that Binet was writing, Charles Spearman, best known for his work on “g” a unitary factor that is claimed to capture the structure of intelligence along with his student, Edward Webb, undertook studies of “character” because of “the urgency of its practical application to all the business of life” (Webb [1915, p. 1]).

Spearman and Webb concluded that many positive aspects of character shared a relation to what modern personality psychologists term “Conscientiousness.”

This general factor, which Spearman and Webb chose to call “persistence of motives,” meaning “consistency of action resulting from deliberate volition, or will,” was distinct from a general intelligence factor (Webb [1915, p. 60]).
Arthur Jensen, an intellectual heir of Spearman who is widely regarded as a proponent of $g$ as an explanatory factor of success and failure in many domains of life, writes: “What are the chief personality traits which, interacting with $g$, relate to individual differences in achievement and vocational success? The most universal personality trait is conscientiousness, that is, being responsible, dependable, caring, organized and persistent” Jensen [1998, p. 575].
The Pioneers of Personality Psychology

- Over the past century, interest in personality among psychologists has fluctuated dramatically.

- During the first half of the twentieth century, many of the most prominent psychologists (e.g., Gordon Allport, Raymond Cattell, Hans Eysenck, Charles Spearman, Lewis Terman) were vigorously engaged in the study of individual differences.

- Personality traits were studied along with intelligence, interests, and motivation.
A systematic approach to the study of personality was conceived by early psychologists who believed that the most important dimensions on which human beings differed would be captured in natural language.

These personality pioneers extracted words from the (English) dictionary that characterized individual differences between people (e.g., irritable, proud) and, after eliminating synonyms and non-trait words.

They designed and administered studies of trait inventories to large samples of individuals and applied the same factor analytic methods developed by Galton, Spearman, Binet, Pearson, Cattell, and Thorndike to these assessments in order to isolate “g” to identify the structure of cognitive abilities.
The fruits of several decades of research in this tradition beginning in the 1970s have produced a widely (but not universally) shared consensus taxonomy of traits, known as the Big Five, that is arrived at through factor analysis of observer and self-reports of behaviors.

The Big Five posits a hierarchical organization for personality traits, with five factors at the highest level and progressively more narrowly defined traits (or facets) at lower and lower levels.
### Table 1: The Big Five Traits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Definition of Trait*</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Openness to Experience (Intellect)</td>
<td>The tendency to be open to new aesthetic, cultural, or intellectual experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Conscientiousness</td>
<td>The tendency to be organized, responsible, and hardworking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Extraversion</td>
<td>An orientation of one’s interests and energies toward the outer world of people and things rather than the inner world of subjective experience; characterized by positive affect and sociability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Agreeableness</td>
<td>The tendency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Neuroticism (Emotional Stability)</td>
<td>Neuroticism is a chronic level of emotional instability and proneness to psychological distress. Emotional stability is predictability and consistency in emotional reactions, with absence of rapid mood changes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From the American Psychological Association Dictionary [2007].
Table 1 presents the Big Five traits.

- They are Openness to Experience (also called Intellect or Culture), Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (also called Emotional Stability).

- The Big Five factors represent personality traits at the broadest level of abstraction.

- They summarize a large number of distinct, more specific, personality facets.
• The Big Five are defined without reference to any context (i.e., situation).

• This gives rise to an identification problem that we discuss in Section 3.

• The behaviors used to measure the traits are also determined by factors other than the Big Five traits.
John [1990], Goldberg [1993], and Costa and McCrae [1992a] present evidence that most of the variables used to assess personality traits in academic research in the field of personality psychology can be mapped into one or more of the dimensions of the Big Five.

They argue that the Big Five are the longitude and latitude of personality traits, by which all more narrowly defined traits may be categorized (see also Costa and McCrae [1992a]).

We discuss the Big Five further in Section 5, where we also consider alternative measurement systems.
In 1968, Walter Mischel published a monograph entitled Personality and Assessment, challenging the most important theoretical assumptions and empirical findings of personality psychology.
An acrimonious “person-situation” debate ensued, which pitted those who favored situational factors as explaining behavior against those who considered personality traits as more consequential.

During this time, considered by many to be a dark age in the history of personality psychology, the general Zeitgeist favored experimental social psychological approaches which focused on the importance of the situation compared to the individual traits featured in personality psychology.
Mischel noted that correlations between behavioral task measures of personality and questionnaire measures seldom, if ever, exceeded 0.3.

The implication of such within-individual behavioral heterogeneity suggested to Mischel that “the behaviors which are often construed as stable personality trait indicators are highly specific and depend on the details of the evoking situations and the response mode employed to measure them” (p. 37).

Mischel wrote “…with the possible exception of intelligence, highly generalized behavioral consistencies have not been demonstrated, and the concept of personality traits as broad dispositions is thus untenable” Mischel [1968, p. 146]
Mischel went on to write that global (i.e., domain-general) traits (e.g., “impulsive”, “confident”) measured in one situation did not predict future behavior and outcomes in other situations.

His view was that global traits, in attempting to summarize behavioral dispositions without regard to situational contingencies, were “excessively crude, gross units to encompass adequately the extraordinary complexity and subtlety of the discriminations that people constantly make” (p. 301).
Mischel now suggests [2004] that there are consistencies in behavior across time, but that the locus of consistency is to be found in highly contextualized if-situation/then-behavior contingencies (e.g., “If I feel threatened, then I am aggressive”).

Variance across situations was, in Mischel’s view, improperly treated by most personality psychologists as “error.”

Indeed, in his view, the systematic variation of behavior across situations points to underlying motivations, beliefs, schemas, strategies, and other factors that collectively and interactively give rise to coherence in any individual’s measured personality.

His revised view of personality is broadly consistent with Robert’s Figure 2.
In Section 3, we formalize the “if-then” relationship using an economic model.

We show that the person-situation debate boils down to an empirical question about the relative importance of person, situation, and their interaction in explaining behaviors.

Although Mischel may have intended otherwise, proponents of the situationist view have used his monograph as ammunition in the battle against accepting evidence from personality psychology into economics.

As is characteristic of most heated debates in social science, this one occurred in the absence of much data.

In Section 5, we discuss the body of evidence that has emerged over the past four decades on the existence of stable personality traits.
The debate over the relative importance of person and situation in the 1960s and 1970s was a manifestation of deeper currents in psychology and social science more generally that still run quite strong.

In the 1960s, Behaviorism, associated with B.F. Skinner, posited, among other things, that all aspects of behavior can be explained by experience, was still influential.

There was the widely held notion that situation and experience were all powerful that people were born as blank slates.

This captured the interventionist spirit of the times.

Inter-individual heterogeneity in traits was ignored.
Ross and Nisbett [1991] summarize the position of many social psychologists: “Manipulations of the immediate social situation can overwhelm in importance the type of individual differences in personal traits or dispositions that people normally think of as being determinative of social behavior” (p. xiv).

A similar view is held by many behavioral economists and they often appeal to Mischel as a guiding influence.
For example, in a recent round table discussion, Richard Thaler noted that “The great contribution to psychology by Walter Mischel [...] is to show that there is no such thing as a stable personality trait” (Thaler [2008]).

Many studies in behavioral economics attempt to establish inconsistency in behavior across situations, in violation of standard assumptions of stable preferences used in mainstream economics.

For instance, several studies find very low correlations in risk-taking behavior across situations.
Personality psychology survived the Behaviorist assault and is a prospering field.

A rich body of correlational evidence, which we summarize in Section 7, shows that for many outcomes, measured personality traits are as predictive, and are sometimes more predictive than standard measures of cognition, that traits are stable across situations, and situations also matter.

The evidence from behavioral genetics shows that measured personality traits are as heritable as cognitive traits.
Studies in neuroscience show that alterations in brain structure and function through accidents, disease and by experiments affect measured personality.

They reinforce the evidence from heritability studies.

This evidence and other evidence shows that something about measured personality is real.

We review this evidence in Section 8.
3. Conceptualizing Personality and Personality Traits Within Economic Models

- Personality psychologists rarely use formal models to define or measure their constructs.

- In order to introduce their knowledge to economists, it is fruitful to formalize their frameworks.

- Doing so serves to make the concepts of personality psychology more precise and also serves as a basis for measurement and policy analysis.
- We introduce a series of progressively more comprehensive models to integrate concepts from personality psychology into economics.

- Roberts’ framework (Figure 2) captures the main features of the influential models used in personality psychology.

- We use it as a point of departure.

- Psychology adds new and often more nuanced descriptions of human behavior to the standard descriptions used in economics.
In the nineteenth century, economics and psychology were closely aligned.

Economists then spoke of the “hedonic calculus” used by people weighing choices.

One of the advances made in neoclassical economics in the first half of the twentieth century was to focus on choices and the objective (easily measured) factors (like prices and incomes) that determine choices.
- Revealed preference became a central tool of economics.
- It was implemented using the marginal rate of substitution between choices—a key parameter that emerged from the neoclassical revolution.
- This parameter did not require measurable utility or knowledge of the mental states of the agents making choices.
- Mental states and measurable utility, once the province of economists, were eliminated by Occam’s Razor.
Measurable utility was used in utilitarian economics but fell out of favor (see Samuelson [1956], Foster and Sen [1997]).

Preferences that fulfilled criteria for rationality were consistent with utility functions that were determined up to monotonic transformations.

Measurable utility returned in a specific fashion with analyses of decision-making under uncertainty (see Savage [1954]).
Mental states are viewed as unnecessary baggage by most economists except insofar as they affect choices.

Thus, the traits, abilities, and narratives used by Roberts in Figure 2 are of interest to most economists only if they affect choices through preferences, constraints, and effects on information processing capabilities.

Motives and values are captured in part by the economic preference parameters which we discuss in Section 6.

Until recently, “happiness,” and “aggregate utility,” as well as other subjective mental states that do not affect behavior (choices) were considered uninteresting to most economists.
The most direct way to introduce psychological variables into economic models is through preferences, constraints, and expectations.

We begin our analysis with a barebones approach that focuses on constraints.

For example, cognitive and personality traits affect earnings capacity because they enhance productivity (see, e.g., Bowles, Gintis and Osborne [2001a]), and, at least up to a point, more of a trait can generate more resources which enlarge choice sets and hence directly affect behavior.
3.A. An Approach Based on Comparative Advantage

- A useful point of departure is the Roy model [1951] of comparative advantage.

- Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] use the Roy model to introduce psychological variables into the study of social and economic outcomes.

- Personality traits are treated as endowments, and choices are determined by personality traits and other factors as they affect productivity in skills.
Agents can perform one of $J$ tasks with productivity $P_j, j \in \{1, \ldots, J\}$.

The productivity in task $j$ depends on the traits of agents represented by $\theta$, and the “effort” they expend on the task, $e_j$:

$$P_j = \phi_j(\theta, e_j), \quad j \in J = \{1, \ldots, J\}, \quad e_j \in E, \theta \in \Theta. \quad (1)$$

The traits are the endowments of agents that govern behavior.

Examples of traits include height, personality characteristics, problem solving ability, and strength.

$\theta$ is a public good as it is available in the same amount for all tasks.

Productivity also depends on effort $e_j$.

Effort is assumed to be divisible and fixed in supply.
In much applied research, effort and traits are often assumed to be measured so that over the relevant range

\[
\frac{\partial \phi_j}{\partial e_j} \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \phi_j}{\partial \theta} \geq 0,
\]

but neither condition is strictly required.

Excess effort (over-exertion; too much attention to detail) may be counterproductive so that function \(\phi_j\) need not be monotonic in \(e_j\), contrary to what is assumed here.

Indeed, as discussed in Section 5, certain psychopathologies are associated with extreme levels of traits that are quite productive at normal levels.

Different traits may have different productivities in different tasks, leading to comparative advantage in different tasks for people with different endowments.
Effort may complement capability \( \left( \frac{\partial^2 \phi_j}{\partial e_j \partial \theta'} > 0 \right) \) or may substitute for it \( \left( \frac{\partial^2 \phi_j}{\partial e_j \partial \theta'} < 0 \right) \).

Some people may solve complex math problems with no effort, while others may have to allocate considerable time and effort to achieve the same result.

Effort can be a vector (time, mental energy, attention), and it is assumed to be a divisible private good with the feature that the more that is applied to task \( j \), the less is available for all other tasks at any point in time.

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{J} e_j = \bar{e}, \text{ where } \bar{e} \text{ is the endowment of total effort.}
\]
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven et al. [1998] interpret self-control as a component of e that is fixed over given time periods.

A person who exerts more self-control in one task may be less self-controlled in another task.
Let $R_j$ be the reward per unit productivity in task $j$.

In the first case we analyze, it is possible for the agents to productively engage in only one of the $J$ tasks at any time.

This can be interpreted as a case where effort can only be applied to a single task.

The agent with trait $\theta$ and endowment $\bar{e}$ faces the problem of picking $\hat{j}$ where

$$\hat{j} = \arg \max_{j \in \{1, \ldots, J\}} \{ R_j \phi_j (\theta, \bar{e}) \} .$$

(2)

In this case, $\theta$ and $\bar{e}$ play the same role.

People with different effort and capability endowments will generally choose different tasks.
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] show how persons with different endowments of personality and intelligence sort into different occupations and levels of schooling.

People low in certain traits may have better endowments of effort and may compensate for their shortfall in ability by exerting effort.

For certain tasks (e.g., creating new branches of mathematics), there may be threshold levels of $\theta$ such that for $\theta < \bar{\theta}_j$, $\phi_j(\theta, e_j) = 0$ for all $e_j < \bar{e}$. 
The person needs a given level of trait $\theta$ no matter how hard they try.

The higher $R_j$, the more likely will the person choose to perform task $j$.

The particular choice of which $j$ to perform depends on the productivity of traits in different tasks.
3.B. Allowing for Multiple Tasking

- More generally, at a point in time, people may perform multiple tasks.

- A less discrete version of the Roy model builds on the same foundations, allows people to perform multiple tasks at any time and postulates that $\phi_j (\theta, e_j)$ is concave and increasing in $e_j$.

- The agent maximizes

$$\sum_{j=1}^{J} R_j \phi_j (\theta, e_j)$$

subject to $\sum_{j=1}^{J} e_j = \bar{e}$. 
As the reward for activity $j$, $R_j$, increases, everything else constant, the effort devoted to $j$ will increase.

This model is consistent with compensation for shortfalls in endowments as well as reinforcement, depending on the pattern of complementarity and substitutability.

Different situations may be associated with different rewards for the same task.

Such variation can produce the situational specificity of measured personality that was featured in the person-situation debate discussed in Section 2.

One needs to standardize for the incentives to exert effort across tasks and for the endowment of effort in order to use measurements of personality to identify traits.
3.C. Identifying Personality Traits

- Before considering more general models, it is useful to discuss a basic identification problem that arises in simple settings and that also arises in more general models.

- At the current level of generality, all traits can potentially affect productivity in all tasks.

- However, some tasks may require only a single trait or a subset of all of the traits.

- Following a traditional dichotomy in psychology that is explicit in Roberts’ Figure 2, divide \( \theta \) into “mental,” \( \mu \), and “personality,” \( \pi \), traits: \( \theta_\mu \) and \( \theta_\pi \), each of which may in turn be a vector.
Psychological measurement systems sometimes use productivity measured in different tasks to identify $\theta_\mu$ and $\theta_\pi$.

This is the way Carroll [1993] defines mental ability where the task is performance on “mental” tests.

To use performance on a task (or on multiple measures of the task) to identify a trait requires that performance on certain tasks (performance on a test, performance in an interpersonal situation, etc.) depends exclusively on one component of $\theta$, say $\theta_{1,j}$.

In that case

$$P_j = \phi_j (\theta_{1,j}, e_j).$$
Even if we can measure productivity $P_j$ in task $j$, and only one component of $\theta$ affects $P_j$, to identify the level of a trait one must control for the level of effort applied to $j$ in order to use $P_j$ to infer the level of $\theta_{1,j}$.

That is, one must standardize for the effort at a benchmark level, say $e^*$, to use $P_j$ to identify a measure of the trait that is uniform across different situations that elicit different levels of effort.
The activity of picking a task (or a collection of tasks) to measure a particular trait ($\theta_{1,j}$ in our example) is called operationalization in psychology.

Construct validity refers to whether or not a purported measure of the trait constructed in the stage of operationalization correlates with measures deemed to represent the trait.

Considerable judgment is required to operationalize a trait and independently validate it.

There is clear danger of circularity.

Economists should carefully scrutinize how the measures they borrow from psychology are operationalized and validated.

We discuss how major constructs are validated in Section 5.
Assuming that construct validity has been established, if effort is involved in the performance of a task used to uniquely define a trait, the measurement of performance must be standardized in order to use measured productivity $P_j$ to identify the trait.

Otherwise, the endowment of effort, and all of the factors that contribute to the exertion of effort, including the reward to the task, $R_j$, will contaminate the estimate of the trait.

Failure to adjust for effort produces the kind of variability across situations with different rewards that was much discussed in the person-situation debate.

We present examples of such contamination of measurement by the operation of incentives on effort in Section 5.
Operationalization and construct validation clearly require heroic assumptions.

Even if one adjusts for effort in a task, and thus adjusts for situational specificity, productivity in a task may depend on multiple traits.

Thus two components of \( \theta \) (say \( \theta_{1,\mu}, \theta_{1,\pi} \)) may determine productivity in task \( j \).

Without further information, one cannot infer which of the two traits produces the productivity in \( j \).

But in general, even having two (or more) measures of productivity that depend on \( (\theta_{1,\mu}, \theta_{1,\pi}) \) is not enough to identify the separate components.
Consider the following case of two productivity measures on tasks $j$ and $j'$:

$$ P_j = \phi_j (\theta_1, \mu, \theta_1, \pi, e_j) $$

$$ P_{j'} = \phi_{j'} (\theta_1, \mu, \theta_1, \pi, e_{j'}) , \quad j \neq j'. $$

One might have such measurements if data are available on the productivity of the same person performing two tasks.

Standardize measurements at a common level of effort $e_j = e_{j'} = e^*.$

If the system of equations satisfies a local rank condition, then one can solve for the pair $(\theta_1, \mu, \theta_1, \pi)$ at $e^*.$
There is no guarantee that this rank condition is satisfied.

The productivity functions need not be monotone in $\theta_1, \mu$ or $\theta_1, \pi$.

Interacting systems might produce multiple equilibria so that the same values of $\theta$ produce different values of $(P_j, P_{j'})$.

Interacting systems might also have no solution.
Note that even if these problems do not arise, only the pair \((\theta_1, \mu, \theta_1, \pi)\) is identified.

One cannot (without further information) determine which component of the pair is \(\theta_1, \mu\) or \(\theta_1, \pi\).

In Section 5, we present an example where scores on achievement tests depend on both IQ and personality traits.

In the absence of dedicated constructs (constructs that are generated by only one component of \(\theta\)), there is an intrinsic identification problem that arises in using measures of productivity in tasks to infer traits.

A dedicated measurement for at least one component is an essential requirement.

Other components can be defined relative to that measurement.
3.D. Extensions of the Roy Model

- The simple gross income maximizing framework of the Roy model is widely used in empirical work by economists studying the effects of personality on outcomes.

- It is amended in many papers by including a cost \( C_j(\theta, e_j) \) for obtaining rewards so that instead of criterion (2), the agent picks \( \hat{j} \) that maximizes the net reward

\[
\hat{j} = \arg \max_{j \in \{1, \ldots, J\}} \left\{ R_j \phi_j(\theta, \bar{e}) - C_j(\theta, \bar{e}) \right\}.
\]
The analogous extension for criterion (3) has the agent maximizing,

\[ \sum_{j=1}^{J} R_j \phi_j (\theta, e_j) - C_j (\theta, e_j) \]

with respect to the choice of \( e_j \).

This extension creates a further identification problem whether the trait identified arises from its role in costs, productivity, or both.

The identification problem deepens when we allow the costs to be psychic costs as in Heckman and Sedlacek [1985], Cunha, Heckman and Navarro [2005], or Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006], and attempt to separate out productivity traits from preference traits.
The framework of the Roy model is widely used in recent analyses of the role of personality and cognition.

It has precedents in the work of Mandelbrot [1962], Heckman and Sedlacek [1985], and Heckman and Honor [1990].

In most applications, the \( \phi_j(\theta, e_j) \) and \( C_j(\theta, e_j) \) (or their logarithms) are assumed to be linear or log linear in \( \theta \) and \( e_j \):

\[
P_j = \alpha'_\theta \theta + \alpha'_e e_j \\
C_j = \beta'_\theta \theta + \beta'_e e_j.
\]

The analyst models both the choice of the task and the output from the chosen task.

A third (mixed) case can arise in which some clusters of tasks are mutually exclusive so the agent can perform only one task within each cluster of tasks, but the agent can simultaneously engage in tasks across clusters.
3.E. Adding Preferences and Goals

- Preferences and goals (see Figure 2) may also shape effort.
- This takes us to a fourth and more general case.
- There may be direct utility benefits or costs associated with exerting effort in each task.
- Array the effort across tasks in vector $e = (e_1, \ldots, e_J)$.
- Agents might also attach direct value to the productivity in tasks arrayed in vector $P = (P_1, \ldots, P_J)$ with reward $R_j$. 
Output can produce income \( \sum_{j=1}^{J} R_j P_j \) which can be spent on final consumption goods \( X \) with associated prices \( W \).

A utility function can be specified over \( X, P, \) and \( e \) with preference parameter vector \( \psi \in \Psi \).
Thus, we write

$$U(X, P, e | \psi),$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where the agent maximizes (4) subject to the constraints

$$Y + R'P = W'X$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where $Y$ is a flow of unearned income available to the agent in addition to his earnings from his productive activities, and

$$\sum_{j=1}^{J} e_j = \bar{e}. \hspace{1cm} (6)$$

Preference specification (4) captures the notions that (a) agents have preferences over goods, (b) agents may value the output of tasks in their own right, and (c) agents may value the effort devoted to tasks.
The parameter $\psi$ determines the tradeoffs in preferences among $X$, $P$, and $e$.

In one interpretation, subjective measures of well-being (Layard [2005]) attempt to directly measure (4).

Parameters that affect subjective well-being but not choices can be identified from the measures of well-being, but not from choices.
3.F. Adding Learning and Uncertainty

- All of the preceding models can be extended to account for learning and uncertainty.
- Let $\mathcal{I}$ be the information possessed by the agent, and let “$E$” denote mathematical expectations.
- An agent can be interpreted as making decisions based on

$$E[U(X, P, e | \psi) | \mathcal{I}], \quad (7)$$

where $\psi$ is in his information set (i.e., the agent knows his preferences).
Different theories specify different amounts of information available to agents.

They might be uncertain about their preferences, $\psi$, traits, $\theta$, the prices they face, $W$, the rewards to productivity, $R$, the outcomes of purchase decisions, $X$, and their endowments of effort, $\bar{e}$, and the theory can be suitably modified to account for this.
The use of the expectations operator begs the question of how the information set is constituted and how subjective expectations are formed.

There may be psychological traits \( \theta \) that affect information perception and processing.

Several recent studies that apply personality traits to search economics suggest that greater locus of control is associated with greater confidence in the arrival of job offers.

Overconfidence may be a trait that causes persons to inflate their perceived productivity.
• A production function for information may depend on components of $\theta$ ($\theta_{I}$) and the effort devoted to acquire information $e_{I}$.

• Intelligent people may acquire information more readily than dull people.

• People more open to experience likely acquire more knowledge.

• Aggressive people may reduce their social interactions and impair their ability to learn from others.

• We discuss the evidence on how psychological traits affect information updating in Section 6.
One might object to the rationality and self perception implicit in this formulation.

As in Freud [1999], decision making might be made by a subconscious mind lacking self perception.

Decision making may be unconscious and agents may not recognize their desired goals.

Nonetheless, their revealed choice behavior is limited by the constraints they face.

Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman et al. [2008] develop a model in which agents have random preferences and make choices at random within their feasible set.

Variations in constraints drive the measured behavior of group averages but do not predict the behavior of any individual.
3.G. Definition of Personality Within an Economic Model

- Personality traits are the components of \( e, \theta \) and \( \psi \) that affect behavior.

- One might define measured personality as the performance (the \( P_j \)) and effort (the \( e_j \)) that arise from solutions to any of the optimization problems previously discussed.

- Thus, the derived productivity and effort functions would constitute the systems generating measured personality as a response to constraints, information, and preferences, i.e., as a system of functions that solve out for the \( P_j \) and \( e_j \) that agents choose in terms of their choice parameters.
This approach to defining personality would not capture the full range of behaviors or actions considered by personality psychologists as constituting manifestations of personality. The actions considered by psychologists include a variety of activities that economists normally do not study, e.g., cajoling, beguiling, bewitching, charming, etc.

Thus, in selling a house, various actions might be taken, e.g., smiling, persuading people by reason, threatening, scowling, showing affection, etc.

Actions also include emotions, feelings, and thoughts, and are not restricted to be activities that promote physical productivity.

Colloquially, “there are many ways to skin a cat,” and the choice of which way to do so in any task defines the action taken.
To capture these more general notions, we introduce the concept of “actions” that are broader than what is captured by e.

Actions are styles of behavior that affect how tasks are accomplished.

They include aspects of behavior that go beyond effort as we have defined it.
Any task can be accomplished by taking various actions.

We denote the $i^{th}$ possible action to perform task $j$ by

$$a_{i,j}, i \in \{1, \ldots, K_j\}.$$ 

Array the actions in a vector $a_j = (a_{1,j}, \ldots, a_{K_j,j}) \in A$.

The actions may be the same or different across the tasks.

Thus one can smile in executing all tasks or one may smile in only some.

The productivity of the agent in task $j$ depends on the actions taken in that task:

$$P_j = f_j (a_{1,j}, a_{2,j}, \ldots, a_{K_j,j}). \quad (8)$$
The actions themselves depend on traits \( \theta \) and "effort" \( e_{i,j} \):

\[
a_{i,j} = \nu_{i,j}(\theta, e_{i,j}),
\]

(9)

where

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{K_j} e_{i,j} = e_j \text{ and } \sum_{j=1}^{J} e_j = \bar{e}.
\]

Less effort may be required to perform a given action if a person has endowment \( \theta \) that favors performance of the action.

For example, one person may be naturally gregarious and as such may find it easier to engage in social interactions than others.

Stated this way, actions generalize the notion of effort to a broader class of behavior.
• Analytically, they play the same role as effort and some actions may be components of effort.

• There may be utility costs or benefits of effort exerted.

• A special case arises when there are increasing returns to effort in each action.

• In that case, the agent will simply apply all of his effort $e_j$ in task $j$ to the action which gives him the highest productivity, and the other possible actions are not taken.
Agents may have utility over actions beyond the utility they get from consuming the outputs of tasks.

For example, an agent may prefer accomplishing a task by working hard rather than by cheating.

Different beliefs, thoughts, and feelings may have different effects on outcomes.

Introducing actions in this fashion allows for the possibility that some actions are valued in their own right and do not directly contribute to productivity in any of the $J$ tasks.
Let $\mathcal{M}$ be the set of actions, including actions that do not directly contribute to productivity.

In this more general formulation

$$a_{i,m} = \nu_{i,m}(\theta, e_{i,m}), \ m \in \mathcal{M}$$

where $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \mathcal{M}$. 
We define utility over actions.

Let $a$ denote the choice of actions, some of which may not be associated with any particular task.

Using the same information as used to characterize (7), the agent solves

$$\max E [U (a, X, P, e | \psi) | \mathcal{I}]$$

with respect to $X$ and $e$ given the stated constraints.

Actions may also directly affect $\mathcal{I}$, so the production of information can depend on $\theta$, $e$ and $a$.

The choice of which actions to take depends on goals and values (captured by $\psi$) and on the available information.

Part of learning may consist of agents learning about the set of actions that are available to them, $A(\mathcal{I})$. 
One can extend the framework to introduce the effects of the situation in the person-situation debate, by considering specific situations represented by $h \in \mathcal{H}$. These situations are assumed to affect productivity by affecting the set of possible actions and hence the action taken.
Thus for a person with traits $\theta$ and effort vector $e_j$ with action $a_{i,j}$, using the specification (9), the action function can be expanded to be dependent on situation $h$:

$$a_{i,j,h} = \nu_{i,j}(\theta, e_{i,j}, h),$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

and productivity on a task can be specified as a function of the action taken to perform the task in situation $h$:

$$P_{j,h} = f_j(a_{1,j,h}, \ldots, a_{K,j,h})$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

or by a more general specification where situation $h$, along with traits, has a direct effect on productivity in addition to their effects on actions taken:

$$P_{j,h} = f_j(\theta, a_{1,j,h}, \ldots, a_{K,j,h}, h).$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)
Situations could include physical aspects of the environment in which the agent is located or the network (and other social situations) in which the agent is embodied.

The situation can include social factors such as peer effects.

Persons taking an achievement test sometimes do much worse if the significance of their scores for social perceptions of their group is stressed, as in the stereotype threat literature.
The situation represents a key notion in the “person-situation” debate discussed in Section 2.

Equations (10)-(12) capture the “if-then” notion of Mischel and Shoda [1995].

Under specification (12), agents with the same actions, the same efforts, and the same traits may have different productivities.

Failure to control for situation $h$, just like failure to control for effort, will contaminate identification of traits using measures of actions or productivities.

Situations may be forced on the agents or may be chosen.
Let $T \in \mathcal{T}$ be the vector of traits $(\theta, \psi, \bar{e})$.

At any point in time, they are regarded as endowments.

In the general case, the solution to the constrained maximization problem is to pick goods ($X$), situation ($h$), action ($a_{i,j}$), and effort ($e_j$), $j \in \{1, \ldots, J\}$ subject to the constraints.

$h$ is fixed if the situation is forced on the agent.

For simplicity, we analyze this case.

Relaxing it is straightforward but notationally more cumbersome.
For the case of fixed \( h \), the solution to the maximization problem produces a set of response functions.

Preference parameters \((\psi)\) characterize the tradeoffs and goals that help shape manifest behavior.

The agent’s response functions (assumed to exist) are

\[
X = X(R, W, T, h, Y, I) \quad (13)
\]

\[
e = e(R, W, T, h, Y, I) \quad (14)
\]

\[
a = a(R, W, T, h, Y, I). \quad (15)
\]

Productivity \( P \) across tasks is derived from the actions, efforts, and traits of the agents.
The behaviors that constitute personality are defined as a pattern of actions in response to the constraints, endowments, and incentives facing agents given their goals and preferences.

This interpretation incorporates the notion that personality is a system of functions.

People may have different personalities depending on their trait endowments, constraints, and situations.

Their actions, not the traits, constitute the data used to identify the traits.
Introducing actions widens the set of data from which one might infer the components of $T$.

Personality psychologists often use actions (e.g., “dispositions”) to infer traits.

The same identification issues previously discussed continue to arise but now apply to a broader set of measurements.
As noted in the introduction to Section 2, many personality psychologists define personality as “enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings and behaviors” that reflect tendencies of persons to respond in certain ways under certain circumstances.

Our notion of action $a$, is broad enough to encompass the wide array of behaviors considered by the personality psychologists.

We previously defined personality traits $T$ as generators of behavior.
One way to capture the notion of enduring actions is to average the \( a \) functions (15) for a person with a given trait vector \( T = t \) over situations and efforts.

Thus for a given task \( j \) and trait vector \( t \), the average action for information set \( \mathcal{I} \) can be defined as

\[
\bar{a}_{T,j,\mathcal{I}} = \int_{S_{T,\mathcal{I}}(h,e_{i,j})} \nu_{i,j}(\theta, e_{i,j}, h) \ g(h, e_{i,j} | T = (\theta, \psi, \bar{e}), \mathcal{I}) \ dh \ de_{i,j}
\]

where \( S_{T,\mathcal{I}}(h, e_{i,j}) \) is the support of \( (h, e_{i,j}) \) given \( T \) and \( \mathcal{I} \), and \( g(h, e_{i,j} | T = (\theta, \psi, \bar{e}), \mathcal{I}) \) is the density of \( (h, e_{i,j}) \) given \( T = (\theta, \psi, \bar{e}) \) and information set \( \mathcal{I} \).

\( \bar{a}_{T,j,\mathcal{I}} \) is the “enduring action” of agents across situations in task \( j \) with information \( \mathcal{I} \), i.e., the average personality.
Notice that if $\nu_{i,j}$ is separable in $T$, the marginal effect of personality trait vector $\theta$ is the same in all situations.

One can define the “enduring traits” in a variety of ways, say by averaging over tasks, $j$, situations, $h$, or both.

Only under separability will one obtain the same marginal effect of $\theta$.

Epstein [1979] and a subsequent literature present evidence against nonseparability and in favor of an “enduring trait” that is common across situations.
3.H. Life Cycle Dynamics

- The analysis in the preceding subsection was for a particular point in time (e.g., a period).

- Traits are not set in stone.

- In a dynamic setting, one can think of traits, $T$, information, $I$, situations, $h$, and actions, $a$, as state variables that evolve through aging, experience, and investment.

- As a result of experience (including social interactions), situations, biology (ontogeny), and investment, traits may change over the life cycle.

- We briefly discuss the dynamics of trait and state formation, leaving a more complete discussion to Section 8.
To capture the evidence from a large and growing literature, we consider the dynamic evolution of traits.

Let $T^v$ be traits at age $v$, $v \in \{1, \ldots, V\} \in V$.

They may change through family and self investment (Cunha and Heckman [2007; 2009]), through schooling, through biology or through experience.

Information $I^v$ may be updated through various channels of learning.

All task outputs, actions and goods inputs may be time dated.
Investment in period \( \nu \) is an action or set of actions that an individual (or a person or group acting for the individual) may take in period \( \nu \).

Investments have dynamic effects.
The technology of skill formation (Cunha and Heckman [2007; 2009]) captures the notion that traits may evolve in response to the inputs of a vector of investments ($IN^v$), and through aspects of the situation in which the agent is found, $h^v$, where $h^v$ is the vector of attributes of the situation:

$$T^{v+1} = f^v(T^v, IN^v, h^v), v = 0, \ldots, V - 1$$ (16)

where the first set of arguments arises from self and cross productivity (skill begets skill; traits beget other traits and traits cross-foster each other; see Cunha and Heckman [2007; 2009]).
The second set of arguments arises from investment.

Investment is a broad concept and includes parental nurturance, schooling, learning by doing, and learning by imitation, etc.

The third set of arguments arises from the situation in which the person is placed.
Notice that if elements of $T^v$ are augmented over the life cycle through investment and practice, the actions and efforts required to achieve a given task can change.

Thus, if $\theta^v$ is enhanced over time, the amount of effort required to perform a task may be reduced.

In this way, we can model habit formation and capture the notion of arete, effortless performance of actions, discussed in Aristotle [1956].
As emphasized by Mischel and Shoda [1995] and Roberts and Jackson [2008], situations may change over time as a function of past actions, past situations, investment, information, and the like.

We present this by the following equation of motion:

$$h^{v+1} = \chi^v (h^v, IN^v, a^v).$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

Past actions may serve to determine the set of present situations.

Those situations in turn may influence current actions.
Information $\mathcal{I}^v$ may change over the life cycle through experimentation as well as through exogenous learning:

$$\mathcal{I}^{v+1} = \phi^v (\mathcal{I}^v, a^v, T^v, \IN^v, h^v).$$

(18)

This learning mechanism incorporates the beliefs of agents about the available data.

Thus people may learn about their environments and themselves in part as a consequence of their own actions and in part as a consequence of the exogenous arrival of information.

Equations of motion (16)-(18) are very general.

We consider special cases of them used in the empirical literature in Section 8.
There is a rich and evolving literature on dynamic preferences when agents do not possess full knowledge of their future environments (see, for example, Hansen [2005], Hansen and Sargent [2008], Rust [2008], Epstein and Zin [1989], Epstein and Schneider [2003], and Skiadas [1998]) that is too large to summarize here.

Preferences need not be separable over time, and there may be time inconsistency of choices associated with hyperbolic discounting.

We discuss commonly used dynamic preference specifications in Section 6.
3.I. Relationship of the Model in This Section to Existing Models in Personality Psychology

- Personality psychologists generally do not present formal models.
- The formalization in this section is, to our knowledge, the first mathematically precise definition of personality traits and measured personality.
- The models we have sketched in this section capture central features of the major models in personality psychology.
By its authors’ own admission, the McCrae-Costa [2008] Five Factor Theory is not a fully articulated model.

It emphasizes the role of traits ($T$) and, in particular, the Big Five factors, in producing outcomes and agent actions, and is sketchy about other details.

Agents are assumed to learn about their own traits, but precise learning mechanisms are not discussed.

Expression of traits is affected by the external environment and through social interactions in a not fully specified fashion.
The concept of an evolving information set $I^v$ plays a central role in Five Factor Theory.

People learn about their traits through actions and experience, but how this occurs is not precisely formulated.

These notions are captured by equation (18).

Situations may also evolve as a function of actions and experience, but no role is assigned to investment.
Thus, a restricted version of (17) formalizes aspects of the Five Factor Theory.

The theory features “characteristic adaptations,” which correspond to the actions and efforts of our model that also affect the productivity in tasks.

The role of preferences is left unspecified.

However, McCrae and Costa explicitly feature rationality (McCrae and Costa [2008, p. 161]) and reject the characterization of flawed human decision making that dominates social psychology and the field of behavioral economics that was spawned from social psychology.

They explicitly reject a purely situationist explanation of the origin of actions, but they allow for situations to affect actions.
• Traits evolve through biological processes (ontogeny), but no role is assigned to investment or experience as a determinant of traits.

• Thus, the arguments of equation (16) are shut down, but traits may still exogenously evolve as a function of age and the biology of the individual.

• Even though traits evolve as part of an exogeneous maturation process, persons may learn about themselves (their traits) by taking actions and by being acted on by the external environment.
A rival to trait theories based on the Big Five are “social cognitive” theories.

Central figures in this literature are Albert Bandura, Daniel Cervone, and Walter Mischel.

Roberts’ diagram (Figure 2) captures key aspects of this theory, and Roberts himself can be viewed as a member of both camps.

This line of thinking stresses the role of cognition in shaping personality and the role of social context in shaping actions and self-knowledge.

Authors writing in this school of thought reject the “cognitive-noncognitive” distinction that is often used in economics.

They view manifest personality as an outcome of cognitive processes.
A major role is assigned to agency-individual goals and motives that produce actions.

Their goals and motives are captured by our $\psi$.

The arrival of information is captured by $\mathcal{I}$.

Although the literature in personality psychology often contrasts these two schools of thought, to us the lines are not distinct.
• Only in one extreme version of the social-cognitive theory are traits are entirely absent.

• In that version, agent behavior is entirely shaped by situations.

• For example, Mischel and Shoda [2008] focus on the role of situation in shaping actions, efforts, and productivities, but also allow for traits to influence actions.

• The “sociogenomic” model of Roberts and Jackson [2008] also considers the dynamics of personality formation.
Thus, both schools of thought accept specification (9) or its extension (10), and both would be comfortable with response systems (13)-(15).

The relative importance of the factors emphasized by the two schools of thought can only be settled by empirical research.

The social-cognitive theorists tolerate deviations from rationality in their theories, while trait theorists typically do not.
Both schools of thought entertain the possibility of learning about oneself.

A major difference between the two groups comes in the role of investment in producing traits.

The social-cognitive theorists feature investment and social interactions as direct determinants of traits that are assumed to evolve as a function of the experiences of agents.

The trait theorists do not consider this possibility.

Instead they emphasize self-learning about traits that evolve by fixed biological principles unrelated to the experiences of individuals.
4. Measuring Personality

- Unlike other personal traits, like height or weight, personality traits cannot be directly measured.
- Observed productivities, efforts, and actions are used to infer traits.
- This leads directly to the analysis of latent variables and to factor models that underlie much of the analysis of trait psychology.
- This is an area where psychology and the econometrics of measurement error, and latent variables more generally, fruitfully interact.
- Factor models underlie the concepts of validity of measurements that are used in psychology.
4.A. Linear Factor Models

- Linear factor models are widely used in personality psychology and in psychometric models for mental test scores.
- We review the use of these models in psychology.
- Versions are already in widespread use in economics.
- To capture essential points, we abstract from a lot of the issues discussed in Section 3.
- We consider measurements arising from productivity in tasks.
- We thus focus solely on outputs of tasks, abstracting from actions, efforts, and situations.
- With suitable extensions of the notation used here, we can extend the factor model to the more general models discussed in Section 3.
We assume additive separability of the arguments of equation (1). The stripped down model writes task performance of person \( n \) on task \( j \) in the following manner:

\[
P_{n,j} = \mu_j + \lambda_j' T_n + \Delta_{n,j}, \quad n = 1, \ldots, N, \quad j = 1, \ldots, J, \quad (19)
\]

where \( \mu_j \) is the mean productivity in the \( j \)th task, \( \lambda_j \) is a vector of factor loadings, and \( \Delta_{n,j} \) is other determinants of measured performance, including measurement errors.
The number of components in $T_n$, $L$, has to be small relative to $J$ ($L \ll J$) if the factor model is to have any explanatory power.

Otherwise for each task one can create a unique factor and the model becomes tautological.

A purely cognitive task would be associated with zero values of the components of vector $\lambda_j$ on elements of $T_n$ that are associated with personality traits.
Factor model (19) captures the notions that: (a) latent traits $T_n$ generate a variety of outcomes, (b) task outputs are imperfect measures of the traits $(T_n)$ because $\Delta_{n,j}$ also determines task output, and (c) tasks other than tests or observer reports may also proxy the underlying traits, i.e., latent traits generate both test scores and behaviors.

A correlation of outcomes across tasks can arise because tasks depend on the same vector of traits.

Outcomes across tasks may be correlated even if the components of $T_n$ are not.
4.B. Discriminant and Convergent Validity

- In this simplified framework, most personality psychologists focus on observer- and self-reports as measures of $P_{n,j}$.
- The measurements are designed to capture a particular trait.
- As discussed in Section 3, the choice of which collection of tasks is used to measure a capability ("operationalization and construct validity") is an inherently subjective activity.
- Many psychologists take a pragmatic, empirical point of view.
- Traits are what the measurements used capture.
- The danger with this empiricist definition is that it offers no guide to the choice of measurements, which are usually settled by conventions or intuitions.
The concept of “discriminant validity” of a collection of tasks (e.g., a set of test scores or a set of observer reports or measurements of productivities) is commonly used to test for construct validity.

It exploits the notion that a particular battery of measurements captures a component of $T_n$, for example, $T_{n,l}$, and not other components.

Many measurements may be taken on $T_{n,l}$, and having multiple measurements helps to control for measurement error.
All measurements are really just outcomes on a type of task although the effort applied may vary greatly across tasks.

The literature in psychology usually assigns a special status to tests, self-reports, and observer-reports of latent traits, but also uses direct measures of productivity, such as supervisor ratings.

Behaviors, tests, observer reports, and self reports all can be used to proxy the underlying traits.

These include repeated measurements on the same types of assessment mechanisms as well as measurements on different behaviors and assessments that are assumed to be generated by common traits.
A standard approach to defining constructs in personality psychology is based on factor analysis.

It takes a set of measurements that are designed to capture a construct arrived at through intuitive considerations and conventions, and measures within-cluster and across-cluster correlations of the measurements to isolate latent factors $T_{n,l}, l = 1, \ldots, L$ or their distributions.

The measurements and clusters of tests are selected on intuitive grounds or a priori grounds, and not on the basis of any predictive validity in terms of real-world outcomes (for example, success in college, performance on the job, earnings). This process gave rise to the taxonomy of traits that became the Big Five.
Because of the somewhat arbitrary basis of these taxonomies, there is some controversy in psychology about competing construct systems which we discuss in Section 5.

In practice, as we document below, the requirement of independence of the latent factors across constructs (lack of correlation of tests across clusters) is not easily satisfied.

This fuels controversy among psychologists advocating competing taxonomies.
To state these issues more formally, let $P_{n,l}^q$ be the $q$th measurement on trait $l$ for person $n$.

Using a linear factor representation, the $q$th measurement of factor $l$ for person $n$ can be represented as

$$P_{n,l}^q = \mu_l^q + \lambda_l^q T_{n,l} + \epsilon_{n,l}^q,$$

$q = 1, \ldots, Q_l, n = 1, \ldots, N, l = 1, \ldots, L$ (20)

The factor $T_{n,l}$ is assumed to be statistically independent of the “measurement errors,” $\epsilon_{n,l}^q$, $q = 1, \ldots, Q_l$.

Different factors are assumed to be independent ($T_{n,l}$ independent of $T_{n,l'}$ for $l \neq l'$).

The measurement errors (or “uniquenesses”) are usually assumed to be mutually independent within and across constructs.
In fact, measurement $P_{n,l}^q$ may depend on other components of $T_n$, so that the measurement captures a composite of latent traits.

A more general case is

$$P_{n,l}^q = \mu_l^q + (\lambda^q)'T_n + \epsilon_{n,l}^q, \quad q = 1, \ldots, Q_l,$$

where $\lambda^q$ is a vector with possibly as many as L nonzero components.

The $\epsilon_{n,l}^q$ are assumed to be independent of $T_n$ and mutually independent within and across constructs ($l$ and $l'$ are two constructs).
The task has discriminant validity for trait $l$ if the only nonzero component of $\lambda^q$ is $\lambda^q_l$.

The $\mu^q_l$ and $\lambda^q_l$ can depend on measured characteristics of the agent, $Q_n$.

The task has convergent validity if measures within the construct are highly correlated.
More precisely, conventional psychometric validity of a collection of items or test scores for different constructs has three aspects.

(a) Factor $T_l$ for construct $l$ is statistically independent of factor $T_{l'}$ for construct $l' \neq l$, discriminant validity.

(b) A factor $T_l$ is assumed to account for the intercorrelations among the items or tests within a construct $l$.

(c) Item-specific and random error variance are low (intercorrelations among items are high within a cluster).

Criteria (b) and (c) define convergent validity.
4.C. Predictive Validity

- An alternative criterion for validating measurement systems is based on the predictive power of the tests for real world outcomes, that is, on behaviors measured outside of the exam room or observer system.

- The Hogan Personality Inventory, the California Personality Inventory, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory were all developed with the specific purpose of predicting real-world outcomes.

- Decisions to retain or drop items during the development of these inventories were based, at least in part, upon the ability of items to predict such outcomes.
This approach has an appealing concreteness about it.

Instead of relying on abstract a priori notions about domains of personality and subjectively defined latent factors generated from test scores and self and observer personality assessments, it anchors measurements in tangible, real-world outcomes and constructs explicit tests with predictive power.

Yet this approach has its own problems.
First, all measurements of factor $T_{n,l}$ can claim incremental predictive validity as long as each measurement is subject to error ($\epsilon_{n,l}^q \neq 0$).

Proxies for $T_{n,l}$ can appear to be separate determinants (or “causes”) instead of surrogates for an underlying one-dimensional construct or factor.

Thus suppose that measurement system (20) is the correct specification and that a set of measurements display both convergent and discriminant validity.

As long as there are measurement errors for construct $l$, there is no limit to the number of proxies for $T_{n,l}$ that will show up as statistically significant predictors of an outcome.

For this reason, it is necessary to correct for measurement error in using predictive validity to identify and measure traits.
A second problem with this approach to validation is reverse causality.

This is especially problematic when interpreting correlations between personality measurements and outcomes.

Outcomes may influence personality measures as well as the other way around.

For example, self-esteem might increase income, and income might increase self-esteem.
Measuring personality traits prior to measuring predicted outcomes does not necessarily solve this problem.

For example, the anticipation of a future pay raise may increase present self-esteem.
Psychologists sometimes address the problem of reverse causality by using early measures of traits determined well before the outcomes are measured to predict later outcomes.

This approach is problematic if the traits the analyst seeks to identify evolve over time and the contemporary values of traits drive behavior.

This practice trades a reverse causality problem with a version of an errors in variables problem.

Early measures of the traits may be poor proxies for the traits that drive measured current behavior.

In our review of the literature in Section 7, we distinguish studies that attempt to control for reverse causality and those that do not.
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] and Urzua [2008] demonstrate the importance of correcting for reverse causality arising from schooling affecting traits and traits affecting schooling in interpreting the effects of personality tests on a variety of socioeconomic outcomes.

Application of econometric techniques for determining the causal effects of factors on outcomes makes a distinctive contribution to psychology.
Many psychologists focus on prediction, not causality.

Establishing predictive validity will often be enough to achieve the goal of making personnel assignment and student placement decisions.

However, for policy analysis, including analyses of new programs designed to augment the skills of the disadvantaged, causal models are required in order to generate policy counterfactuals.
The papers of Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] and Cunha and Heckman [2008], develop frameworks for circumventing the problems that arise in using predictive validity to define and measure personality constructs.

These frameworks recognize the problem of measurement error in the proxies for constructs.

Constructs are created on the basis of how well latent factors predict outcomes not direct measures.

They develop frameworks for testing discriminant validity.

They allow the factors across different clusters of constructs to be correlated, and show how to test for the presence of correlations across the factors.
They use an extension of factor analysis to represent proxies for low-dimensional factors.

They test for the number of latent factors required to fit the data and rationalize the proxies.

Generalizing the analysis of Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004], Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] allow for lifetime experiences and investments to determine, in part, the coefficients of the factor model and to affect the factor itself.

They correct estimates of latent factors on outcomes for the effects of spurious feedback, and separate proxies from factors.

The factors are estimated to change over the life cycle as a consequence of experience and investment.

We review these studies in Sections 7 and 8.
4.D. Faking

- Measurements designed to proxy latent factors may be corrupted by “faking.”

- There are at least two types of false responses: those arising from impression management and those arising from self-deception (Paulhus [1984]).

- For example, individuals who know that their responses on a personality questionnaire will be used to make hiring decisions may deliberately exaggerate their strengths and downplay their weaknesses.

- Subconscious motives to see themselves as virtuous may produce the same faking behavior, even when responses are anonymous.
- It is possible to fake Conscientiousness on a self-report questionnaire whereas it is impossible to fake superior reasoning ability on an IQ test.
- To a lesser degree, a similar bias may also operate in cognitive tests.
- Persons who know that their test scores will affect personnel or admissions decisions may try harder.
The literature on “stereotype threat” shows that the framing of an achievement test can affect the performance of the test taker.

The effects of faking on predictive validity have been studied by psychologists, who conclude that distortions have surprisingly minimal effects on prediction of job performance.

Correcting for faking using scales designed to measure deliberate lying does not seem to improve predictive validity.

Nevertheless, when measuring cognitive and personality traits, as noted in Section 3, one should standardize for incentives and environment.
The linear factor model does not capture a variety of interesting interactions among traits.

Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] and the papers they cite develop a nonlinear non-normal factor analysis that allows for measurement errors to be correlated across measures and over time.

We report estimates based on their nonlinear factor analyses in Section 8.
4.E. The Causal Status of Latent Variables

- Some psychologists question the causal status of latent variables extracted from factor analyses of measurements across individuals.
- Such factor analytic studies summarize interindividual variation but do not necessarily inform analysts about the effects of exogenously changing the factor in producing outcomes across individuals.
- In addition, variations of traits within persons may have very different effects than variations across persons.
The distinction between the effects of changing traits within and across persons is traditional in econometrics.

Econometric models that capture this distinction could be fruitfully applied to psychology.

So can hierarchical linear models.
These methods do not address the deeper problem that most of the estimates of “the effects” of psychological traits on outcomes (either from “within” or “across” studies) have no causal status.

Structural equation methods have been used to estimate causal relationships using cross-person variation.

They rely on the usual toolkit of simultaneous equations exclusion restrictions to secure identification.

Standard experimental and econometric techniques for inferring causality from within person changes have only recently been applied to generate causal effects of personality.

We review this literature in Section 8.
5. Implementing the Measurement Systems

- How do psychologists measure individual differences?
- In this section we analyze the major measurement systems for cognition and personality and we examine their relative performance of measures of cognition and personality in predicting a variety of outcomes.
- For cognition, there is a fairly well-established set of terminologies and conventions.
- Aptitude tests are designed to measure differences in the rates at which individuals learn (i.e., fluid intelligence).
- Achievement tests are designed to measure acquired knowledge (i.e., crystallized intelligence).
For personality, a variety of alternative measurement systems are proposed and this is a source of confusion.

We attempt to compare and equate these systems of measurement.

We link them to measures of childhood temperament and psychopathology which are also used to describe individual differences.

We note that the problems of operationalization and construct validity are present in analyzing any measures of traits.
5.A. Cognition

- Intelligence (also called cognitive ability and general mental ability) is defined by psychologists to include the “ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought” (Neisser, Boodoo, Bouchard et al. [1996, p. 77]).

- These are clearly distinct traits, and the literature distinguishes more finely among them.
The term “IQ” is often used synonymously with intelligence but in fact refers specifically to scores on intelligence tests. Notwithstanding a century of active study and general agreement about the sorts of tasks on which more intelligent individuals perform better, the construct of intelligence “resists a consensual definition.”
Scores on different tests of cognitive ability tend to be highly correlated, with half or more of the variance of diverse tests accounted for by a single general factor labeled “g” and more specific mental abilities loading on other factors.

g is widely interpreted as general mental ability.

An extreme version of g-theory that is no longer widely accepted is that g accounts for all the correlation among different tests of cognition.
Psychometricians have expanded this notion to create a hierarchy of “orders.”

The order of a factor indicates its generality in explaining a variety of tests of cognitive ability deemed to satisfy construct validity.

Tests have different emphases (for example, verbal ability, numeracy, coding speed, and other tasks).

A first-order factor is predictive in all cognitive tasks, j = 1, ..., J in equation (19).

In modern parlance this general correlation is called “g,” but it is no longer viewed as the sole predictor of cognitive test scores.
A lower-order factor is predictive of performance in only some tasks.

Lower-order factors can be correlated with the higher-order factors and may be correlated with each other.

They have independent predictive power from the higher-order factors.

Figure 3 reports one possible partition of general intelligence due to Ackerman and Heggestad [1997], who summarize the work of Carroll [1993] on the multiple facets of intelligence.
Figure 3: An Hierarchical Scheme of General Intelligence and Its Components

Source: Recreated from Ackerman and Heggestad [1997].
Fluid vs. Crystallized Intelligence

- There is less agreement about the number and identity of lower-order factors.

- Carroll [1993] proposed a general intelligence factor (g) and several more specific second-order factors, including, but not limited to, what Cattell [1971/1987] dubbed crystallized and fluid intelligence.

- Crystallized intelligence, Cattell proposed, comprises acquired skills and knowledge and thus is partly dependent upon educational opportunity and motivation.

- Fluid intelligence, by contrast, is a general “relation-perceiving ability” (p. 138).
Cattell’s student Rindermann [2007] elaborates: “Fluid intelligence is the ability to “perceive complex relations, educe complex correlates, form concepts, develop aids, reason, abstract, and maintain span of immediate apprehension in solving novel problems in which advanced elements of the collective intelligence of the culture were not required for solution” (p. 462).

In contrast, crystallized intelligence is the same class of skills, “but in materials in which past appropriation of the collective intelligence of the culture would give one a distinct advantage in solving the problems involved” (p. 462).
Carroll [1993] and Horn and McArdle [2007] summarize the large body of evidence against the claim that a single factor g is sufficient to explain the correlation structure of achievement and intelligence tests.

Two pieces of evidence are worth highlighting.

First, crystallized intelligence tends to increase monotonically for most of the life cycle, whereas fluid intelligence tends to peak in very early adulthood then to decline.

Second, the well-known Flynn effect, which documents the population-wide increase in performance on intelligence tests over the past half-century, is particularly dramatic for measures of fluid intelligence but much smaller for measures of crystallized intelligence.

SAT scores have declined rather than increased over the same period, requiring a renorming in the 1990s.
The relative weighting of fluid versus crystallized intelligence varies among tests according to the degree to which prior experience is crucial to performance.

These second order factors are correlated with the first-order factor (g) but also contribute additional explanatory power to predicting some clusters of test score outcomes.

Achievement tests, like the Armed Forces Qualifying Test used by economists and psychologists alike, are heavily weighted towards crystallized intelligence, whereas tests like the Raven Progressive Matrices [1962] are heavily weighted towards fluid intelligence.

Several studies have shown that fluid intelligence is much more strongly related to g than are measures of crystallized intelligence.
Moreover, lay intuitions of intelligence (i.e., what most people mean by “being smart”) correspond more closely with the ability to learn than with possession of already acquired knowledge.

Thus, it seems to us useful to reserve the term “intelligence tests” for tests that primarily measure fluid intelligence, and the term “achievement tests” for tests that primarily measure crystallized intelligence.

Some would argue that g has been usurped by fluid intelligence.

A closer reading is that what is commonly meant by intelligence encompasses a number of distinct traits captured in the lower order factors of Figure 3.
Predictive Validity of Tests of Cognition

- How well do IQ and achievement tests predict success in life?
- This is a hard question to answer.
- Many different skills are required to achieve success in any task.
- Different tasks in life require different skills in different degrees.
Table 2 shows the domains of validation and the estimated validities of a number of widely used tests of cognition.

Notice that the domains of validation differ greatly.

For IQ tests, the validities are usually established by comparing test scores with other test scores or with grades in school and not success in life.

Nevertheless, it is well-established that standardized tests of ability and achievement predict objectively measured academic, occupational, and life outcomes.
The SAT college entrance exam is moderately successful in predicting grades in college which was what the SAT was designed to do.

However, high school grades are better predictors of college performance.

Geiser and Santelices [2007] The rival American College Test (ACT) is validated in a similar fashion but uses somewhat broader measures of college performance, such as grades in higher years of college rather than just freshman year grades.

The Graduate Record Exam is validated by performance in graduate school.

The Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) is validated by performance in the military.
Performance is measured by success in military training schools and performance standardized tasks like fixing a rifle or repairing a radio.

One can interpret The Bell Curve by Herrnstein and Murray and the flood of papers it stimulated as conducting validity studies of the AFQT using real world outcomes of the sort studied in Tables A1 and A2 in the Web Appendix.

The correlation of AFQT with wages is a moderate \( r = 0.3 \).

The General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) predicts success at work as measured by supervisor ratings in over 12,000 occupations and participation in training programs.
# Table 2: Predictive Validities of Various Tests of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>0.42</td>
<td>ACT Technical Manual</td>
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<td>Correlations with other intelligence tests</td>
<td>0.77 to 0.87 with WISC-R</td>
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<td>WISC (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children)</td>
<td>Correlations with academic achievement</td>
<td>WISC: 0.443 to 0.751 with WRAT tests, 0.482 to 0.788 with 1st grade grades, 0.462 to 0.794 with 2nd grade grades; WISC-R: 0.346 to 0.760 with WRAT tests, 0.358 to 0.537 with 1st grade grades, 0.420 to 0.721 with 2nd grade grades</td>
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<td>WAIS (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale)</td>
<td>Correlations with other intelligence tests, achievement tests, and outcomes</td>
<td>0.67 (median) with verbal tests, 0.61 (median) with nonverbal tests, 0.69 with education attained, 0.38 to 0.43 with college grades, 0.62 with high school grades, 0.14 with nursing Grades</td>
<td>Feingold [1982]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices</td>
<td>Correlations with other intelligence tests</td>
<td>0.74 to 0.84 with WAIS-R O'Leary, Rusch and Guastello [1991]</td>
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<tr>
<td>GED (General Educational Development)</td>
<td>Test difficulty is normed against graduating HS seniors. Test scores of high school seniors and grades of high school seniors</td>
<td>0.33 to 0.49 for HS Senior GPA</td>
<td>Technical Manual: 2002 Series GED Tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAT (Differential Aptitude Tests)</td>
<td>Correlations with academic achievement</td>
<td>0.13 to 0.62 for college GPA</td>
<td>Omizo [1980]</td>
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<td>WIAT (Wechsler Individual Achievement Test)</td>
<td>Correlation with other achievement tests; teacher ratings of student achievement</td>
<td>0.80 with grade 4 CAT/2, 0.69 with grade 5 CAT/2, 0.83 with grade 6 CAT/2; 0.67 with teacher ratings</td>
<td>Michalko and Saklofske [1996]</td>
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5.B. Personality Traits

- We have noted in Sections 2 and 3 that sharp contrasts between cognition and personality are not easy to make.

- Consider, for example, the so-called “quasi-cognitive” traits (Kyllonen, Walters and Kaufman [2005]).

- These include creativity (Csikszentmihalyi [1996]), emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey [1997]), cognitive style (Stanovich [1999]; Perkins and Tishman [2001]), typical intellectual engagement (Ackerman and Heggestad [1997]), and practical intelligence (Sternberg, Forsythe, Hedlund et al. [2000]).
Furthermore, the Big Five factor of Openness to Experience has as facets curiosity ("ideas") and imagination ("fantasy") that are often associated with intellect and measured intelligence (McCrae and Costa [1997a]; Noftle and Robins [2007]).

(See the entries under Openness in Table 3.)

We note in Section 5.C that personality can affect performance on tests of fluid intelligence.

Personality traits also affect acquired skills and knowledge (i.e., crystallized intelligence).

A general pattern is higher correlation of personality tests with tests of crystallized knowledge (e.g., achievement tests).

For many personality traits and for measures of cognition that are based on fluid intelligence, the correlations are close to zero, as we note below.
Finally, consider the construct of executive function.

“Cognitive control” and “executive function” are terms used interchangeably, primarily in the neuroscience literature.

Both have been defined as the voluntary, effortful blocking of a habitual behavior in order to execute a less familiar behavior (Matsumoto and Tanaka [2004]).

Some authors (e.g., Gray [2004]) also use the terms “cognitive control” and “self-control” interchangeably, though self-control is traditionally considered a personality trait rather than an aspect of cognition.

While tasks requiring executive function are related to questionnaire measures of self-control, the size of these associations is only about $r = 0.11$ to $0.14$. (Duckworth and Schulze [2009]).
A region of the brain called the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), in conjunction with the nearby region called the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), are now understood as responsible for “executive control” over lower order processes.

That is, executive control entails top-down, intentional control of behavior and is not necessary for the performance of simple, automatic tasks (Miller and Cohen [2001]).

The PFC achieves structural and functional maturity later than other (e.g., sensorimotor) brain regions (Casey, Tottenham, Liston et al. [2005]).
Specific executive functions attributed to the PFC include abstract reasoning, planning, decision making, working memory (the ability to keep the facts of a problem at hand), attention, conflict monitoring, task switching, and inhibition of prepotent (i.e., dominant, habitual) impulses.

While many functions have been attributed to the PFC, Miller [2000] notes that “there is little agreement on the cardinal prefrontal functions” (p. 449).

Nevertheless, there is some consensus that one can distinguish between working memory on the one hand, and response inhibition and task switching on the other (Garon, Bryson and Smith [2008], Miyake, Friedman, Emerson et al. [2000]).
This distinction is important because working memory is highly related to performance on measures of fluid intelligence.

(Being able to have access to all of data about a problem is helpful in solving it.)

Thus, working memory is a common component of the constructs of both executive function and general intelligence.
While the construct of executive function demonstrates the inadequacy of terms such as “cognitive” and “non-cognitive”, many personality traits nevertheless are conceptually and empirically easily distinguished from general cognitive ability.

Most personality traits are in fact very weakly correlated with IQ (Webb [1915]; McCrae and Costa [1994]; Stankov [2005]; Ackerman and Heggestad [1997]).

Thus, regardless of the terms used to describe individual differences that determine life outcomes, one thing is clear: human ability entails more than intelligence.

Personality traits, however defined, do matter, and they have independent predictive power from standard measures of intelligence.
5.C. Operationalizing the Concepts

- Intelligence tests are routinely used in a variety of settings including business, education, civil service, and the military.

- Psychometricians attempt to use test scores to measure a factor (a component of \( T \) in the notation of Section 4).

- The working hypothesis in the intelligence testing business is that specific tests measure only a single component of \( T \), and that tests with different “content domains” measure different components.

- We first discuss the origins of the measurement systems for intelligence and we then discuss their validity.
Modern intelligence tests have been used for just over a century, beginning with the decision of a French minister of public instruction to identify retarded pupils in need of specialized education programs.

In response, Alfred Binet created the first IQ test.

Other pioneers in intelligence testing include Cattell [1890] and Galton [1883], both of whom developed tests of basic cognitive functions (for example, discriminating between objects of different weights).

These early tests were eventually rejected in favor of tests that attempt to tap higher mental processes.

Terman [1916] adapted Binet’s IQ test for use with American populations.
Known as the Stanford-Binet IQ test, Terman’s adaptation was, like the original French test, used primarily to predict academic performance.

Stanford-Binet test scores were presented as ratios of mental age to chronological age multiplied by 100.

IQ scores centered at 100 as the average are now conventional for most intelligence tests.
Wechsler [1939] noted two major limitations of the Stanford-Binet test.

First, it was overly reliant on verbal skills and, therefore, dependent upon formal education and cultural exposure.

Second, the ratio of mental to chronological age was an inappropriate metric for adults (Boake [2002]).

Wechsler created a new intelligence test battery divided into verbal subtests (e.g., similarities) and performance subtests (e.g., block design, matrix reasoning).

He also replaced the ratio IQ score with deviation scores that have the same normal distribution at each age.
This test, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and, later, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) produces two different IQ subscores, verbal IQ and performance IQ, which sum to a full-scale IQ score.

The WAIS and the WISC have for the past several decades been by far the most commonly used IQ tests.
Similar to Wechsler’s Matrix Reasoning subtest, the Raven Progressive Matrices test is a so-called “culture-free” IQ test because it does not depend heavily on verbal skills or other knowledge explicitly taught during formal education.

Each matrix test item presents a pattern of abstract figures.

The test taker must choose the missing part.

If subjects have not had exposure to such visual puzzles, the Raven test is an almost pure measure of fluid intelligence.

However, the assumption that subjects are unfamiliar with such puzzles is not typically tested.

It is likely that children from more educated families or from more developed countries have more exposure to such abstract puzzles (Blair [2006]).
Our view is that to varying degrees, IQ and achievement tests reflect fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and personality factors, such as motivation, to succeed on the test.

We offer evidence on the effect of motivation on test scores below.
5.D. Personality Constructs

- Dominant theories of personality assume a hierarchical structure analogous to that found for intelligence.

- However, despite early efforts to identify a g for personality (for example, Webb [1915]), even the most parsimonious personality models incorporate more than one factor.

- The most widely accepted taxonomy of personality traits is the Big Five.

- The Big Five factors are obtained from conventional factor analysis using a version of (19) where the “tests” are measures of different domains of personality based on observer reports or self reports.
The five-factor model has its origins in Allport and Odbert’s [1936] lexical hypothesis, which posits that the most important individual differences are encoded in language.

Allport and Odbert combed English dictionaries and found 17,953 personality-describing words, which were later reduced to 4,504 personality-describing adjectives.

Subsequently, several different psychologists working independently and on different samples concluded that personality traits can be organized into five superordinate factors.
Table 3 presents the Big Five factors that were discussed in Section 2.

It summarizes the 30 lower-level facets (six facets for each of five factors) identified in the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R, Costa and McCrae [1992b]).

The acronym is shorthand for Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness to Experience Personality Inventory Revised.

Of course, these lower-level facets (e.g., “impulsive”) can be further subdivided into even more narrow traits (“impulsive about junk food,” “impulsive about smoking”).
The more narrowly defined a trait, the more specific are the contexts in which the trait is predictive.

In parentheses in the third column of this Table, we have included a strongly related trait adjective.

In the fourth column of Table 3, we present other traits in each family.

In the fifth column, we relate the Big Five to children’s temperament traits studied by developmental psychologists.
Table 3: The Big Five domains and their facets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Big Five Personality Factor</th>
<th>American Psychology Association Dictionary description</th>
<th>Facets (and correlated trait adjective)</th>
<th>Related Traits</th>
<th>Childhood Temperament Traits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conscientiousness</td>
<td>“the tendency to be organized, responsible, and hardworking”</td>
<td>Competence (efficient) Order (organized) Dutifulness (not careless) Achievement striving (ambitious) Self-discipline (not lazy) Deliberation (not impulsive)</td>
<td>Grit Perseverance Delay of gratification Impulse control Achievement striving Ambition Work ethic</td>
<td>Attention/(lack of) distractibility Effortful control Impulse control/delay of gratification Persistence Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to Experience</td>
<td>“the tendency to be open to new aesthetic, cultural, or intellectual experiences”</td>
<td>Fantasy (imaginative) Aesthetic (artistic) Feelings (excitable) Actions (wide interests) Ideas (curious) Values (unconventional)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Sensory sensitivity Pleasure in low-intensity activities Curiosity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: The Big Five domains and their facets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extraversion</th>
<th>“an orientation of one’s interests and energies toward the outer world of people and things rather than the inner world of subjective experience; characterized by positive affect and sociability”</th>
<th>Warmth (friendly)</th>
<th>Surgency</th>
<th>Social dominance</th>
<th>Social vitality</th>
<th>Sensation seeking</th>
<th>Shyness*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gregariousness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Activity (energetic)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive emotionality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(sociable)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Excitement seeking (adventurous)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive emotionality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assertiveness (self-confident)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Activity (energetic)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ambitious)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-discipline (not lazy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deliberation (not impulsive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeableness</td>
<td>“the tendency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner”</td>
<td>Trust (forgiving)</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>Perspective taking</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
<td>Irritability*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Straight-forwardness (not demanding)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Altruism (warm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aggressiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compliance (not stubborn)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Modesty (not show-off)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tender-mindedness (sympathetic)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuroticism/</td>
<td>Emotional stability is “predictability and consistency in emotional reactions, with absence of rapid mood changes.” Neuroticism is “a chronic level of emotional instability and proneness to psychological distress.”</td>
<td>Anxiety (worrying)</td>
<td>Internal vs. External</td>
<td>Locus of control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Stability</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hostility (irritable)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Depression (not contented)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-consciousness (shy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Impulsiveness (moody)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vulnerability to stress (not self-confident)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Facets specified by the NEO-PI-R personality inventory (Costa and McCrae [1992b]). Trait adjectives in parentheses from the Adjective Check List (Gough and Heilbrun [1983]). * These temperament traits may be related to two Big Five factors. Source: Table adapted from John and Srivastava [1999].
Temperament is the term used by developmental psychologists to describe the behavioral tendencies of infants and children.

Because individual differences in temperament emerge so early in life, these traits have traditionally been assumed to be biological (as opposed to environmental) in origin.

However, findings in behavioral genetics suggest that, like adult personality, temperament is only partly heritable, and as discussed in Section 8, both adult and child measured traits are affected by the environment.
Temperament is studied primarily by child and developmental psychologists, while personality is studied by adult personality psychologists.

The past decade has seen some convergence of these two research traditions, however, and there is evidence that temperamental differences observed during the preschool years anticipate adult personality and interpersonal functioning decades later (for example, Caspi [2000]; Newman, Caspi, Moffitt et al. [1997]; Shiner and Caspi [2003]).

Column 5 of Table 3 displays temperament traits that have been associated both theoretically and empirically with adult personality traits.
Historically, many temperament researchers examined specific lower-order traits rather than broader, higher-level factors that characterize studies of adult intelligence and personality.

Shiner [1998] suggests that “there is therefore a great need to bring order to this vast array of studies of single lower-level traits” (p. 320).

Recently, taxonomies of temperament have been proposed that group lower-order traits into higher-order dimensions; several of these taxonomies resemble the Big Five (for example, John, Caspi, Robins et al. [1994]; Putnam, Ellis and Rothbart [2001]; Rothbart, Ahadi and Evans [2000]; Shiner and Caspi [2003]).

However, compared to adults, there seem to be fewer ways that young children can differ from one another.
Child psychologists often refer to the “elaboration” or “differentiation” of childhood temperament into the full flower of complex, adult personality.

The lack of direct correspondence between measures of temperament and measures of adult personality presents a challenge to researchers interested in documenting changes in personality over the full life cycle.

Developing the required measures is an active area of research.
Alternatives to the Big Five

- The Five-Factor model is not without its critics.
- Alternative systems have been proposed.
- For example, Eysenck [1991] offers a model with just three factors (i.e., Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Psychoticism).
- Cloninger [1987] and Tellegen [1985] offer different three-factor models.
- Figure 4 shows the commonalities across some competing taxonomies and also areas of divergence.
Solutions with more factors can increase the prediction of outcomes including job performance, income, and change in psychiatric status (Mershon and Gorsuch [1988]).

On the other hand, more parsimonious models in which the five factors are reduced to two “metatraits” have also been suggested (Digman [1997]).

In addition to these controversies, the facet-level organization of any given Big Five factor is subject to debate and controversy.
**Figure 4: Competing taxonomies of personality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evensck Big Three</th>
<th>Costa &amp; McCrae NEO-PRF Big Five</th>
<th>Tellegen MPQ</th>
<th>Zuckerman</th>
<th>Cloninger</th>
<th>Big Nine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neuroticism</td>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>Negative Emotionality</td>
<td>Neuroticism-Angry</td>
<td>Harm Avoidance</td>
<td>Adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Stress reaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>Low self-esteem</td>
<td>Self-consciousness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High self-esteem</td>
<td>Tense</td>
<td>Impulsiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>Irritable</td>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mood</td>
<td>Self-centered</td>
<td>Aggression</td>
<td>Aggression-Hospitality</td>
<td>Cooperativeness</td>
<td>Agreeableness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impulsivity</td>
<td>Impulsiveness</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
<td>Self-Directedness</td>
<td>Dependability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Achievement striving</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalism</td>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraversion</td>
<td>Sensation-seeking</td>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>Positive emotion</td>
<td>Reward Dependence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensation-seeking</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>Well-being</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Sociable</td>
<td>Gregariousness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgent</td>
<td>Lively</td>
<td>Assertiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careful</td>
<td>Sociable</td>
<td>Positive emotions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertive</td>
<td>Lively</td>
<td>Assertiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>Positive emotions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>Fantasy</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fantasy</td>
<td>Aesthetics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings</td>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td>Values</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figure reproduced from Bouchard and Loehlin [2001], with kind permission from Springer Science and Business Media.
Recent research suggests that the rush to accept the Big Five may be premature.

The first studies of the Big Five were based primarily on English speaking samples.

And, although the Big Five structure appears to replicate across many cultures (McCrae and Costa [1997b]), studies of more diverse cultures show that taxonomies known as the Big Six (Ashton, Lee, Perugini et al. [2004]) or the Multi-Language Seven (ML7; Saucier [2003]), may better represent the personality domain.

While they add one or two dimensions to the Big Five and shift the meaning of the Big Five slightly, they are, however, not very different from the Big Five.
One of the most stinging criticisms of the Five-Factor model is that it is atheoretical (Block [1995]).

It is derived from factor analysis of a variety of measures without any firm biological underpinnings.

While research is under way on determining the neural substrates of the Big Five (see Canli [2006] and DeYoung, Hirsh, Shane et al. [2010]), the finding that descriptions of behavior as measured by tests, self-reports, and reports of observers cluster reliably into five groups has not so far been satisfactorily explained by any scientifically grounded theory.
• Some psychologists suggest that the categories are too crude to be useful.

• Estimates based on the Big Five factors obscure relationships between specific facets of the Big Five and outcomes.

• Given that each Big Five factor is a composite of distinct facets, the predictive validities are diluted when analyses consider only factor-level aggregate scores.

• For instance, Paunonen and Ashton [2001] compared Big Five Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience with two related facets, need for achievement and need for understanding.

• In each comparison, the lower-level facet predicted course grades among undergraduates better than its higher-level factor measure.
• The Five-Factor model is largely silent about motivation.

• In the notation of Section 3, $\psi$ parameterizes preferences and goals.

• The omission of motivation (that is, what people value or desire) from measures of Big Five traits is not complete, however.

• The NEO-PI-R, for example, includes as a facet “achievement striving”. Individual differences in motivation were more prominent in older (now rarely used) measures of personality.

• The starting point for Jackson’s Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson [1974]), for example, was Murray’s [1938] theory of basic human drives.
Included in the PRF are scales for (need for) play, order, autonomy, achievement, affiliation, social recognition, and safety.

The Schwartz Values Survey (Schwartz [1992]) is another self-report measure of motivation which yields scores on ten different motivations including power, achievement, benevolence, and conformity.

Some motivation theorists believe that one’s deepest desires are unconscious and, therefore, may dispute the practice of measuring motivation using self-report questionnaires (see McClelland, Koestner and Weinberger [1989]).

For a brief review of this debate and an overview of how motivation and personality trait measures differ, see Roberts, Harms, Smith et al. [2006].
A practical problem facing the analyst who wishes to measure personality is the multiplicity of personality questionnaires.

The proliferation of personality measures reflects, in part, the more heterogeneous nature of personality in comparison to cognitive ability, although, as we have seen, various types of cognitive ability have been distinguished in the literature.

The panoply of measures and constructs also points to the relatively recent and incomplete convergence of personality psychologists on the Big Five model, as well as the lack of consensus among researchers about identifying and organizing lower-order facets of the Big Five factors (see DeYoung, Quilty and Peterson [2007] and Hofstee, de Raad and Goldberg [1992]).
For example, some theorists argue that impulsivity is a facet of Neuroticism (Costa and McCrae [1992b]), others claim that it is a facet of Conscientiousness (Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark et al. [2005]), and still others suggest that it is a blend of Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and perhaps Neuroticism (Revelle [1997]).

Figure 4 shows in italics facets of the Big Five whose classifications are under question.

One reason for the proliferation of measures is the variety of alternative methodologies for verifying tests discussed in Section 4 which are not guaranteed to produce the same taxonomies.
5.D.1. Self-Esteem and Locus of Control are related to Big Five Emotional Stability

- The traits of self-esteem and locus of control deserve special attention since they are collected in large-sample longitudinal studies used by economists.

- They are not part of the traditional Big Five typology.

- However, they can be related to it.
Self-esteem refers to an individual’s subjective estimation of his or her own worth.

An example item from the widely-used Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg [1989]) asks respondents to indicate their agreement with the statement, “I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.”

Locus of control refers to one’s belief about whether the determinants of one’s life events are largely internal or external.
Those with an internal (as opposed to external) locus of control believe that life events are typically caused by their own actions.

An example item from the widely-used Rotter Locus of Control Scale (Rotter [1966]) requires respondents to choose between “Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck” and “People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.”
For the most part, researchers who study self-esteem and locus of control have carried out their work in isolation of each other and without reference to the Big Five taxonomy.

However, Judge and colleagues (Judge, Bono, Erez et al. [2005]; Judge, Erez, Bono et al. [2002]; Judge and Hurst [2007]) have proposed that locus of control, self-esteem, and Big Five Emotional Stability are indicators of a common construct, termed core self-evaluations.
They point out that measures of these three traits, as well as generalized self-efficacy (the belief that one can act effectively to bring about desired results) demonstrate high convergent validity, poor discriminant validity, and poor incremental predictive validity.

Positive core self-evaluations indicate a generally positive and proactive view of oneself and one’s relationship to the world.

Accordingly, we have, in Table 3, associated aspects of core self-evaluations with the Big Five factors of Neuroticism and Emotional Stability.
5.D.2. Relating the Big Five to Measures of Psychopathology

- Extreme manifestations of personality traits may be a form of mental illness.
- Thus, a very conscientious person may be viewed as an obsessive compulsive person.
- It is of interest to consider how psychopathology may be characterized using the Big Five.
Psychopathology is defined by the APA dictionary as “patterns of behavior or thought processes that are abnormal or maladaptive.”

Used interchangeably with the terms mental illness and mental disorder, psychopathology is primarily studied by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

Historically, the study of psychopathology was carried out in near complete isolation from the study of “normal” variation in personality.

Very recently, however, several attempts have been made to integrate taxonomies of psychopathology and normal personality into a single framework.
In particular, a compelling argument can be made for conceptualizing of and measuring mental disorders as extreme variants of personality traits (see Krueger and Eaton [2010] and ensuing commentary).

This approach is quite revolutionary in the study of psychopathology in at least two ways.

First, it takes a dimensional as opposed to categorical characterization of mental disorders.

By a dimensional approach, psychologists mean that traits lie on an underlying continuum and are not discrete valued.

Second, the recent research relies upon structural validity (e.g., evidence of convergent and discriminant validity) rather than historical path dependency (e.g., diagnoses that persist because they are familiar to clinicians who learned about them during their training).
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association distinguishes between Axis I disorders, which are acute disorders requiring clinical attention (e.g., depression, schizophrenia) and Axis II disorders, 10 personality disorders that are more chronic and, generally, less impairing of overall functioning.

Research has documented that Big Five Neuroticism is a non-specific correlate of various Axis I disorders, and that various other reliable associations can be documented (e.g., the positive emotionality facet of Extraversion is associated with bipolar disorder); however, the direction of causality is difficult to ascertain in what have typically been cross-sectional studies (Bagby, Bindseil, Schuller et al. [1997]; Cloninger, Svrakic, Bayon et al. [1999]; Gunderson, Triebwasser, Phillips et al. [1999]).
Twin studies demonstrate that the shared variance in mental disorders and personality traits is predominantly genetic, that is, common genetic antecedents give rise to certain mental disorders and personality traits.
More research has examined relations between Axis II disorders and normal personality variation.

Several authors have proposed a Big Four taxonomy (the Big Five minus Openness to Experience).

Watson, Clark and Chmielewski [2008] proposed that a fifth factor called Oddity is needed to model traits related to eccentricity.

Others have argued that the Big Five structure itself, without modification, can account for Axis II personality disorders (Widiger and Costa Jr. [2002]; Widiger, Trull, Clarkin et al. [2002]).
For instance, Widiger, Trull, Clarkin et al. [2002] suggest that all Axis II personality disorders can be “translated as maladaptively extreme variants of the 30 facets” of the NEO-PI-R, a widely used Big Five personality inventory.

More recently, Samuel and Widiger [2008] completed a meta-analytic review of the relationships between facets of the NEO-PI-R and Axis II personality disorders which we reproduce in Table 4.

Notably, personality disorders relate to multiple facets spanning more than one Big Five factor.
Table 4: Independent weighted mean effect size correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FFM facet</th>
<th>Paranoid</th>
<th>Schizoid</th>
<th>Schizotypal</th>
<th>Antisocial</th>
<th>Borderline</th>
<th>Histrionic</th>
<th>Narcissistic</th>
<th>Avoidant</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Obsessive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N Anxiousness</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry hostility</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depressiveness</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-consciousness</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impulsiveness</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Warmth</td>
<td>−0.28</td>
<td>−0.42</td>
<td>−0.28</td>
<td>−0.13</td>
<td>−0.20</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>−0.35</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregariousness</td>
<td>−0.20</td>
<td>−0.48</td>
<td>−0.25</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>−0.42</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>−0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertiveness</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>−0.22</td>
<td>−0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>−0.39</td>
<td>−0.21</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>−0.25</td>
<td>−0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>−0.29</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
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<td>Excitement seeking</td>
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<td>−0.01</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<td>Values</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
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<td>−0.31</td>
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<td>−0.37</td>
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<td>−0.11</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>−0.19</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.17</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Competence</td>
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<td>−0.18</td>
<td>−0.21</td>
<td>−0.29</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>Order</td>
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<td>−0.18</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
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<td>−0.03</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutifulness</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>−0.29</td>
<td>−0.22</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
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<td>Achievement striving</td>
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<td>−0.13</td>
<td>−0.19</td>
<td>−0.19</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.19</td>
<td>−0.16</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-discipline</td>
<td>−0.14</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
<td>−0.18</td>
<td>−0.25</td>
<td>−0.29</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberation</td>
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<td>−0.13</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All values larger than $r = 0.04$ are significant at $p < 0.05$; correlations larger than 0.20 are marked in boldface type. Underlined values indicate those for which the assumption of homogeneity of variances was rejected. Source: Reproduced from Samuel and Widiger [2008].
5.E. IQ and Achievement Test Scores Reflect Incentives and Capture Both Cognitive and Personality Traits

- We now elaborate on the discussion of Section 3 on the difficulty of isolating a pure measure of intelligence.
- Performance on intelligence and achievement tests depends in part on personality traits of the test taker, as well as their motivation to perform.
- A smart child unable to sit still during an exam or uninterested in exerting much effort can produce spuriously low scores on an IQ test.
Almost 40 years ago, several studies called into question the assumption that IQ tests measure maximal performance (that is, performance reflecting maximal effort).

These studies show that among individuals with low IQ scores, performance on IQ tests could be increased up to a full standard deviation by offering incentives such as money or candy, particularly on group-administered tests and particularly with individuals at the low-end of the IQ spectrum.

Engaging in complex thinking is effortful, not automatic (Schmeichel, Vohs and Baumeister [2003]), and therefore motivation to exert effort affects performance.
Zigler and Butterfield [1968] found that early intervention (nursery school, for example) for low-SES kids may have a beneficial effect on motivation, not on cognitive ability per se. 

In their study, the benefits of intervention (in comparison to a no-treatment control group) on IQ were not apparent under testing conditions where motivation to perform well were maximized.

Raver and Zigler [1997] present further evidence on this point.

Table 5 summarizes evidence that extrinsic incentives can substantially improve performance on tests of cognitive ability, especially among low-IQ individuals.
Table 5: Incentives and Performance on Intelligence Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Sample and Study Design</th>
<th>Experimental Group</th>
<th>Effect size of incentive (in standard deviations)</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edlund [1972]</td>
<td>Between subjects study. 11 matched pairs of low SES children; children were about one standard deviation below average in IQ at baseline</td>
<td>M&amp;M candies given for each right answer</td>
<td>Experimental group scored 12 points higher than control group during a second testing on an alternative form of the Stanford Binet (about 0.8 standard deviations)</td>
<td>“…a carefully chosen consequence, candy, given contingent on each occurrence of correct responses to an IQ test, can result in a significantly higher IQ score.” (p. 319)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Sample 1</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample 2</strong></td>
<td>Within subjects study. 12 mentally retarded children (avg IQ 46.8)</td>
<td>Tokens given in experimental condition for right answers exchangeable for prizes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample 3</strong></td>
<td>Within subjects study of 12 matched pairs of mentally retarded children</td>
<td>Six weeks of token reinforcement for good academic performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clingman and Fowler [1976]</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample 1</strong></td>
<td>Within subjects study of 72 first- and second-graders assigned randomly to contingent reward, noncontingent reward, or no reward conditions.</td>
<td>M&amp;Ms given for right answers in contingent condition; M&amp;Ms given regardless of correctness in noncontingent condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample 2</strong></td>
<td>Within subjects study 34 urban fourth graders (avg IQ = 92.8)</td>
<td>Tokens given in experimental condition for right answers exchangeable for prizes</td>
</tr>
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“…test scores often reflect poor academic skills, but they may also reflect lack of motivation to do well in the criterion test…These results, obtained from both a population typically limited in skills and ability as well as from a group of normal children (Experiment II), demonstrate that the use of reinforcement procedures applied to a behavior that is tacitly regarded as “at its peak” can significantly alter the level of performance of that behavior.” (p. 483)
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<td>6.25 points out of a possible 51 points on the Metropolitan Readiness Test. t = 4.03 “…test scores often reflect poor academic skills, but they may also reflect lack of motivation to do well in the criterion test…These results, obtained from both a population typically limited in skills and ability as well as from a group of normal children (Experiment II), demonstrate that the use of reinforcement procedures applied to a behavior that is tacitly regarded as “at its peak” can significantly alter the level of performance of that behavior.” (p. 483)</td>
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<td>Tokens given in experimental condition for right answers exchangeable for prizes</td>
<td>3.67 points out of a possible 51 points on a post-test given under standard conditions higher than at baseline; control group dropped 2.75 points. On a second post-test with incentives, exp and control groups increased 7.17 and 6.25 points, respectively. “…test scores often reflect poor academic skills, but they may also reflect lack of motivation to do well in the criterion test…These results, obtained from both a population typically limited in skills and ability as well as from a group of normal children (Experiment II), demonstrate that the use of reinforcement procedures applied to a behavior that is tacitly regarded as “at its peak” can significantly alter the level of performance of that behavior.” (p. 483)</td>
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<td>M&amp;Ms given for right answers in contingent cdt; M&amp;Ms given regardless of correctness in noncontingent condition</td>
<td>Only among low-IQ (&lt;100) subjects was there an effect of the incentive. Contingent reward group scored about 0.33 standard deviations higher on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary test than did no reward group. “…contingent candy increased the I.Q. scores of only the ‘low I.Q.’ children. This result suggests that the high and medium I.Q. groups were already functioning at a higher motivational level than children in the low I.Q. group.” (p. 22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Methodology Description</th>
<th>Motivation Description</th>
<th>Baseline Difference Description</th>
<th>Performance Impact</th>
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<tr>
<td>Zigler and Butterfield [1968]</td>
<td>Within and between subjects study of 52 low SES children who did or did not attend nursery school were tested at the beginning and end of the year on Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test under either optimized or standard conditions.</td>
<td>Motivation was optimized without giving test-relevant information. Gentle encouragement, easier items after items were missed, and so on.</td>
<td>At baseline (in the fall), there was a full standard deviation difference (10.6 points and SD was about 9.5 in this sample) between scores of children in the optimized vs standard conditions. The nursery group improved their scores, but only in the standard condition.</td>
<td>“…performance on an intelligence test is best conceptualized as reflecting three distinct factors: (a) formal cognitive processes; (b) informational achievements which reflect the content rather than the formal properties of cognition, and (c) motivational factors which involve a wide range of personality variables. (p. 2) “…the significant difference in improvement in standard IQ performance found between the nursery and non-nursery groups was attributable solely to motivational factors…” (p. 10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Breuning and Zella [1978] Within and between subjects study of 485 special education high school students all took IQ tests, then were randomly assigned to control or incentive groups to retake tests. Subjects were below-average in IQ. Incentives such as record albums, radios (<$25) given for improvement in test performance. Scores increased by about 17 points. Results were consistent across the Otis-Lennon, WISC-R, and Lorge-Thorndike tests. “In summary, the promise of individualized incentives contingent on an increase in IQ test performance (as compared with pretest performance) resulted in an approximate 17-point increase in IQ test scores. These increases were equally spread across subtests… The incentive condition effects were much less pronounced for students having pretest IQs between 98 and 120 and did not occur for students having pretest IQs between 121 and 140.” (p. 225)
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<tr>
<th>Author</th>
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<th>Results</th>
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</tr>
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<th>Result Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holt and Hobbs [1979]</td>
<td>Between and within subjects</td>
<td>Exp 1 - Token reinforcement for correct responses; Exp 2 – Tokens forfeited for incorrect responses (punishment), Exp 3 - feedback on correct/incorrect responses</td>
<td>1.06 standard deviation difference between the token reinforcement and control groups (inferred from ( t = 3.31 ) for 39 degrees of freedom)</td>
<td>“Knowledge of results does not appear to be a sufficient incentive to significantly improve test performance among below-average I.Q. subjects...Immediate rewards or response cost may be more effective with below-average I.Q. subjects while other conditions may be more effective with average or above-average subjects.” (p. 83)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zigler and Butterfield [1968] Within and between subjects study of 52 low SES children who did or did not attend nursery school were tested at the beginning and end of the year on Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test under either optimized or standard conditions. Motivation was optimized without giving test-relevant information. Gentle encouragement, easier items after items were missed, and so on.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Source</th>
<th>Design Type</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Incentive Description</th>
<th>Performance Description</th>
<th>Reasons for Lack of Dramatic Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Larson, Saccuzzo, and Brown [1994]</td>
<td>Between subjects study</td>
<td>109 San Diego State University psychology students</td>
<td>Up to $20 for improvement over baseline performance on cognitive speed tests</td>
<td>“While both groups improved with practice, the incentive group improved slightly more.”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(p.34)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$F(1,93) = 2.76, p &lt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 reasons why incentive did not produce dramatic increase: 1) few or no unmotivated subjects among college volunteers, 2) information processing tasks are too simple for ‘trying harder’ to matter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duckworth [2007]</td>
<td>Within subjects study</td>
<td>61 urban low-achieving high school students tested with a group-administered Otis-Lennon IQ test during their freshman year, then again 2 years later with a one-on-one (WASI) test</td>
<td>Standard directions for encouraging effort were followed for the WASI brief test. Performance was expected to be higher because of the one-on-one environment.</td>
<td>Performance on the WASI as juniors was about 16 points higher than on the group-administered test as freshmen. Notably, on the WASI, this population looks almost “average” in IQ, whereas by Otis-Lennon standards they are low IQ. $t(60) = 10.67, p &lt; 0.001$</td>
<td>The increase in IQ scores could be attributed to any combination of the following 1) an increase in “g” due to schooling at an intensive charter school, 2) an increase in knowledge or crystallized intelligence, 3) an increase in motivation due to the change in IQ test format, and/or 4) an increase in motivation due to experience at high performing school</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Segal [2008] shows that introducing performance-based cash incentives in a low-stakes administration of the coding speed test of the Armed Services Vocational Battery (ASVAB) increases performance substantially among roughly one-third of participants.

Men with lower levels of Conscientiousness are particularly affected by incentives.

Segal’s work and a large body of related work emphasize heterogeneity in the motivations that affect human performance.

Borghans, Meijers and ter Weel [2008] show that adults spend substantially more time answering IQ questions when rewards are higher, but subjects high in Emotional Stability and Conscientiousness are less affected by these incentives.
They already operate at a high level even without these incentives.

Similarly, Pailing and Segalowitz [2004] find that an event-related potential (ERP) indexing the emotional response to making an error increases in amplitude when incentives are offered for superior test performance.

This effect is smaller for individuals high in Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability.
Thus, IQ scores do not accurately reflect maximal intellectual performance for individuals who are low in Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability.

Performance on IQ tests encodes, in part, how effective persons may be in application of their intelligence, that is, how people are likely to perform in a real-world setting.

However, it is far from obvious that motivation on an exam and motivation in a real-world situation are the same.
Like low motivation, test anxiety can significantly impair performance (Hembree [1988]).

That is, subjects do worse when they worry excessively about how they are performing and when their autonomic nervous system over-reacts by increasing perspiration, heart rate, and so on.

Because individuals who are higher in Big Five Neuroticism are more likely to experience test anxiety, there is another reason, beyond incentives, why Emotional Stability can impact IQ scores (Moutafi, Furnham and Tsaousis [2006]).
Many IQ tests require factual knowledge acquired through schooling and life experience, which are, in part, determined by the motivation, curiosity, and persistence of the test taker.

Thus, personality traits can also affect IQ scores indirectly through the knowledge acquired by individuals who are higher in Big Five Openness to Experience and Big Five Conscientiousness.

Cunha and Heckman [2008] show a correlation between cognitive and personality factors of the order of $r = 0.3$. 
Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004], and Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] show how schooling and other acquired traits substantially causally affect measured cognitive and personality test scores.

We discuss this research in Section 8.

Cattell’s 1971 investment theory [1971] anticipates recent findings that knowledge and specific complex skills depend not only on fluid intelligence but also on the cumulative investment of effort and exposure to learning opportunities.
How, then, should one interpret a low IQ score?

Collectively, the evidence surveyed here suggests that IQ test performance reflects not only pure intelligence, but also personality traits (including anxiety), intrinsic motivation, and reactions to extrinsic incentives to perform well, as indicated in our discussion of Section 3.

It also reflects the knowledge acquired up to the date of the test, which reflects personality and motivational traits that affect the acquisition of knowledge.
The relative impurity of IQ tests likely varies from test to test and individual to individual.

Little effort to date has been made to standardize the context and incentives of tests.

To capture pure intelligence, it is necessary to adjust for incentives, motivations, and context in which the measurements are taken, using the framework discussed in Section 3.
Just as personality traits and incentives can affect IQ scores, they can also affect standardized achievement tests that are commonly used as proxies for pure intelligence.

Figure 5 and Figure 6, below, show how scores on two achievement tests, the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) and the Differential Aptitudes Test (DAT), are decomposed into IQ and personality (personality in these figures is measured by locus of control and self-esteem).

A substantial portion of the variance in both the AFQT score and DAT scores is independently explained by these two facets of personality.

The variance explained is less than the variance independently explained by IQ scores, but it is still substantial.
Furthermore, the facets are incrementally valid in that they explain the variance above and beyond the variance that IQ explains when all three are included in a regression.

These findings caution the interpretation that these commonly used tests proxy mental ability.

They likely proxy aspects of personality as well.

Ironically, the measure of intelligence used by Herrnstein and Murray in The Bell Curve to predict a variety of social and economic outcomes is substantially affected by personality measures.

We discuss evidence about personality and standardized achievement tests further in Section 7.
Figure 5: (A) AFQT Score Decomposed by IQ, Self-Esteem and Locus of Control

Notes: The data come from the NLSY. Rosenberg, and Rotter were administered in 1979. The ASVAB was administered in 1980. To account for varying levels of schooling at the time of the test, scores have been adjusted for schooling at the time of the test conditional on final schooling using the method developed in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004]. AFQT is constructed from the Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Numeric Operations, and Paragraph Comprehension ASVAB subtests. DAT and DAT percentile, IQ, and GPA are from high school transcript data. IQ is pooled across several IQ tests using IQ percentiles. GPA is the individual’s core-subject GPA from each year of school. Sample excludes the military over-sample. Background variables include mother’s highest grade completed, father’s highest grade completed, southern residence at age 14, urban residence at age 14, living in a broken home at age 14, receiving newspapers in the household at age 14, receiving magazines in the household at age 14, and the household having a library card at age 14. Top 50% and Bottom 50% are based on AFQT scores from the population representative sample of NLSY79. Sample restricted to the non-military sub-sample.

Source: Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2010].
Figure 5: (B) AFQT Score Decomposed by IQ, Self-Esteem and Locus of Control

Notes: The data come from the NLSY. Rosenberg, and Rotter were administered in 1979. The ASVAB was administered in 1980. To account for varying levels of schooling at the time of the test, scores have been adjusted for schooling at the time of the test conditional on final schooling using the method developed in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004]. AFQT is constructed from the Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Numeric Operations, and Paragraph Comprehension ASVAB subtests. DAT and DAT percentile, IQ, and GPA are from high school transcript data. IQ is pooled across several IQ tests using IQ percentiles. GPA is the individual's core-subject GPA from each year of school. Sample excludes the military over-sample. Background variables include mother's highest grade completed, father's highest grade completed, southern residence at age 14, urban residence at age 14, living in a broken home at age 14, receiving newspapers in the household at age 14, receiving magazines in the household at age 14, and the household having a library card at age 14. Top 50% and Bottom 50% are based on AFQT scores from the population representative sample of NLSY79. Sample restricted to the non-military sub-sample.

Source: Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2010].
Figure 6: DAT Score Decomposed by IQ, Self-Esteem and Locus of Control

Notes: The data come from the NLSY79. Rosenberg and Rotter were administered in 1979. The ASVAB was administered in 1980. To account for varying levels of schooling at the time of the test, scores have been adjusted for schooling at the time of the test conditional on final schooling using the method developed in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004]. AFQT is constructed from the Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Numeric Operations, and Paragraph Comprehension ASVAB subtests. DAT and DAT percentile, IQ, and GPA are from high school transcript data. IQ is pooled across several IQ tests using IQ percentiles. GPA is the individual’s core-subject GPA from each year of school. Sample excludes the military over-sample. Background variables include mother’s highest grade completed, father’s highest grade completed, southern residence at age 14, urban residence at age 14, living in a broken home at age 14, receiving newspapers in the household at age 14, receiving magazines in the household at age 14, and the household having a library card at age 14. Sample restricted to the non-military sub-sample.
Source: Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2010].
Since the publication of Mischel’s [1968] book, psychologists have addressed the situational specificity hypothesis, i.e., the hypothesis that situations help explain variations across people in actions, effort and behavior.

Boiled down to its essence, this hypothesis says little more than that situations affect actions and efforts in a nonlinear fashion, i.e., that in equations (13)-(15), situational variables enter in a nonlinear fashion.

This interaction effect gives rise to the Mischel-Shoda [1995] “if-then” relationship.
An important paper by Epstein [1979] defines stability of personality generated by traits across situations using measurements that average across tasks.

He notes that in the presence of nonlinearities, agents with the same traits will take different actions in different situations.

In four different studies, he presents compelling empirical evidence that, averaging over tasks and situations at a point in time, persons act in a predictable fashion with a high level of reliability ($R^2$ of 0.6-0.8) of average behavior (“measured personality”) across situations.

He uses a variety of measures based on objective behavior, self ratings, and ratings by others.

He also establishes consistency (high levels of correlation) across the different types of measures.
In any given situation, personality may not play a particularly powerful role but averaging over many situations, stable patterns emerge.

Fleeson [2001] and Moskowitz [1982] present additional evidence on this question.

Fleeson and Noftle [2008] summarize a substantial body of evidence on the stability of behaviors across tasks and situations, and the evidence of consistency of different measurements of personality (e.g., self reports, observer reports).
In one of the most ambitious recent studies of this question, Borkenau, Mauer, Riemann et al. [2004] establish a correlation of 0.43 of personality traits measured by the Big Five (self rated and observer rated) across 15 very different tasks.

The range of correlations is from 0.51 to 0.29.

Wood and Roberts [2006] present further evidence on the persistence of traits across a variety of situations.

Roberts [2009] provides a valuable overview of the latest research.
Funder [2008] provides another useful overview of the debate and the evidence on the existence of a stable personality trait that at a point in time predicts behavior in a variety of different situations.

Mischel’s [1968] claim that there is no stable personality trait across situations does not hold up against a large array of data.

Virtually all papers in that special issue acknowledge the existence of stable personality traits whose manifestations are tempered by situations and incentives.

The editors summarize the main message of the collected papers with the following words: “All personality psychologists should be unified when it comes to asserting that personality differences are worthy of scientific study, that individual differences are more than just error variance and that not all behavior is simply a function of the situation” Lucas and Donnellan [2009, p. 147]
6. Personality and Preference Parameters

- Measures of personality predict a wide range of life outcomes that economists study.

- However, the latent nature of traits makes it difficult to relate them to economic models.

- Since personality psychologists define traits as relatively stable, person-specific determinants of behavior, preferences are the natural counterpart of these traits in economics.

- Preferences are also, at least in most models, unaffected by changes in constraints.

- While personality might relate to preferences, the exact link is unclear.
Do preferences generate measured personality?

Does personality generate preferences?

Or are both generated from other, deeper parameters?

The model in Section 3 links latent preferences to measured personality.

This section reviews the empirical evidence linking preferences and personality and discusses the conceptual differences between the two.
Overall, the links between measures of personality and preferences are largely unexplored.

However, some evidence suggests that social preferences link to the Big Five.

The link between traditional preferences, such as risk aversion and time discounting, and personality remain largely unknown.

Personality measures might allow economists to broaden the dimensions of preferences and could potentially resolve some apparent inconsistencies in observed choices.
6.A. Evidence on preference parameters and corresponding personality measures

- The features of preferences that receive the most attention in the economics literature—time discounting, risk aversion, leisure preference, and social preferences—seem to have analogues in the psychology literature.
Table 6: Standard preference parameters and conceptually similar measures in the psychology literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference parameter</th>
<th>Personality measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time preference</td>
<td>Conscientiousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self-control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>affective mindfulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>consideration of future consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>elaboration of consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>time preference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk aversion</td>
<td>Impulsive sensation seeking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balloon Analogue Risk Task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure Preference</td>
<td>Achievement Striving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industriousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social preference</td>
<td>Warmth</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gregariousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Altruism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tender-mindedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hostility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 presents an overview of measures of personality which conceptually relate to preference parameters in economics.

The table includes measures as well as latent factors (see Section 4).
Psychologists have used experiments to elicit time preference and risk preference since the 1960’s, see, e.g., Mischel, Ayduk, Berman et al. [2010] and Slovic [1962].

A recent example is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez, Read, Kahler et al. [2002]), a computer game in which participants make repeated choices between keeping a certain smaller monetary reward and taking a chance on an incrementally larger reward.
In addition to the experimental measures, it is tempting to try to map preferences to more vaguely defined traits.

Time preference seems to relate to Conscientiousness, self-control, and consideration of future consequences.

Risk aversion seems related to Openness to Experience and impulsive sensation seeking, a trait proposed by Zuckerman, Kolin, Price et al. [1964], defined as “the tendency to seek novel, varied, complex, and intense sensations and experiences and the willingness to take risks for the sake of such experience.”
Preferences for leisure may be related to several personality measures.

The Big Five includes an Achievement Striving subscale of Conscientiousness, which describes ambition, the capacity for hard work, and an inclination toward purposeful behavior.

Jackson’s Personality Research Form [1974] includes an achievement scale measuring the aspiration to accomplish difficult tasks and to put forth effort to attain excellence, as well as an endurance scale, measuring willingness to work long hours and perseverance in the face of difficulty, and a play scale, measuring the inclination to participate in games, sports, and social activities “just for fun.”

Industriousness has been proposed as one of six facets of Conscientiousness (Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark et al. [2005]).
Social preferences also have conceptual analogues in the personality literature.

- Warmth and gregariousness are facets of Extraversion; trust, altruism, and tender-mindedness are facets of Agreeableness; and hostility is a facet of Neuroticism.
Despite this intuitive mapping of preferences to traits, the empirical evidence is still weak.

The few studies investigating empirical links typically report only simple regressions or correlations without discussing an underlying model.

Some use survey and self-report measures similar to those used by psychologists rather than elicited preferences.

Table 7 gives an overview of papers investigating the links.
### Table 7: Overview of empirical studies of the links between preferences and traits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferences</th>
<th>Personality measure</th>
<th>Empirical study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Preference</td>
<td>Conscientiousness, Self-control, Affective mindfulness, Elaboration of consequences, Consideration of future consequences.</td>
<td>Daly, Delaney and Harmon [2009]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraversion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Preference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neuroticism, ambition, Agreeableness</td>
<td>Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2009]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balloon Analogue Risk Task</td>
<td>Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky et al. [2003]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Preferences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
<td>Neuroticism, Agreeableness</td>
<td>Ashton, Paunonen, Helmes et al. [1998], Osiński [2009], Bekkers [2006]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness</td>
<td>Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2008]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Openness, Conscientiousness</td>
<td>Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2008]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The evidence relating personality to time preferences is mixed.

Using data from an experiment involving college students, Daly, Delaney and Harmon [2009] find that a factor that loads heavily on self-control, consideration of future consequences, elaboration of consequences, affective mindfulness, and Conscientiousness, is negatively associated with the discount rate.

Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010] measure time preferences experimentally, and while time preference is related to cognition, Openness to Experience is the only Big Five trait that explains some of the variation in time preference.

Figure 7 reports correlations between experimental measures of time preference, Big Five factors, and measures of cognition.

Here only cognitive measures are correlated with time preference.
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010] find that Openness to Experience and Agreeableness are related to risk aversion.

Figure 7 reports correlations between risk aversion, Big Five and measures of cognition.

Openness to Experience is correlated with risk aversion.

There is little evidence on risk aversion and sensation seeking, but Eckel and Grossman [2002] include it as a control in a study of risk aversion and find no statistically significant effect.
Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2009] show that risk-aversion is positively associated with Neuroticism, which contains measures of fear and strong emotional responses to bad outcomes.

They also find that risk aversion is negatively associated with ambition, a trait which may involve investment in uncertain opportunities.

Further, Agreeableness is positively associated with risk aversion.
The links between social preferences and the Big Five traits is better established.

Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2008] use an experimentally validated survey measure of trust and find that Conscientiousness and Neuroticism are negatively associated with trust, whereas Agreeableness and Openness to Experiences are positively associated with trust.

Agreeableness and Conscientiousness are associated with more positive reciprocity and less negative reciprocity, whereas Neuroticism is associated with more negative reciprocity.
In sum, while many measures of personality and preferences seem conceptually related, the empirical associations are not uniform across studies, and often the measures of preference are uncorrelated with intuitively similar personality traits.

The empirical links between preference parameters and personality traits depend on the data used.
Figure 7: Pairwise Correlations between Time Preference (Impatience), Risk Tolerance, Personality, and Cognitive Ability for Males and Females

Notes: *statistically significant at the 10 percent level; **statistically significant at the 5 percent level; ***statistically significant. O-Openness to Experience; C-Conscientiousness; E-Extraversion; A-Agreeableness; N-Neuroticism. The value in each box is the pairwise correlation. Darker shaded boxes have lower p-values. The measures of the Big Five are based on 3 questions each. The measures of cognitive ability (symbol test and word test) are based on timed modules similar to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). Time preference and risk tolerance were elicited through a real-stakes experiment.

Source: The data come from Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010], available online. The calculations were conducted by the authors.
6.B. Mapping preferences into personality

- Despite some plausible empirical and conceptual links between preferences and traits, a precise mapping between the measures is not yet available.
- In Section 3, we argued that measured personality is generated by underlying preference parameters and constraints.
However, the preferences measured by economists are often chosen to ensure identification on particular types of data on choices and may be misspecified.

Further, studies documenting relationships between preferences and traits typically only study correlations without being motivated by an underlying model.

Hence causal claims are, at this stage, largely premature.

There are two main reasons for the disconnect between measures of personality and measures of preferences.
First, economists typically study marginal rates of substitution, measured over relevant ranges via observed choices.

Personality psychologists typically do not study these tradeoffs and often do not measure choices.

Most approaches to measuring preferences in economics, whether observational or experimental, use some variation of revealed preference given observed choices.

In contrast, psychologists typically use surveys to elicit preferences, information, or "typical" actions.
Some questions elicit how respondents would feel about a given outcome, without presenting an alternative outcome.

While such questions may elicit some (unspecified) feature of preferences, it is not clear what is being measured.

The difference in approach makes it intrinsically difficult to compare economic and psychological measures.
Second, traditional preference parameters may not span the entire space of human decisions measured by psychologists.

Time, risk, social, and leisure preferences may not capture the only tradeoffs in life.

While time preference, risk aversion, leisure preference, and social preference have analogues in psychology, many personality psychologists do not perceive self-control and delay of gratification, risk-taking behavior and sensation-seeking, and motivation and ambition as the most important aspects of human decision making.
Economists typically make strong simplifying assumptions to make their models tractable and to secure identification.

The estimated parameters are used to build models, evaluate policy, and create counterfactuals.

The most widely used specifications of tradeoffs are through parameterizations assuming separability, and assume that marginal rates of substitution are summarized by one or two parameters.
Personality psychologists do not have the same incentives as economists to describe behavior by simple specifications as they are often content to stop with rich descriptions and do not use their estimated relationships in subsequent policy analyses.

Thus, they allow for a more complex range of behaviors.

The choice of measured traits is large and often defies a simple, tractable, explanation.

As discussed in the previous sections, to economists these often appear to be arbitrary.
6.C. Do measured parameters predict real world behavior?

- One test of the stability of measured preferences is whether they predict behavior in other contexts.

- Several recent studies have investigated whether risk preference predicts behavior.

- For example, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2011], use an experimentally validated measure of risk preference in the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and find that it predicts self-reported risky behaviors, such as holding stocks, being self-employed, participating in sports, and smoking, but it does not predict as well as a survey question about willingness to take risks in general.
However, the observed relationship might arise because both the self-reported behaviors and questions about willingness to take risk are noisy contemporaneous survey measures.

Barsky, Juster, Kimball et al. [1997] measure risk tolerance, time preference, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and find that risk tolerance predicts smoking and drinking, holding insurance and stock, and decisions to immigrate and be self-employed.

However, measures of risk tolerance only explain a small fraction of the variation in risky behaviors.
Benz and Meier [2008] compare measures of social preferences with charitable giving in a field experiment and find that experimental measures do not predict real life behavior well.

Levitt and List [2007] and List [2009] discuss the more general discrepancy between results from the lab and the field and argue that this is not necessarily because people behave inconsistently, but because experimenters are not controlling for relevant aspects of the choice situation.

This is just a rehash of the old person-situation debate.

Falk and Heckman [2009] present a different interpretation of the value of experiments.

We discuss the evidence below.
6.D. Integrating traits into economic models

- Behavioral economics has incorporated some aspects of personality psychology to investigate how standard models of preferences can be improved to better reflect reality.
- Behavioral economics has highlighted many so-called anomalies, ways in which standard preferences do not accurately describe human behavior.
- We can divide these attempts into two main approaches.
First, behavioral economists have tried to improve models of behavior by developing more flexible functional forms for preferences.

Below we discuss some of the now standard examples, such as loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting, and reciprocity.

These are not anomalies with respect to rationality, but are examples that challenge standard models of preferences.

For example, the time inconsistent actions induced by hyperbolic discounting defined below, are often described as "errors", but they are not.

The agent is simply optimizing non-standard preferences.
Second, behavioral economists have introduced the concept of bounded rationality.

These are behaviors for which there is no reasonable preference specification that can rationalize a behavior.

They are called anomalies or biases relative to conventional economic choice frameworks.

Examples include failure to predict the winner’s curse, mental accounting, framing effects, failure to apply Bayesian updating, and default effects.

We think of these as mental constraints, or traits, along the lines of the models discussed in Section 3.

However, these examples are consistent with evidence reviewed below on the interaction between cognitive ability and preference parameters.
Note that while some of the nonstandard features of preferences may seem compelling, the higher level of generality tends to make it difficult to identify the parameters in the data commonly used by economists.

See the discussion in Hansen [2005].
6.D.1. Traits as constraints

- Preference measurements that do not account for all of the constraints that agents face might be biased.

- In the model of personality in Section 3, we describe how agents act based on both preference parameters and productive traits that embody constraints.

- The marginal rate of substitution is typically identified through price variation.

- However, the true price ratio might also depend partly on the unobserved traits of the individual.

- Failure to account for the traits that reflect constraints could lead to bias.
The empirical literature has focused on the interaction between cognition and preference parameters.

Virtually all methods of estimating time preference assume that respondents are equally numerate, but Peters, Vastfjall, Slovic et al. [2006] show that this assumption is often untrue.

Furthermore, more numerate individuals are less susceptible to framing effects and draw stronger and more precise affective meaning from numbers and comparisons using numbers.
The confound with numeracy may explain why more intelligent (or educated) individuals often display lower discount rates when decisions require complex calculations to compare subtly different delays or reward amounts (for example, de Wit, Flory, Acheson et al. [2007]; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010]) but does not shed light on why smarter individuals also have lower discount rates when choosing between relatively simple cash sums (Funder and Block [1989]) and between non-cash rewards (such as smaller vs. larger candy bars in Mischel and Metzner [1962]).

A meta-analysis by Shamosh and Gray [2007] of 24 studies in which both IQ and discount rates were measured shows the two traits are inversely related ($r = -0.23$).
The complexity entailed by comparing the present and future values of rewards suggests that the inverse relationship between discount rates and intelligence is not just an artifact of measurement.

One explanation for this could be that cognitive ability is related to the ability to direct attention.

Daly, Delaney and Harmon [2009] find that lower discount rates are associated with cognitive mindfulness, which includes the ability to control attention.
Further, an individual with poor working memory and low intelligence may not be capable of accurately calculating or even perceiving the value of a deferred reward.

At the least, making such calculations is more effortful (that is, costly) for individuals of low cognitive ability.

If the cost of making calculations exceeds the expected benefit of such deliberation, the individual may choose by default the immediate, certain reward.

However, it is important to be aware of reverse causality, since more patient individuals may also invest more in cognitive ability.
Measures of cognitive constraints also relate to measured risk preference.

There is an inverse relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion, where higher-IQ people have higher risk tolerance (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010]).

Reference dependence can lead subjects to be susceptible to framing because they will perceive two identical lotteries differentially when one is framed as a loss and the other is framed as a gain.
Some evidence suggests that individuals with higher cognitive ability and education are less risk averse.

Burks, Carpenter, Goette et al. [2009] find that higher IQ individuals are more consistent in their choices between a lottery and fixed sums.

They hypothesize that agents with higher cognitive ability can better translate their preferences into choices between lotteries.
Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2010] find that while risk aversion is related to personality traits, ambiguity is not.

In particular, IQ does not explain how subjects choose between a risky and an ambiguous urn.
6.D.2. Traits as preferences

- Some aspects of traits may be more naturally thought of as aspects of preferences than as constraints.
- For example, Openness to Experience might relate to a preference for learning and Extraversion might reflect a preference for social interactions.
- The distinction between preferences and constraints often seems tautological.
- One way of incorporating personality into preferences is by modifying functional forms, which fall into two broad and sometimes overlapping categories.
First, some of the domains which are traditionally treated as fundamentally different, such as risk and time preference, social and risk preference, and leisure and time preference, may be closely related and generated from a common set of psychological traits.

Second, nonseparabilities could confound measures of tradeoffs.

The literature on addiction presents an interesting class of nonseparable models.

So does the literature on exotic preferences in economics.
Multidimensionality

- Marginal rates of substitution are often assumed to be generated by only one or two parameters, for example the discount factor and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.

- This facilitates identification given sparse data, and, if it is a sensible specification of preferences, it gives a convenient description of behaviour.

- However, one or two parameters may not describe behaviour well.

- Conversely, some of the concepts analyzed separately in the literature may be governed by the same parameters.
In discussing the concept of time discounting, Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue [2002] argue that time preference has three dimensions: impulsivity, the tendency to act spontaneously and without planning; compulsivity, the tendency to stick with plans; and inhibition, the ability to override automatic responses to urges or emotions.

There may be multiple interpretations of this assertion.
First, the tradeoff between different time periods might be described by several parameters.

Second, impulsivity, inhibition, and compulsivity might reflect constraints, i.e., as something that affects shadow prices of consumption in different time periods.

Third, the relevant tradeoff might not be between different time periods but, for example in the case of impulsivity, might be between various levels of sensation seeking, a behavior which is also related to risk seeking.
Like time preference, risk preference may depend on multiple parameters.

As noted by Rabin [2000], the simple expected utility framework does not explain risk aversion over small stakes, since it would imply an implausibly high curvature of the utility of wealth function.

See Starmer [2000] for a review of the literature on departures from expected utility.

When psychologists started measuring risk taking behavior, they were puzzled by the large variance across domains (see the discussion of situational specificity in Section 2).
More recently, Weber [2001] shows that risk preference varies by domain, and a scale that assesses risk taking in five different domains shows low correlations across these domains (Weber, Blais and Betz [2002]).

One can be quite risk-averse when it comes to financial decisions but risk-loving when it comes to health decisions (Hanoch, Johnson and Wilke [2006]).

Weber’s risk-return model of risk taking (Weber and Milliman [1997]; Weber and Hsee [1998]) finds that low correlations among risk-taking preference across domains can be explained by domain-specific perceptions of riskiness and return.

Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2011] find that a survey question on willingness to take risks within a domain predicts self-reported behaviors within each domain.
Einav, Finkelstein, Pascu et al. [2010] also find that there are domain-specific components of risk-taking behavior.

Domain specificity might arise because sensation-seeking, enjoyment of risk per se, is an important aspect of risk preferences.
Ambiguity aversion, the disutility from model uncertainty, might help explain some apparent inconsistencies.

Ambiguity aversion is measured as the tradeoff between lower expected return and higher model uncertainty.

Ambiguity aversion explains Ellsberg’s paradox: people tend to prefer an urn with a .5 probability of winning to an urn with an unknown probability where they are allowed to choose which side to bet on.
One version of preferences over ambiguity is due to Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989].

They specify max-min preferences, where the agent maximizes an expected utility function which has been minimized with respect to the prior probabilities, i.e., \( U(X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_K) = \min_{\pi_1, \pi_2, \ldots, \pi_K} \pi_1 u(X_1) + \pi_2 u(X_2) + \ldots + \pi_K u(X_K) \).

Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2009] measure ambiguity aversion and risk aversion in a group of Dutch high school students and show that this aspect of choice is distinct from risk aversion.
There is no consensus on how social preferences govern choices.

Social preferences refer to any explanation for non-selfish behavior, usually as measured in a dictator game where people have to divide a sum between themselves and another person.

Typically, more than 60 percent of proposers give positive amounts, averaging 20 percent of the sum.

A variation of this game is the classic ultimatum game in which a giver divides a sum between himself and another subject, the receiver, and the other subject can accept or decline the sum.

If he declines, both will lose their money.
Studies typically find that receivers decline if offered less than 20 percent.

These results cannot be explained by pure selfishness.

In the dictator game, the giver is willing to forgo his own consumption in order to increase another person’s consumption, and in the ultimatum game, the receiver is willing to forgo his own consumption in order to decrease the giver’s consumption if he pays him too little.

Many studies seek to find deeper traits that govern these behaviors, such as preferences over the utility of oneself compared to others, efficiency, and fairness.
The notion of fairness covers various concepts, including equality and rewards in proportion to talent, effort, kindness, or intentions.

For reviews of this literature, see List [2009], and Camerer and Fehr [2004].
In the linear, separable model, where each good $X_i$ is the consumption of person $i$, we can think of the weights as caring or altruism, the fact that people often care about other people’s utility or consumption.

See Meier [2007] for a review.

Fehr and Schmidt [1999] analyze inequality aversion in which people dislike inequality rather than valuing the consumption or utility of agents per se.
Caring and altruism have been shown to decrease with social distance.

People typically care more about themselves than about others, and they are less altruistic the less well they know other people.

The social preference of reciprocity has been studied.

Fehr and Gächter [2000], and Falk and Fischbacher [2006] present evidence on reciprocity and conditional cooperation, in which agents act in a pro-social or antisocial manner depending on the behavior of others with whom they interact.

People exert positive reciprocity if they tend to reward others for kindness but negative reciprocity if they tend to punish others for unkindness.
More precisely, they are willing to incur a cost in order to reward or punish others.

Falk and Fischbacher [2006] develop a theory of reciprocity where utility depends on the kindness of others, which is a function not only on the outcome from the another person’s action, but also on the perceived intentions.
Reciprocity then reflects how much value a person puts on rewarding kindness.

Economists could model these features by letting the person-specific weights on the subutilities depend on social distance and past actions of others.

Reciprocity is often measured using a gift-giving game where the proposer offers a wage to a responder, who then subsequently chooses a level of effort.
However, List [2009] argues that the importance of fairness preferences may have been overstated in the literature, that many of the observed results are due to concerns over either reputation or scrutiny by experimenters.

Several studies have shown that observed reciprocity fades over a longer time frame than the short duration of lab experiments (Gneezy and List [2006], Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach and Sadrieh [2010], Kube, Marchal and Puppe [2006]).

Andreoni’s [1995] warm glow model of altruism suggests that people do not care about others, but value the act of giving.
Inequality aversion is distinct from caring in the sense that A’s utility may be decreasing in B’s consumption if it is higher than A’s.

(See Fehr and Schmidt [2006] for a review.)

Fehr and Schmidt [1999] suggest the following asymmetric specification for the utility of agent $n$:

\[
U_n (X_1, \ldots, X_j, \ldots, X_n, \ldots, X_K) = X_n - \alpha_n \frac{1}{K-1} \sum_{j \neq n} \max |X_j - X_n, 0| - \beta_n \frac{1}{K-1} \sum_{j \neq n} \max |X_n - X_j, 0|
\]

where the weights satisfy $\beta_n \leq \alpha_n$ and $0 \leq \beta_n \leq 1$. 

In this case, the MRS changes from 1 to -1 at $X_A = X_B$.

People place a higher weight on own consumption compared to others’, but when asked about the distribution of rewards in games where subjects do not have any interest in the outcome, preferences vary greatly.
People seem to be more accepting of inequality if they believe that it represents a difference earned through effort more than from differences in exogenously given talent.

(See Tausch, Potters and Riedl [2010] for a review.)

This finding may be related to the notion of reciprocity.

The distinction may be whether the preference is for people who have earned their reward for doing something “for me” or something admirable in general.
While some aspects of preferences seem to be multidimensional, some preference parameters reflect the same underlying trait.

For example, the social preference of “trust” relates to risk aversion and reciprocity.

Altmann, Dohmen and Wibral [2008] measure trust as the willingness to give money to an investor in a trust game where he will only be repaid if the investor decides to return the favor.

In this game, one can think of trust as the belief about how own actions affect those of others.

They find that trust and positive reciprocity are positively related.
Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2008] find that most people exert positive reciprocity; positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity are only weakly correlated; and people who are negatively reciprocal are less willing to trust others.

In situations involving trust, it seems natural that trust is closely related to risk and ambiguity aversion, that a person who is more prone to accept uncertainty is also more likely to trust others.

Altmann, Dohmen and Wibral [2008] also find that people who are less risk averse are also more willing to trust.

However, they do not measure which beliefs the agents hold.
Great care has to be taken in separating trust from risk aversion.

We demonstrate below how an additively separable model imposes observational equivalence between risk and social preferences.

Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak et al. [2005] find that people who receive oxytocin exhibit more trusting behavior in a real-stakes trust game.

Oxytocin, however, does not make subjects more generous, suggesting that trust is not simply altruism.

Additionally, oxytocin does not affect people’s decision over risky outcomes when playing against a computer rather than a human.
Combined, these findings suggest that there is a unique characteristic that affects willingness to trust, distinct from altruism and risk aversion.

Fehr [2009] posits that this missing element might be “betrayal aversion.”

Using survey data from Germany, Fehr [2009] finds that risk preferences, betrayal aversion, and altruism (as expressed through volunteering) predict people’s self-reported willingness to trust others.
Nonseparabilities

- The most restrictive version of the additively separable model suggests that the marginal rate of substitution between two goods does not depend on the consumption of other goods.

- Browning, Hansen and Heckman [1999] provide considerable evidence against this assumption.

- Apparent inconsistencies can arise if nonseparability is ignored.

- Further, estimates will suffer from omitted variable bias.

- See Section A6.D in the web appendix for a discussion of additive separability.
Barsky, Juster, Kimball et al. [1997] find no evidence that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is correlated with risk tolerance.

However, the sample on which they measure these parameters is small.

Green and Myerson [2004] argue that risk and time belong to different underlying psychological processes.

As evidence, they point out that the two constructs react differently to the same effect: for example, an increase in the size of reward generally decreases the discount on time but increases the discount rate when rewards are probabilistic.

This is evidence against the standard intertemporally separable model of risk aversion.
One type of nonseparability is between goods and the state or time period.

The additively separable model allows for this type of dependence, represented by the subscript \( v \) on the utility function.

While exponential discounting is still the most common representation of time preferences, experiments show that people tend to put higher weight on the present than on future periods, the motivation for hyperbolic discounting.
The most often used specification is \((\beta, \delta)\)-preferences where \(\beta\) is the usual discount factor while \(\delta\) is an additional discounting of all future periods.

\[
U_v (X_v, X_{v+1}, \ldots) = u(X_v) + \delta \beta u(X_{v+1}) + \delta \beta^2 u(X_{v+2}) + \cdots
\]

The consequence of these preferences is that the tradeoff between period \(v\) and period \(v + 1\) is not evaluated the same way from the perspective of period \(v - 1\) and period \(v\), leading to time inconsistency.
Other possibilities are that the discount rates change with age.  

Hyperbolic and age-dependent discounting makes use of the subscript $v$ on the utility function.  

We may think of an agent in multiple periods as several agents who play a game with each other.  

The agent today might account for what future agents might do.  

Further, discount rates appear to vary inversely with the size of reward and vary with the type of reward offered.
As previously noted, the expected utility form for risk preferences does not explain risk preferences over small stakes, as argued by Rabin [2000].

If subutility functions represent utility of lifetime wealth in different states, people should be approximately risk neutral for small stakes.

However, people often avoid more than fair small bets.

If this is explained by expected utility, then the curvature of the utility of wealth function would have to be implausibly high.

Kahneman and Tversky [1979] suggest that people are loss averse, i.e., that losses weigh higher than gains in the utility function.
This would imply that people have state-dependent preferences, which can be expressed as

\[ U_n(X_1, X_2, ...X_n, ...X_K) = \pi_1 u(X_1 - X_n) + \pi_2 u(X_2 - X_n) + ...\pi_K u(X_K - X_n) \]

where \( n \) is the current state, and where \( u'(y) \) is higher for negative \( y \) than for positive \( y \).

Note that this specification is very similar to that of inequality aversion discussed above.

Both models share the feature that people do not have stable preferences over levels, but over differences.
The concepts of loss aversion, reference point dependence, and endowment effects (Thaler [1980], Kahneman and Tversky [1979]) are variations on this theme.

If an agent has had an object in his possession for even a short amount of time, it affects how he trades it off against other goods.

List [2003] has shown that this effect disappears when agents have market experience.

However, loss aversion will interact with many choices in life, for example, how agents evaluate lotteries.
Reference point dependence has also been demonstrated in dictator games.

In the standard dictator game, the first player, the “dictator,” is given a positive endowment and can choose to transfer some of it to a second player at which point the game ends.

Numerous studies have shown that most dictators transfer a positive amount, even though they have no monetary incentive to do so.

List [2007] and Bardsley [2008] modified the standard dictator game by allowing dictators to take part of the second player’s endowment.

With this modification, most dictators did not transfer positive amounts to the second player.
Experimental measures of social preferences vary greatly across studies.

Levitt and List [2007] and List [2009] argue that the degree of scrutiny in the lab as opposed to in the real world may make subjects behave more pro-socially (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul [2005], List [2006]) and argue against the “realism” of experimental data.

Further, several studies have found that people tend to be more selfish when the stakes of the game increase (Carpenter, Verhoogen and Burks [2005], Slonim and Roth [1998], Parco, Rapoport and Stein [2002]).
There is evidence of substantial heterogeneity in preferences both between socioeconomic groups and within groups.

Marginal rates of substitution depend on other factors such as education, age, cultural values, etc.

See the evidence in Browning, Hansen and Heckman [1999].

This evidence supports the claim that people are different at a basic level, since preferences govern the choices that shape life.

However, preferences may be experience dependent.

While most studies view life outcomes as the result of choices governed by exogenous preferences, and hence infer preferences from outcomes, initial conditions might determine both preferences and constraints on the available choices.
The motivation for preference specifications in economics is typically introspection, axioms about rationality, and convenience, rather than empirical evidence.

When measuring preferences, functional forms are chosen in an attempt to minimize approximation error subject to identification.

However, economists typically consider preferences over a limited range of fundamental attributes.

Time, risk, and social preferences may not be the right dimensions of choice over which parameters are stable.

Each of these domains seem to be guided by multiple parameters, and some of these parameters seem to matter for each of the domains.
While the marginal rates of substitution economists measure are correct at observed prices, they may not be easily mapped into the conventional preference specifications.

Personality psychology may help in guiding economists as where to look for more fundamental parameters.

However, the potential is largely unexplained.
Table 8 summarizes the empirical evidence discussed in this section.

It presents a summary of the main papers relating economic preference parameters to psychological measurements.
### Table 8: Link between Personality Traits and Preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Main Variable(s)</th>
<th>Data and Methods</th>
<th>Causal Evidence</th>
<th>Main Result(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altmann, Dohmen and Wibral [2008]</td>
<td><strong>Outcome(s):</strong> trust – amount the first-player sends in a real-stakes experimental trust game</td>
<td>Data: Collected by authors; 240 students from the University of Bonn</td>
<td>Controls: gender</td>
<td>Reciprocity and trust are positively related (p&lt;0.01). Risk aversion and trust are positively related (p&lt;0.05).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Variable(s): reciprocity – amount returned by the second player in a real-stakes experimental trust game; risk aversion – certainty equivalent as measured by real-stakes choices over lotteries</td>
<td>Methods: OLS</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: The measures are contemporaneous.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Theory: People might generally value adhering to social norms associated with trust and reciprocity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2009]</td>
<td><strong>Outcome(s):</strong> risk aversion – choices over real-stakes lotteries; ambiguity aversion – comparison of the willingness to bet on lotteries when the probability distribution is unknown</td>
<td>Data: Collected by authors; 347 students aged 15 to 16 from a Dutch high school</td>
<td>Controls: n/a</td>
<td>Men are less risk averse than women (p&lt;0.001) but more ambiguity averse (p&lt;0.05). Risk-aversion is mediated by personality (p&lt;0.05), while ambiguity aversion is not. Risk-aversion is positively associated with Agreeableness and Neuroticism and is negatively associated with ambition (p&lt;0.05).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Variable(s): gender; personality – self-reported measures of The Big Five, ambition, flexible thinking, and self-control</td>
<td>Methods: OLS, F-test</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: The measures are contemporaneous.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Theory: Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion represent different preferences and might reflect different personality traits.</td>
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</table>
### Table 8: Link between Personality Traits and Preferences

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome(s)</th>
<th>Explanatory Variable(s)</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Controls</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borghans, Meijers and ter Weel [2008]</td>
<td>Outcome(s): cognitive ability – number of correct answers on an IQ test; effort – time spent on each question</td>
<td>Data: Collected by authors; 128 university students from a Dutch University</td>
<td>Controls: type of cognitive test, the amount of incentive pay, and time constraints</td>
<td>Methods: probit</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: They measured IQ both before and after providing incentives. Theory: People with different personalities and preferences might be willing to expend different amounts of mental effort during a test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burks, Carpenter, Goette et al. [2009]</td>
<td>Outcome(s): risk aversion – choices over real-stakes lotteries; time discounting – choices over real-stakes payments at different times; inconsistent risk and time preference – making at least one inconsistent choice in the experiments eliciting preferences; job performance – whether a worker leaves before the end of the first year</td>
<td>Data: Collected by authors, administrative data; 892 trainee truckers from a U.S. trucking company (2005-2006)</td>
<td>Controls: race, age, age squared, education, household income, absorption, achievement, aggression, alienation, control harm avoidance, social closeness, social potency, stress reaction, traditionalism, and well-being</td>
<td>Methods: OLS, interval regressions, linear probability model, Cox proportional hazard</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: The measures are contemporaneous, except for job-turnover which was evaluated after the experiment. Theory: People with higher IQ can better forecast the future. Performance motivation, fear of failure, internal locus of control, curiosity, low discount rates, and risk aversion are positively associated with more correct answers (p&lt;0.05). Negative fear of failure, Extroversion, Openness to Experience, and Agreeableness are negatively associated with answering the question correctly (p&lt;0.05). Incentives did not affect the number of questions answered correctly. Intrinsin motivation, curiosity, internal locus of control, Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness, and discount rates are negatively associated with responsiveness to incentives (p&lt;0.05). Risk aversion is negatively associated with responsiveness to incentives (p&lt;0.10). Leisure preference and Openness to Experience are positively associated with responsiveness (p&lt;0.05). An increase in IQ from the bottom quartile to the top quartile is associated with an increase in risk-taking consistency of 25 percentage points (p&lt;0.001), an increase of intertemporal consistency of 15 percentage points (p&lt;0.001), a decrease in discount rate (p&lt;0.001), and a decrease in risk aversion (p&lt;0.001). People in the lowest quartile of IQ are about twice as likely to leave the job within the first year (p&lt;0.001).</td>
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</table>
**Table 8: Link between Personality Traits and Preferences**

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<tr>
<th>Daly, Delaney and Harmon [2009]</th>
<th>Outcome(s): time preference – discount rate measured by a real-stakes choices over delayed payments</th>
<th>Data: Collected by authors; 204 students from Trinity College Dublin</th>
<th>Controls: age and sex</th>
<th>Age and sex do not predict the estimated discount rate. A factor that loads heavily on self-control, consideration of future consequences, elaboration of potential outcomes, emotional regulation, cognitive and affective mindfulness, suppression of unwanted thoughts, experiential avoidance.</th>
<th>Theory: Personality traits and health indicators might be associated with willingness to delay gratification.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Variable(s): health – blood pressure, body fat, blood glucose, weight, height, heart rate; personality – questionnaire measures of The Big Five, self-control, consideration of future consequences, elaboration of potential outcomes, emotional regulation, cognitive and affective mindfulness, suppression of unwanted thoughts, experiential avoidance</td>
<td>Methods: factor analysis, OLS</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: The measures are contemporaneous.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2011]</th>
<th>Outcome(s): experimental risk measure – measured by real-stakes choices over lotteries and cash payments</th>
<th>Data: Collected by the authors; 450 adults from Germany</th>
<th>Controls: gender, age, height, and other personal characteristics</th>
<th>Survey measures of general risk attitude predict incentive compatible, experimentally elicited measures of risk attitude (p&lt;0.01).</th>
<th>Theory: Survey and experimentally elicited risk measure the same concept</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Variable(s): survey risk measure – survey responses on an 11-point scale, relating to general risk preference and risk preference relating to car driving, financial matters, leisure and sports, career and health</td>
<td>Methods: OLS</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: The measures are contemporaneous.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Outcome(s)</th>
<th>Explanatory Variable(s)</th>
<th>Data: Collected by the authors; 121 students of PKU in Beijing who participated in an experiment (2008)</th>
<th>Controls: major, gender, family income, and class rank</th>
<th>Timing of Measurements: The measures are contemporaneous.</th>
<th>Theory: There could be an underlying risk parameter that applies in all situations.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ding, Hartog and Sun [2010]</td>
<td>Experimental risk measure – measured by real-stakes choices over lotteries and cash payments</td>
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<td>The survey measures of risk explain at most 10 percent of the variance in the experimental measures of risk (general risk attitude and financial risk are the best). Self-assessed risk depends much on the domain or context; the highest correlation between context-based survey questions is r=0.55. Women are more risk averse than men; risk-aversion decreases with parental income; and risk attitudes depend on domain (context). People view winning and losing money differently.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daly, Delaney and Harmon [2009]</td>
<td>Health – blood pressure, body fat, blood glucose, weight, height, heart rate; Personality – questionnaire measures of The Big Five, self-control, consideration of future consequences, elaboration of potential outcomes, emotional regulation, cognitive and affective mindfulness, suppression of unwanted thoughts, experiential avoidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ding, Hartog and Sun [2010]</td>
<td>Survey risk measure – responses on an 11 point scale, relating to general risk preference and risk preference relating to car driving, financial matters, leisure and sports, career and health, survey responses to hypothetical lotteries</td>
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7. The Predictive Power of Personality Traits

- This section discusses the empirical evidence on the power of personality in predicting life outcomes.
- A growing body of evidence suggests that personality measures, especially those related to Conscientiousness, and, to a lesser extent, Neuroticism, predict a wide range of outcomes.
- The predictive power of any particular personality measure tends to be less than the predictive power of IQ but in some cases rivals it.
For three reasons, summarizing the large literature on the predictive power of personality on outcomes is a daunting task.

First, the measures of personality and cognition differ among studies.

As noted in Section 5, not all psychologists use the Big Five.

We attempt to cast all measures into Big Five categories.

When this is not possible, we discuss the measures used and how they may differ from the Big Five measures.
Second, different studies use different measures of predictive power.

Many studies report only simple correlations or simple standardized regression coefficients.

Such estimated relationships do not control for other factors that may influence outcomes.

This is particularly problematic for estimated relationships between personality measures and other outcomes that do not control for cognition, situation, or the effect of other personality measures.

Where possible, we report both simple and partial correlations.
We also consider a measure of predictive validity that extends traditional conceptions of variance explained.

Recent work by economists relaxes the normality and linearity assumptions that underlie the use of simple partial correlations and standardized regression coefficients that are used in psychology.

This method measures the predictive power of variables by the slopes of percentile changes on outcomes and not by variance explained.

If outcomes are characterized by substantial measurement error, a low $R^2$ for a predictor may still be consistent with a substantial effect of the predictor on means and quantiles.
For example, Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] report the effects of percentile changes in cognitive and personality measures on a variety of outcomes over the full range of estimated relationships, relaxing traditional normality or linearity assumptions and not relying directly on measures of variance explained.

This approach to measuring predictive power is increasingly being applied by economists (see, e.g., Piatek and Pinger [2010]).
Third, many studies do not address the question of causality, i.e., does the measured trait cause (rather than just predict) the outcome?

Empirical associations are not a reliable basis for policy analysis.

Problems with reverse causality are rife in personality psychology.

Contemporaneous measures of personality and outcomes are especially problematic.

For example, does greater Neuroticism lower earnings, is it the other way around, or do they mutually influence each other?
Few economists or psychologists working on the relationship between personality and outcomes address the issue of causality, and when they do so, it is usually by employing early measures of cognition and personality to predict later outcomes.

As discussed in Section 4, using early measures of personality traits to predict later outcomes raises problems of its own.

We delineate how each study addresses causality.
A main finding of our survey, consistent with the claims of the early psychologists cited in Section 2, is that Conscientiousness is the most predictive Big Five trait across many outcomes.

However, other personality measures predict some outcomes.
Measures of personality predict a range of educational outcomes.

Of the Big Five, Conscientiousness best predicts overall attainment and achievement.

Other traits, such as Openness to Experience, predict finer measures of educational attainment, such as attendance and course difficulty.

Traits related to Neuroticism also affect educational attainment, but the relationship is not always monotonic.

Conscientiousness predicts college grades to the same degree that SAT scores do.

Personality measures predict performance on achievement tests and, to a lesser degree, performance on intelligence tests.
Personality measures predict a variety of labor market outcomes.

Of the Big Five traits, Conscientiousness best predicts overall job performance but is less predictive than measures of intelligence.

Conscientiousness, however, predicts performance and wages across a broad range of occupational categories, whereas the predictive power of measures of intelligence decreases with job complexity.
Additionally, traits related to Neuroticism (e.g., locus of control and self-esteem) predict a variety of labor market outcomes, including job search effort.

Many traits predict sorting into occupations, consistent with the economic models of comparative advantage discussed in Section 3.

Personality traits are valued differentially across occupations.
All Big Five traits predict some health outcomes.

Conscientiousness, however, is the most predictive and can better predict longevity than does intelligence or background.

Personality measures predict health both through the channel of education and by improving health-related behavior, such as smoking.
The little evidence on the effect of personality measures on crime suggests that traits related to Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are important predictors of criminality.

These findings are consistent with the possibility that personality is related to social preferences, as discussed in Section 6.

Our survey, even though extensive, is not fully comprehensive.

We place additional material in the Web Appendix.
7.A. Educational Attainment and Achievement

- We now turn to evidence for the predictive power of personality traits for educational outcomes, separately considering educational attainment, grades, and test scores.
Educational Attainment

- Despite recent increases in college attendance, American high school dropout rates remain high.
- About one in four American students drops out of formal schooling before receiving a high school diploma, and in recent decades the dropout rate has increased slightly (Heckman and LaFontaine [2010]).
- A growing body of research finds that personality is associated with educational attainment, suggesting that further study of personality and its determinants might shed light on the recent stagnation in educational attainment.
- We begin by reviewing evidence about the relationship of personality measures with years of schooling and then consider specific aspects of educational achievement.
Traits such as perseverance and preferences related to an interest in learning might lead people to attain more total years of schooling.

Indeed some evidence suggests that this might be the case.

Table 9 presents associations between years of schooling and the Big Five from three nationally representative samples.

The studies yield different results, possibly because they control for different covariates or because they come from different countries.
The first study controls for age, sex, and gender and finds that of the Big Five, Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness are most related to years of schooling attained (Goldberg, Sweeney, Merenda et al. [1998]).

The second study which also controls for parental education and father’s occupational status reports a strong relationship with Openness to Experience but a much weaker relationship with Conscientiousness than the first study, suggesting that parental background might mediate some of the effects of Conscientiousness (van Eijck and de Graaf [2004]).
The first two samples lack information on cognitive ability.

Openness to Experience, however, is the only Big Five factor with moderate associations with general intelligence ($r = 0.33$ in a meta-analysis by Ackerman and Heggestad [1997]), and intelligence is associated with years of education ($r = 0.55$ in Neisser, Boodoo, Bouchard et al. [1996]).

Thus Openness to Experience may proxy for intelligence.

However, as Figure 8 illustrates, controlling for rudimentary measures of crystallized intelligence and fluid intelligence does not affect the coefficients on the Big Five within the third sample.

This sample differs from the others, because Openness to Experience is not strongly associated with years of education unconditional on intelligence, possibly because it is based on a smaller inventory of questions.
Conscientiousness, however, is associated with years of schooling to a similar degree as intelligence.

In each study, schooling and personality are measured at the same point in time, so that for older individuals, personality is measured long after schooling has been completed.

This complicates the interpretation of the estimated effects of schooling on personality in young samples.
### Table 9: The Relationship between Years of Educational Attainment and Big Five Traits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Timing of Measurement and Outcome</th>
<th>Controls</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goldberg, Sweeney, Merenda et al. [1998]</td>
<td>Representative sample of U.S. working adults aged 18-75 (N=3,629)</td>
<td>All the variables were measured in the same year, but years of schooling were cumulative.</td>
<td>age, gender, ethnicity</td>
<td>Partial Correlation with Years of Schooling ((r))</td>
<td>Openness: 0.31*** Conscientiousness: 0.12*** Extraversion: -0.04** Agreeableness: -0.08*** Neuroticism: -0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Eijck and de Graaf [2004]</td>
<td>Representative sample of Dutch adults aged 25-70 (N=1,735)</td>
<td>All the variables were measured in the same year, but years of schooling were cumulative.</td>
<td>age, gender, father’s education, mother’s education, and father’s occupational status</td>
<td>Standardized Regression Coefficient ((\beta))</td>
<td>Openness: 0.14*** Conscientiousness: 0.05*** Extraversion: -0.07*** Agreeableness: -0.07*** Neuroticism: -0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Socio-Economic Panel GSOEP (2004-2008), own calculations.</td>
<td>Representative sample of Germans aged 21-94 (N=2,381)</td>
<td>The Big Five were measured 3 years prior to the measurement of schooling, but years of schooling were cumulative.</td>
<td>age, age², gender, crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence</td>
<td>Standardized Regression Coefficient ((\beta))</td>
<td>Openness: -0.03 Conscientiousness: 0.18*** Extraversion: -0.02 Agreeableness: -0.03 Neuroticism: -0.09***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**statistically significant at the 5 percent level; ***statistically significant at the 1 percent level
Figure 8: Association of the Big Five and intelligence with years of schooling in GSOEP

Note: The figure displays standardized regression coefficients from multivariate of years of school attended on the Big Five and intelligence, controlling for age and age-squared. The bars represent standard errors. The Big Five coefficients are corrected for attenuation bias. The Big Five were measured in 2005. Years of schooling were measured in 2008. Intelligence was measured in 2006. The measures of intelligence were based on components of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). The data is a representative sample of German adults between the ages of 21 and 94. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), waves 2004-2008, own calculations.
Figure 8: Association of the Big Five and intelligence with years of schooling in GSOEP

Note: The figure displays standardized regression coefficients from multivariate of years of school attended on the Big Five and intelligence, controlling for age and age-squared. The bars represent standard errors. The Big Five coefficients are corrected for attenuation bias. The Big Five were measured in 2005. Years of schooling were measured in 2008. Intelligence was measured in 2006. The measures of intelligence were based on components of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). The data is a representative sample of German adults between the ages of 21 and 94. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), waves 2004-2008, own calculations.
Nevertheless, the components of Openness to Experience representing an intrinsic interest in ideas and learning may affect educational attainment not measured by total years of schooling such as the student’s difficulty with classes and attendance.

Consistent with this supposition, a longitudinal study of talented high school students showed that when controlling for PSAT score, students who expressed more intrinsic motivation in learning took more difficult math courses one year later ($\beta = 0.30, p < 0.05$), two years later ($\beta = 0.31, p < 0.05$), and three years later ($\beta = 0.26, p < 0.10$) but did not have higher grades (Wong and Csikszentmihalyi [1991]).
Likewise, of the Big Five, Openness to Experience is most consistently associated with fewer contemporaneously measured school absences in 7th grade \( (r = -0.31, p < 0.01) \), 10th grade \( (r = -0.19, p < 0.01) \), and 12th grade \( (r = -0.27, p < 0.01) \) (Lounsbury, Steel, Loveland et al. [2004]).

Still, interest in learning is not the whole story.

Using prospective data, Lleras [2008] finds that controlling for cognitive ability, three Conscientious behaviors (completing homework, working hard, arriving promptly to class) in tenth grade predicted educational attainment ten years later, whereas relating well to others, a behavior related to Extraversion and Agreeableness, did not.
Examiner discrete educational decisions, rather than total years of education, gives a more nuanced picture.

The decision to obtain a GED is a particularly telling example.

Many view GED certification as equivalent to earning a high school diploma.

Indeed GED recipients have the same distribution of measured achievement test scores as high school graduates who do not attend college.

However, controlling for cognitive ability, GED recipients have lower hourly wages and annual earnings and attain fewer years of education, suggesting they may “lack the abilities to think ahead, to persist in tasks, or to adapt to their environments” (Heckman and Rubinstein [2001, p. 146]).
Figure 9, taken from Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010], shows that GED recipients have cognitive skills similar to students who obtain high school diplomas but do not attend college.

However, GED recipients have noncognitive skills (personality traits) similar to high school dropouts.
**Figure 9:** Distribution of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills by Education Group

**Females: Cognitive Density**

Notes: The data come from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (no college sample, all ethnic groups). The distributions above represent noncognitive ability factors estimated using measures of early violent crime, minor crime, marijuana use, regular smoking, drinking, early sexual intercourse, and educational attainment as laid out in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004]. The sample is restricted to the cross-sectional subsample for both males and females. Distributions show only those with no post-secondary educational attainment. The noncognitive ability factors are separately normalized to be mean zero standard deviation one. Source: Reproduced from Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010].
Figure 9: Distribution of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills by Education Group

Males: Cognitive Density

Notes: The data come from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (no college sample, all ethnic groups). The distributions above represent noncognitive ability factors estimated using measures of early violent crime, minor crime, marijuana use, regular smoking, drinking, early sexual intercourse, and educational attainment as laid out in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004]. The sample is restricted to the cross-sectional subsample for both males and females. Distributions show only those with no post-secondary educational attainment. The noncognitive ability factors are separately normalized to be mean zero standard deviation one. Source: Reproduced from Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010].
Figure 9: Distribution of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills by Education Group

Females: Noncognitive Density

Notes: The data come from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (no college sample, all ethnic groups). The distributions above represent noncognitive ability factors estimated using measures of early violent crime, minor crime, marijuana use, regular smoking, drinking, early sexual intercourse, and educational attainment as laid out in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004]. The sample is restricted to the cross-sectional subsample for both males and females. Distributions show only those with no post-secondary educational attainment. The noncognitive ability factors are separately normalized to be mean zero standard deviation one.
Source: Reproduced from Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010].
Figure 9: Distribution of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills by Education Group

Males: Noncognitive Density

Notes: The data come from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (no college sample, all ethnic groups). The distributions above represent noncognitive ability factors estimated using measures of early violent crime, minor crime, marijuana use, regular smoking, drinking, early sexual intercourse, and educational attainment as laid out in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004]. The sample is restricted to the cross-sectional subsample for both males and females. Distributions show only those with no post-secondary educational attainment. The noncognitive ability factors are separately normalized to be mean zero standard deviation one.
Source: Reproduced from Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010].
Supporting the evidence from the GED program that personality plays an important role in explaining educational attainment in adolescence, several prospective studies have shown that facets of Conscientiousness (e.g., self-control, distractibility) and facets of Neuroticism (e.g., internal locus of control) predict successful graduation from high school (Bowman and Matthews [1960]; Gough [1964]; Hathaway, Reynolds and Monachesi [1969]; Janosz, LeBlanc, Boulerice et al. [1997]; Kelly and Veldman [1964]; Whisenton and Lorre [1970]).

Table 10 presents findings from three more recent studies examining the relationship between locus of control, a trait related to Emotional Stability, and high school graduation.
While the level of statistical significance varies across studies, the studies report remarkably similar estimates.

When controlling for basic demographics a one standard deviation increase in locus of control is associated with effects of between 4.5 and 6.8 percentage point increase in graduating from high school.

Two of the studies control for cognitive ability and find that the coefficient drops to between 1.4 and 1.5.

However, the measures of cognitive ability (course grades and AFQT score) are partly determined by locus of control, as discussed later in this section.
Table 10: The Relationship between Probability of High School Graduation and Locus of Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Timing of Measurement and Outcome</th>
<th>Controls</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Báron and Cobb-Clark</td>
<td>Australians born in 1987 or 1988 (N=2,065)</td>
<td>Contemporaneous</td>
<td>welfare receipts, family structure, sex, parental education, parental immigration status, parental involvement in education, indigenous background, and born early for their grade</td>
<td>The effect of a standard deviation increase in locus of control on the probability of high school graduation ( (b) )</td>
<td>Locus of control 4.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cebi [2007]</td>
<td>Nationally representative sample of students in the US (N=1,394)</td>
<td>Locus of control was measured in 10(^{th}) or 11(^{th}) grade</td>
<td>(1) race, gender, urban, parental education, family structure (2) race, gender, urban, parental education, family structure, home life, AFQT</td>
<td>The effect of a standard deviation increase in locus of control on the probability of high school graduation ( (b) )</td>
<td>Locus of control (1) 4.6*** ( ) Locus of control (2) 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coleman and DeLeire</td>
<td>Nationally representative sample of students in the US (N= (1) 13,720 and (2) 12,896)</td>
<td>Locus of control was measured in 8(^{th}) grade</td>
<td>(1) race, gender (2) race, gender, 8(^{th}) grade Math Score, 8(^{th}) grade reading score, 8(^{th}) grade GPA, parent’s education, parenting controls, family structure</td>
<td>The effect of a standard deviation increase in locus of control on the probability of high school graduation ( (b) )</td>
<td>Locus of control (1) 6.8 ( ) Locus of control (2) 1.4**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The (#) in the control column indicates the controls used in different specifications. The (#) preceding the number of observations and estimate indicates the model used. * statistically significant at 10 percent level; ** statistically significant at 5 percent level; *** statistically significant at 1 percent level
Several recent studies using methods that address measurement error and reverse causality corroborate the evidence that traits related to Neuroticism affect educational attainment.

For example, Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] account for the effect of family background on test scores; correct for the influence of schooling on personality; and address measurement error in test scores.

(Their estimates of the effect of schooling on these traits and on cognitive measures are discussed in Section 8.)

Figure 10 shows that better adolescent personality traits as measured by locus of control and self-esteem (traits related to Neuroticism) increases the probability of graduating from high school (and stopping at high school) for males at the lowest quantiles of the personality distribution.
However, at the higher quantiles, the probability of stopping education at high school graduation is decreasing in measured personality, because those students continue on to college.

As discussed in Section 3, the effects of traits on outcomes need not be monotonic.

As Figure 11 shows, both higher cognitive and personality traits have strong effects on graduating from a 4-year college at all deciles.

Moving from the lowest decile to the highest decile in the measured personality distribution increases the probability of graduating from college more than a similar change in the cognitive trait distribution.
These examples show why considering broad measures of education might obscure important relationships between skills and educational attainment and why assuming a linear or even monotonic relationship between skills and educational attainment might be incorrect.

Applying similar methods that account for reverse causality, Piatek and Pinger [2010] find that moving from the first to the last decile of the locus of control distribution results in a 0.30 point increase in the probability of attaining higher education for males and a 0.23 increase for females.
Figure 10: Probability of Being a High School Graduate at Age 30 and Not Going on to Further Education, Males

i. By Decile of Cognitive and Noncognitive Factors

Probability and Confidence Interval (2.5%-97.5%)

Notes: The data are simulated from the estimates of the model and our NLSY79 sample. We use the standard convention that higher deciles are associated with higher values of the variable. The confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapping (200 draws). Solid lines depict probability, and dashed lines, 2.5%-97.5% confidence intervals. The upper curve is the joint density. The two marginal curves (ii) and (iii) are evaluated at the mean of the trait not being varied.

Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 19].
**Figure 10:** Probability of Being a High School Graduate at Age 30 and Not Going on to Further Education, Males

Notes: The data are simulated from the estimates of the model and the NLSY79 sample. Higher deciles are associated with higher values of the variable. The confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapping (200 draws). Solid lines depict probability, and dashed lines, 2.5%-97.5% confidence intervals. The upper curve is the joint density. The two marginal curves (ii) and (iii) are evaluated at the mean of the trait not being varied.

Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 19].
Figure 11: Probability of Being a 4-year-college Graduate or Higher at Age 30, Males

i. By Decile of Cognitive and Noncognitive Factors

Notes: The data are simulated from the estimates of the model and the NLSY79 sample. Higher deciles are associated with higher values of the variable. The confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapping (200 draws). Solid lines depict probability, and dashed lines, 2.5%-97.5% confidence intervals. The upper curve is the joint density. The two marginal curves (ii) and (iii) are evaluated at the mean of the trait not being varied.
Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 21].
**Figure 11:** Probability of Being a 4-year-college Graduate or Higher at Age 30, Males

Notes: The data are simulated from the estimates of the model and the NLSY79 sample. Higher deciles are associated with higher values of the variable. The confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapping (200 draws). Solid lines depict probability, and dashed lines, 2.5%-97.5% confidence intervals. The upper curve is the joint density. The two marginal curves (ii) and (iii) are evaluated at the mean of the trait not being varied.

Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 21].
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] use a dynamic factor model to investigate the development of both cognitive skills and personality traits during childhood, allowing for endogenous investment in skills and dynamic complementarities.

They find that adolescent personality as measured by a variety of behavior inventories accounts for 12% of the variation in educational attainment, whereas adolescent cognitive ability accounts for 16% of the variability.
A separate, but related literature examines the importance of early attention (a trait related to Conscientiousness) and aggression (a trait related to low Agreeableness) in determining graduation from high school.

Some studies find that aggression is particularly important compared to attention.

Duncan and Magnuson [2010a] find that when controlling for measures of intelligence and demographic variables, antisocial behavior, but not attention measured in childhood, predicts high school completion.
Likewise, Fergusson and Horwood [1998] find that teacher and parent ratings of conduct problems at age 8 are negatively related to predicted high school completion at age 18.

In contrast, Vitaro, Brendgen, Larose et al. [2005] examines individuals in a population-based sample of Quebec children and find that kindergarten teacher ratings of hyperactivity-inattention (inversely) predicted completion of high school better than did aggressiveness-opposition.

Both attention and aggression likely play roles, but there is no consensus on their relative importance.
In sum, traits related to Big Five Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness are particularly important in determining how many total years of education individuals complete in their lifetimes.

Two traits related to Neuroticism, locus of control and self-esteem, play a particularly important role for adolescent schooling decisions.

Their effects differ across schooling attainment levels, suggesting that analysts should be wary of using years of schooling attained as the outcome variable compared to using the probability of attainment at different grades.

Attention and early aggression, traits related to Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, are also predictive.
Conscientiousness is the most robust Big Five predictor of course grades, in terms of raw and partial correlations.

Poropat [2009] conducted a meta-analysis of Big Five personality traits and course grades in primary, secondary, and post-secondary education, presented in Figure 12.

Associations between grades and Conscientiousness are almost as large those between grades and cognitive ability.

Associations with grades are substantially smaller for other Big Five factors, the largest of which is Openness to Experience.
Figure 12: Correlations of the Big Five and Intelligence with Course Grades

Notes: All correlations are significant at the 1% level. The correlations are corrected for scale reliability and come from a meta analysis representing a collection of studies representing samples of between N=31,955 to N=70,926, depending on the trait. The meta-analysis did not clearly specify when personality was measured relative to course grades. Source: Poropat [2009].
A few prospective, longitudinal studies, have estimated the effect of Conscientiousness on course grades when controlling for baseline levels of grades.

These studies help isolate the effects of personality on grades by reducing the potential for omitted variable bias and misleading halo effects—the propensity for teachers to favor students based on traits unrelated to academic achievement.

In general, these studies support the conclusions of studies that do not account for halo effects.
For instance, in a sample of American middle school students, self-control predicts report card grades, controlling for both general intelligence and baseline grades (Duckworth and Seligman [2005]).

Likewise, Duckworth, Tsukayama and May [2011] use longitudinal hierarchical linear models to show that changes in self-control predict subsequent changes in report card grades.

In a sample of Chinese primary school children, effortful control predicted report card grades when controlling for baseline grades (Zhou, Main and Wang [2010]).
Figure 13 shows that associations between course grades and personality and cognitive ability are generally stronger in the primary grades, a pattern consistent with censoring.

A notable exception to this trend is Conscientiousness, which is as strongly associated with course grades at higher grade levels.

If censoring on cognitive and personality traits attenuates observed associations with course grades among students at higher grade levels, Conscientiousness might be even more predictive of course grades as students progress through the education system.

Consistent with this possibility, in a prospective study of an entire cohort of Belgium’s medical students, the correlation (corrected for censoring) of Conscientiousness for GPA increased from $r = 0.18$ in the first year to $r = 0.45$ in the seventh and final year (Lievens, Dilchert and Ones [2009]).
Figure 13: Correlations with Course Grades by Level of Education

Notes: The reported values for The Big Five are partial correlations, controlled for intelligence. The meta-analysis did not address when personality was measured relative to course grades.
Source: Poropat [2009].
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that Conscientiousness may be as predictive as cognitive ability in predicting and possibly causing higher course grades.

Why?

Even intelligent students might not enjoy the work (Wong and Csikszentmihalyi [1991]).

Indeed, there is evidence that the association between Conscientiousness and course grades is mediated by positive study habits and attitudes, effort, and prosocial behavior in the classroom.
Standardized achievement test scores

- Like course grades, standardized achievement test scores reflect a student’s acquired skills and knowledge.
- Thus, dimensions of personality that influence the acquisition of skills and knowledge should predict both outcomes.
- One might expect, therefore, that traits related to Conscientiousness predict achievement test scores.
- While studies using standardized achievement tests are less common than studies using grades, ample empirical evidence shows that aspects of personality predict both metrics of performance.
As shown in Section 5, two traits related to Neuroticism, locus of control and self-esteem, explain much of the variance of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), an achievement test which is often used as a measure of pure intelligence in studies in economics.

Similarly, Figure 14 shows that in samples from three New York City middle schools, controlling for IQ, Openness to Experience is associated with Standardized Achievement Test Scores.
Figure 14: Associations with Standardized Achievement Test Scores

Notes: The values represent standardized regression coefficients in models including personality, IQ, gender, and ethnicity. The bars represent standard errors around the estimate. IQ is measured using Raven’s Progressive Matrices. The achievement tests are based on the Comprehensive Testing Program test in the private school sample and the English/Language Arts and Mathematics standardized achievement test in the public school sample. Source: Data collected by Authors. Authors’ own calculation.
Roy Martin and colleagues were among the first to demonstrate that teacher and parent ratings of early childhood persistence, (low) distractibility, and (low) activity prospectively predict both course grades and standardized achievement test scores (see Martin [1989] for a summary).

Likewise, in a representative sample of Baltimore first graders, teacher ratings of attention span restlessness in first grade predicted both course grades and standardized achievement test scores four years later (Alexander, Entwisle and Dauber [1993]).
More recently, in a sample of preschool children from low-income homes, parent and teacher ratings of effortful control, a facet of Conscientiousness, predicted standardized achievement test scores in kindergarten, even after controlling for general intelligence (Blair and Razza [2007]).

Similarly, in a sample of kindergarteners, teacher and parent ratings of effortful control predicted performance on standardized achievement tests six months later when controlling for both verbal intelligence and family socioeconomic status (Valiente, Lemery-Chalfant and Swanson [2010]).

Teacher ratings of inattention at the beginning of the school year predicted standardized achievement test scores at the end of the school year in a sample of fourth graders (Finn, Pannozzo and Voelkl [1995]).
Task measures of effortful control, a trait related to Conscientiousness, predict performance on standardized achievement tests much later in life.

For instance, the number of seconds a child waits for a more preferred treat in the preschool delay of gratification paradigm predicts the SAT college admission test more than a decade later, with raw correlations of $r = 0.42$ for the verbal section and $r = 0.57$ for the quantitative section (Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez [1989]).
The Head-to-Toes and Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders tasks require young children to inhibit automatic responses, pay attention, and keep instructions in working memory (e.g., to touch their heads when the experimenter says “touch your toes”) (Ponitz, McClelland, Jewkes et al. [2008]; Ponitz, McClelland, Matthews et al. [2009]).

Performance on this brief task predicts later performance on standardized achievement tests (McClelland, Cameron, Connor et al. [2007]).
Perhaps most conclusively, Duncan and colleagues [2007] analyzed six large, longitudinal datasets and found that school-entry attention skills, measured variously by task and questionnaire measures, prospectively predict achievement test scores, even when controlling for school-entry academic skills.

In contrast, internalizing behavior (e.g., depression, anxiousness, withdrawal) and externalizing behaviors (e.g., aggression, hyperactivity, antisocial behavior) at school-entry do not reliably predict standardized achievement test scores.

Attention skills are related to Conscientiousness; externalizing behavior is related to Agreeableness and Conscientiousness; and internalizing behaviors are related to Neuroticism.
In sum, traits related to Conscientiousness play an important role in predicting achievement tests above and beyond cognitive ability.

Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 6, time discounting and risk aversion also relate to test score performance, suggesting that both personality-related traits and preferences are important determinants of outcomes, consistent with the economic model presented in Section 3.

In contrast to educational attainment, traits related to Emotional Stability (the opposite of Neuroticism) are less important for test performance.
Where course grades and standardized achievement test scores diverge

- Course grades and standardized test scores are generally highly correlated.
- Each form of assessment provides reciprocal evidence on the validity of the other.
- Willingham, Pollack and Lewis [2002] estimate a raw correlation of $r = 0.62 \ (p < 0.01)$ between total grade average and NELS score.
This strong association and the objective of each form of assessment to gauge student learning explains why standardized achievement tests and grades are widely assumed to be “mutual surrogates; that is, measuring much the same thing, even in the face of obvious differences” Willingham, Pollack and Lewis [2002, p. 2].

What are these differences, and how might the contribution of personality to performance vary accordingly?
Standardized achievement tests are designed to enable apples-to-apples comparisons of students from diverse contexts.

To this end, standardized achievement tests are uniform in subject matter, format, administration, and grading procedure across all test takers.

A course grade, on the other hand might depend on a particular teacher’s judgment.
The power of standardized achievement tests to predict later academic and occupational outcomes is well-established (Kuncel and Hezlett [2007]; Sackett, Borneman and Connelly [2008]; Willingham [1985]).

Nevertheless, cumulative high school GPA predicts graduation from college dramatically better than SAT/ACT scores do, even without adjusting for differences in high school quality (Bowen, Chingos and McPherson [2009b]).

Similarly, high school GPA more powerfully predicts college rank-in-class (Bowen, Chingos and McPherson [2009b]; Geiser and Santelices [2007]).
Perhaps more important than which measure of academic achievement—course grades or standardized achievement test scores—is more predictive of later outcomes is why these outcomes are related but not entirely interchangeable.

Bowen and colleagues [2009b] speculate that aspects of Conscientiousness seem differentially essential to earning strong course grades because of what is required of students to earn them.

Standardized achievement tests, in contrast to teacher-designed quizzes, exams, homework assignments, and long-term projects, challenge students to solve relatively novel problems.
It is therefore not surprising that Frey and Detterman [2004] found a correlation of $r = 0.82 \ (p < 0.01)$ between SAT scores and performance on the ASVAB, an aptitude and achievement test developed for the United States Army.

In a separate sample, Frey and Detterman found a correlation of $r = 0.72 \ (p < 0.01)$ between SAT scores and IQ when accounting for censoring.

In contrast, the correlation between GPA and IQ is $r = 0.23 \ (p < 0.01)$ (Poropat [2009]).
In three longitudinal, prospective studies of middle school students, Duckworth, Quinn and Tsukayama [2010] compare the variance explained in year-end standardized achievement test scores and GPA by self-control (a facet of Conscientiousness) and fluid intelligence measured at the beginning of the school year.

For example, in a national sample of children, 4th grade self-control was a stronger predictor of 9th grade GPA ($\beta = 0.40, p < 0.001$) than was 4th grade IQ ($\beta = 0.28, p < 0.001$).

In contrast, 4th grade self-control was a weaker predictor of 9th grade standardized test scores ($\beta = 0.11, p < 0.05$) than was 4th grade IQ ($\beta = 0.64, p < 0.001$).
These findings are consistent with those of Willingham, Pollack, and Lewis [2002], who show that conscientious classroom behaviors are more strongly associated with GPA than with standardized achievement test scores.

Likewise, Oliver, Guerin, and Gottfried [2007] found that parent and self-report ratings of distractibility and persistence at age 16 predicted high school and college GPA, but not SAT test scores.

Table 11 presents results showing that Conscientiousness and SAT scores are similarly predictive of college GPA.

However, in each of the studies below, Conscientiousness was measured in college which presents problems for a causal interpretation of this evidence due to the potential for reverse causality.
Table 11: The Predictive Power of Conscientiousness Relative and SAT Scores for College GPA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conard [2005]</td>
<td>University students in the US (N=186)</td>
<td>College GPA and SAT were both self-reported during college. Personality was measured in college.</td>
<td>Class Attendance</td>
<td>Standardized Regression Coefficient ($\beta$)</td>
<td>SAT Total Conscientiousness 0.27*** 0.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noftle and Robins [2007]</td>
<td>University students in the US (N=10,472)</td>
<td>College GPA and SAT were both self-reported during college. Personality was measured in college.</td>
<td>Gender, Other Big Five Traits</td>
<td>Standardized Regression Coefficient ($\beta$)</td>
<td>SAT Verbal SAT Math Conscientiousness 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noftle and Robins [2007]</td>
<td>University students in the US (N=465)</td>
<td>College GPA and SAT were both self-reported during college. Personality was measured in college.</td>
<td>Gender, Other Big Five Traits</td>
<td>Standardized Regression Coefficient ($\beta$)</td>
<td>SAT Verbal SAT Math Conscientiousness 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noftle and Robins [2007]</td>
<td>University students in the US (N=444)</td>
<td>College GPA and SAT were both self-reported during college. Personality was measured in college.</td>
<td>Gender, Other Big Five Traits</td>
<td>Standardized Regression Coefficient ($\beta$)</td>
<td>SAT Verbal SAT Math Conscientiousness 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfe and Johnson [1995]</td>
<td>University students in the US (N=201)</td>
<td>GPA and SAT were provided by the College’s Record Office. Personality was measured in college.</td>
<td>High School GPA</td>
<td>Standardized Regression Coefficient ($\beta$)</td>
<td>SAT Total Conscientiousness 0.23*** 0.31***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Self-reported SAT scores and those obtained from college records were highly correlated ($r = 0.92$). Self-reported GPA and that obtained from college records were highly correlated ($r = 0.89$). *statistically significant at the 10 percent level; **statistically significant at the 5 percent level; ***statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
In sum, standardized achievement tests and teacher-assigned course grades both reflect students’ accumulated knowledge and skill.

However, they differ in important ways.

The benefits of Conscientiousness, which inclines students to more productive work habits, seem greater for course grades than for test scores.

This finding might explain why girls, who are higher than boys in Conscientiousness, reliably earn higher grades than boys in every subject from primary school through college but do not reliably outperform boys on either standardized achievement or intelligence tests (Duckworth and Seligman [2006]).
7.B. Labor Market Outcomes

“Eighty percent of success is showing up.” – Woody Allen
It is intuitive that personality traits affect labor market outcomes.

Showing up is required for completing a task.

Precisely quantifying the direct effects of personality, however, is more difficult.

Recently, social scientists have started to tackle the problem and, in general, find that of the Big Five, Conscientiousness and traits associated with Neuroticism (locus of control and self-esteem) play a particularly important role in determining job performance and wages.

The evidence suggests multiple channels of influence, including occupational matching, incentive scheme selection, absenteeism, turnover, and job search.
Aspects of job performance are related to academic performance.

For example, both require completing work on a schedule and involve intelligence to varying degrees.

It is therefore not surprising, that, as with academic performance, numerous studies and meta-analyses have found that Conscientiousness is associated with job performance and wages (Nyhus and Pons [2005]; Salgado [1997]; Hogan and Holland [2003]; Barrick and Mount [1991]).

Figure 15 presents correlations of the Big Five and IQ with job performance.
- Of the Big Five, Conscientiousness is the most associated with job performance but is about half as predictive as IQ.

- Conscientiousness, however, may play a more pervasive role than IQ.

- The importance of IQ increases with job complexity, defined as the information processing requirements of the job: cognitive skills are more important for professors, scientists, and senior managers than for semi-skilled or unskilled laborers (Schmidt and Hunter [2004]).
In contrast, the importance of Conscientiousness does not vary much with job complexity (Barrick and Mount [1991]), suggesting that it pertains to a wider spectrum of jobs.

Causality remains an open question as it does in most of the literature in psychology.

The raw correlations presented in Figure 15 do not account for reverse causality, and the authors do not clearly delineate when the measures of personality were taken.
Figure 15: Associations with Job Performance

Notes: The values for personality are correlations that were corrected for sampling error, censoring, and measurement error. Job performance was based on performance ratings, productivity data and training proficiency. The authors do report the timing of the measurements of personality relative to job performance. Of the Big Five, the coefficient on Conscientiousness is the only one that is statistically significant with a lower bound on the 90credibility value of 0.10. The value for IQ is a raw correlation.

Sources: The correlations reported for personality traits come from a meta-analysis conducted by Barrick and Mount [1991]. The correlation reported for IQ and job performance come from Schmidt and Hunter [2004].
Facets related to Emotional Stability (the opposite of Neuroticism) are also important for labor market success.

Accounting for reverse causality, however, is particularly important, because strong evidence suggests labor market participation can affect traits related to Neuroticism (See the discussion of the research of Gottschalk [2005] in Section 8).

Several studies have addressed this problem by using measures of personality measured well before individuals enter the labor market and find that locus of control and self-esteem, two facets of Emotional Stability, predict wages (Judge and Hurst [2007]; Drago [2008]; Duncan and Dunifon [1998]).
Table 12 presents results from the causal model of Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] suggesting that standardized adolescent measures of locus of control and self-esteem predict adult earnings to a similar degree as cognitive ability.

However, the effects vary across educational levels.

In general, noncognitive ability (personality) affects wages to a similar degree across all education levels, whereas cognitive ability tends to have little effect for GED recipients, high school dropouts, and college dropouts.
Table 12: Estimated Coefficients of Cognitive and Noncognitive Factors for Log Hourly wages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schooling Level</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Noncognitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school dropout</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.076)</td>
<td>(.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GED</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.107)</td>
<td>(.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college, no degree</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.086)</td>
<td>(.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-year-college degree</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.138)</td>
<td>(.209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-year-college degree</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>-.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.175)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample from NLSY79 males and females at age 30. We exclude the oversample of blacks, Hispanics, and poor whites, the military sample, and those currently enrolled in college. The cognitive measure represents the standardized average over the raw ASVAB scores (arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, math knowledge, and coding speed). The noncognitive measure is computed as a (standardized) average of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale. The model also includes a set of cohort dummies, local labor market conditions (unemployment rate), and the region of residence.

Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006].
Some recent evidence suggests that locus of control affects wages mostly through the channel of educational attainment.

Piatek and Pinger [2010] apply statistical methods to account for reverse causality and measurement error to a German sample and find that for males moving from the first to the last decile of the locus of control distribution increases earnings by 36%.

The effect, however, becomes statistically insignificant when controlling for education suggesting that education might be the channel through which locus of control affects earnings.

However, other studies by Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] and Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010] find direct effects of these traits on earnings and a variety of other traits controlling for education.
Further highlighting the possible role of educational decisions, Figure 16 shows that GED recipients who have lower levels of non-cognitive skills but comparable levels of cognitive skills (see the previous section) have lower wages, total wage income, and work fewer hours relative to high school graduates, when controlling for ability.
Figure 16: Ability-adjusted economic gaps relative to dropouts: GEDs and high school graduates for males (A) and females (B)

Notes: Regressions control for baseline AFQT scores, age, mother’s highest grade completed, and dummies for urban residence at age 14, southern residence at age 14, and race. Baseline test scores are estimated using the procedure of Hansen et al. 2004 as implemented in Carneiro, Heckman and Masterov [2005]. The regressions use the cross-sectional subsample and minority oversamples of the NLSY79 data. The estimation sample is restricted to individuals who never attend college and who have not been incarcerated. Regressions for hourly wage and hours worked are restricted to those reporting more than 1/4/hour and less than 100/hour, and individuals working less than 4,000 hours in a given year. Wage income regressions are restricted to individuals reporting wage incomes between 1,000/year and 100,000/year. All monetary values are in 2005 dollars. Standard errors are clustered by individual.

Source: Data come from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).
These various studies have shown that personality is associated with wages, but do not explain why they are associated other than suggesting that the relationship occurs through the channel of educational attainment.

Other mechanisms might be absenteeism, job turnover and unemployment.

Indeed, controlling for basic demographics, employment history and health, Strmer and Fahr [2010] estimate that a standard deviation increase in Emotional Stability and Agreeableness is associated with 12% ($p < 0.01$) and 9% ($p < 0.05$) fewer absent days for men and a standard deviation increase in Openness to Experience is associated with 13% ($p < 0.01$) more absent days for women.

However, the study uses contemporaneous measures of personality and absenteeism.
Personality plays a role outside of formal employer-employee relationships.

Self-employed workers, with either very low or high levels of risk-aversion, a trait related to dimensions of personality as discussed in Section 6, tend to remain self-employed for a shorter time, suggesting that they are less suited to self employment (Caliendo, Fossen and Kritikos [2008]).
Personality could directly affect the duration of unemployment spells.

Gallo, Endrass, Bradley et al. [2003] finds that an internal locus of control is associated with a higher probability of reemployment.

A couple of studies have explicitly incorporated locus of control into standard job search models.

For example, Caliendo, Cobb-Clark and Uhlendorff [2010] examine whether a higher locus of control increases the perceived marginal benefit of exerting search effort, so that people with a more internal locus of control will search more intensely and will have a higher reservation wage.
Supporting their theory, a one standard deviation increase in internal locus of control was associated with a 1.9 increase in the reservation wage ($p < 0.01$) and 5.3% increase in the number of job applications submitted ($p < 0.01$), controlling for demographic characteristics and past employment history.

While the measures were contemporaneous, the respondents became unemployed near the time that the locus of control was measured, potentially limiting the role of reverse causality.

Similarly, McGee [2010] proposes a similar model in which people with a higher locus of control believe that search effort has a higher return.
The theoretical model predicts that those with an internal locus of control search more intensely but have higher reservation wages, so that the effect on the hazard rate of leaving unemployment is ambiguous.

In line with his predictions, he finds that a standard deviation increase in pre-labor market locus of control is associated with a 1.3% increase in the reservation wage ($p < 0.01$) and a 20% increase in the time spent searching for a job per week ($p = 0.14$).

Those with moderate levels of locus of control have the highest hazard rates for leaving unemployment.

Consistent with the interpretation that locus of control affects beliefs (not productivity), locus of control has no effect on reemployment wages when controlling for reservation wages.
Personality traits also affect occupational choice.

From an economic perspective, some personality traits that reflect ability might be valued more highly in some occupations, and, on the supply side, people with certain personality traits that relate to preferences might value the non-pecuniary benefits associated with particular occupations.

Supporting this notion, Conscientiousness (Barrick and Mount [1991]; Ham, Junankar and Wells [2009]), locus of control and self-esteem (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006]) predict sorting into occupations.

However, these studies use relatively broad occupational categories that might obfuscate more nuanced influences of personality.
Analyzing eighteen occupational categories, Cobb-Clark and Tan [2009] find that for men, a one standard deviation increase in Agreeableness is associated with a 2.8% decrease in the probability of being a manager ($p < 0.01$) and a 2.9% decrease in being a business professional ($p < 0.01$).

A standard deviation increase in internal locus of control is associated with 2.8% decrease in the probability of being a manager ($p < 0.01$).

In contrast, for women, a one standard deviation increase in Openness to Experience is associated with a 2.5 increase in being a manager ($p < 0.01$).
Furthermore, the value of cognitive ability and personality differs based on occupation just as they do by education.

Cattan [2010] estimates a structural model of comparative advantage along the lines discussed in Section 3 and finds different skills are valued differently, depending on the occupation.
Accounting for selection, a standard deviation increase in adolescent sociability (related to Extraversion) leads to a 6% increase in the wages of managers ($p < 0.01$), a 4% increase in the wages of sales workers ($p < 0.10$), a 2% increase in the wages of clerical workers ($p < 0.05$), but leads to a 2% decrease in wages of professionals ($p < 0.10$) and has no significant impact on the wages of blue-collar workers.

Self-esteem and locus of control are positively valued in all occupations, but the magnitudes also depend on the occupation.

The effects of traits need not be uniform on wages across occupations.
Personality might affect not only the occupational selection, but also the type of compensation scheme selected within occupation.

Dur, Non and Roelfsema [2010] extend the standard principal-agent model by allowing for workers to reciprocate positive attention from managers by working harder.

Their theoretical model implies that promotions, rather than monetary incentives, should be more effective for eliciting effort from reciprocal workers.

Workers self-select into different compensation schemes.

Supporting their model, they find that a one point increase on a seven point reciprocity scale for workers is associated with a 5 percentage point increase of having a job with promotion incentives ($p < 0.01$).
They use contemporaneous measures of reciprocity and job attributes, which could be problematic if pay-for-performance schemes affect reciprocity.

Similarly, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2009] find that in a German sample self-reported positive reciprocity is associated with income, and employment, and working over time.

Negative reciprocity tends to work in the opposite direction.

As discussed in Section 6, these measures of social preference relate to personality.
In sum, there are good theoretical reasons as well as some empirical evidence that personality affects labor market outcomes through channels other than education.

Conscientiousness and Neuroticism are associated with job performance and wages to a similar but lesser degree than cognitive ability.

The personality traits are more important for people with lower levels of job complexity or education level, whereas cognitive ability is more important at higher levels of job complexity.
Nevertheless, some research suggests that facets related to Neuroticism might affect labor outcomes primarily through the channel of educational attainment.

Other traits, such as Openness to Experience and Agreeableness affect more specific outcomes, such as selection into particular careers or type of compensation.

Table A9 in Web Appendix A7 summarizes a variety of studies that associate personality with labor market outcomes.
A link between personality and health has been noted for thousands of years.

Hippocrates argued that an imbalance of the four temperaments would affect both personality and physical health.

Consistent with Hippocrates’ ideas, recent evidence suggests that personality predicts health.

The mechanisms are relatively unexplored but some empirical evidence suggests that personality affects health-related behavior, psychological responses, and social relationships (Kern and Friedman [2010a]).
A growing body of work shows that personality measures predict longevity.

Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner et al. [2007] review evidence from 34 different studies on the predictive validity of Big Five personality traits, relative to that of cognitive ability and socioeconomic status, for longevity.

Most studies in their meta-analysis control for relevant background factors, including gender and severity of disease.

Roberts and colleagues convert the results of each study into correlation coefficients that can be compared across studies.
As shown in Figure 17, Conscientiousness was a stronger predictor of longevity than any other Big Five trait and a stronger predictor than either IQ or socioeconomic status.

In general, traits related to Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness are associated with longer lives, whereas those related to Neuroticism are associated with shorter life spans.

The magnitudes of the relationships, however, vary across studies and not all results are replicable.

While the specific channels through which personality affects longevity and health are largely unknown, several studies provide some clues.
Figure 17: Correlations of mortality with personality, IQ, and socioeconomic status (SES)

Notes: The figure represents results from a meta-analysis of 34 studies. Average effects (in the correlation metric) of low socioeconomic status (SES), low IQ, low Conscientiousness (C), low Extraversion/Positive Emotion (E/PE), Neuroticism (N), and low Agreeableness (A) on mortality. Error bars represent standard error. The lengths of the studies represented vary from 1 year to 71 years.
Source: Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner et al. [2007]
Personality may affect health-related behavior, such as smoking, diet, and exercise.

For example, Hampson, Goldberg, Vogt et al. [2007] find that high scores of teacher-assessments of Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness during elementary school predict overall health status during midlife (less smoking, more exercise, better self-rated health) and indirectly affect health through educational attainment.

The correlations that were statistically significant at the 5% level or less ranged from 0.06 for the effect of Extraversion on physical activity to 0.12 for the effect of Conscientiousness on self-reported health status.
Both the initial level and the growth in hostility (a facet of Neuroticism) throughout elementary school predict cigarette, alcohol, and marijuana use in high school, and sociability (a trait related to Extraversion) predicts drinking but not smoking (Hampson, Tildesley, Andrews et al. [2010]).

As Figure 18 illustrates, Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] find that locus of control and self-esteem affect the probability of daily smoking for males.

The gradient is steepest at the high and low quantiles of the locus of control and self-esteem distribution.
Notes: The data are simulated from the estimates of the model and our NLSY79 sample. We use the standard convention that higher deciles are associated with higher values of the variable. The confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapping (200 draws). Solid lines depict probability, and dashed lines, 2.5%-97.5% confidence intervals. The upper curve is the joint density. The two marginal curves (ii) and (iii) are evaluated at the mean of the trait not being varied. 
Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 22]
Although many studies control for socioeconomic and health factors associated with mortality, most do not explore how personality affects health throughout the life-cycle (Kern and Friedman [2010b]).

The relationship between health and personality is complicated because health can affect personality.

Some studies investigate the mechanisms by which personality affects health by considering how initial endowment of traits and health affect mid-life outcomes, such as healthy behavior and education, which in turn can influence health and longevity.

For example, Gale, Batty and Deary [2008] find that a one standard deviation increase in age-10 locus of control decreases the risk of adult obesity by 8 (p<0.05).
Similarly, Friedman, Kern and Reynolds [2010] find that in a cohort of gifted children, Conscientiousness better predicted longevity and social interactions at age 70.

They find that Neuroticism is associated with worse health for women but better health for men.

These studies do not account for the possibility that health and personality exhibit dynamic complementarities over the life cycle.
Several studies have controlled for reverse-causality by using structural models to estimate the life-cycle evolution of health.

Using a structural model of skill expression, Conti and Heckman [2010] estimate the causal relationship between personality traits, initial health endowments and endogenous choices about schooling and post-schooling outcomes.

They find that women sort into higher education based on cognitive ability, personality traits and initial health endowment.

Furthermore, personality and health status measured during youth explain more than half of the difference in poor health, depression and obesity at age 30.
Figure 19 shows that for males, personality and health endowments are more predictive than the cognitive ones, whereas for females all three are similarly predictive.

Using similar methods, Savelyev [2010] finds that both child Conscientiousness and higher education increase survival through age 80, but these traits serve as substitutes for each other so that effects of education are only strong at low levels of Conscientiousness.
Figure 19: Effects of Cognitive, Noncognitive, and Health Endowments on Self-rated Health (A lower number corresponds to a better outcome)

Notes: Effects of endowments on fair or poor health outcomes for males (A) and females (B). The endowments and the outcomes are simulated from the estimates of the model in each panel; when the authors compute the effect of each endowment on the outcome, they integrate out the observable characteristics and fix the other two endowments at their overall means.
Source: Conti and Heckman [2010].
In sum, Conscientiousness seems to be the most important Big Five trait in predicting health outcomes.

Personality likely affects health through behaviors such as smoking, eating, and exercising.

Studies that model the dynamic evolution of health over the life cycle find that personality affects health outcomes as much as cognitive measures or more so in some cases.
7.D. Crime

- Few studies have examined the relationship between the Big Five and criminal behavior.

- The available evidence suggests that Big Five Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are important protective factors against criminal activity.

- Figure 20 illustrates that in a sample of at-risk youth, boys who had committed severe delinquent behaviors were more than three quarters of a standard deviation lower in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, as measured by mother’s reports at age 12 or 13, than boys who had committed minor or no delinquent behaviors up to that age (John, Caspi, Robins et al. [1994]).
Figure 20: Juvenile delinquency and the Big Five

Notes: Delinquents are those who have committed at least one of the following: breaking and entering, strongarming, or selling drugs. Non-delinquents have committed at most one of the following: stealing at home, vandalism at home, or theft of something less than $5. The y-axis reports mean differences in standardized scores of the Big Five measures based on mother’s reports. The measures were taken at ages 12-13 and reflect cumulative delinquent behavior.

Source: John, Caspi, Robins et al. [1994].
Much of the literature in criminology focuses on the effects of self-control on crime.

People with low self-control are “impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted, and non-verbal” (Gottfredson and Hirschi [1990], p. 90).

Measures of self-control are associated with Big Five Conscientiousness (O’Gorman and Baxter [2002]).

Several other studies have confirmed that self-control is associated with criminal activity.
In an international sample, controlling for basic demographics, a measure of self-control explained between 10 and 16% of the variance in contemporaneously measured theft, assault, drug use, and vandalism (Vazsonyi, Pickering, Junger et al. [2001]).

Self-control relates to controlling impulsive behavior so it is not surprising that sensation-seeking and impulsivity are also positively associated with crime.

In a sample of college students, partial correlations between a crime factor and sensation-seeking and impulsive behavior were of 0.27 and 0.13 respectively, when controlling for peer behavior and measures of risk appraisal (Horvath and Zuckerman [1993]).
Self-control might not be the entire story.

Negative emotionality, a tendency towards depression likely related to Neuroticism, is associated with contemporaneously measured delinquency.

Raw correlation coefficients range from $r = 0.13$ for whites ($p < 0.05$) and $r = 0.20$ for blacks ($p < 0.05$) in one sample (Caspi, Moffit, Silva et al. [1994]) to $r = 0.22$ ($p < 0.01$) in another sample (Agnew, Brezina, Wright et al. [2002]).

None of these studies control for cognitive ability nor do they address causality.
Further, an emerging literature investigates causal effects of education on crime.

Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] estimate a causal model of personality and education accounting for reverse causality.

They find that both cognitive traits and noncognitive traits, as captured by locus of control and self esteem are affected by schooling.
These traits in turn are equally predictive of criminal activity.

Using changes in compulsory schooling laws as an instrument, Lochner and Moretti [2004] and Machin, Marie and Vujić [2010] find that years of education are negatively associated with criminal activities in the US and UK, respectively.

In a structural model of skill production, Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] show that personality traits are relatively more important in predicting criminal activity than are cognitive traits.
8. Stability and Change in Personality Traits and Preferences

- In this section, we review empirical evidence that shows that personality and IQ change over the life cycle.
- We explore three channels through which personality can change.
First, we discuss the contribution of ontogeny (programmed developmental processes common to all persons) as well as sociogeny (shared socialization processes) and show how aspects of personality, such as sensation-seeking, evolve as the brain develops.

Second, we show how personality changes through external forces that operate through alterations in normal biology, such as brain lesions and chemical interventions.

Third, and most relevant for policy, we show that education, interventions, and parental investment can affect personality throughout the lifecycle.

We also discuss the less abundant evidence on the malleability of preferences.
8.A. Broad Evidence on Changes in Traits over the Life Cycle

- The malleability of personality can be defined and measured in several ways: Mean-level change refers to change over time in absolute levels of a trait and is measured by changes in measures of a trait over time.

- Rank-order change, in contrast, refers to changes in the ordinal ranking of a trait in a population and is measured by rank correlations among longitudinal measures.

- One commonly held view is that rank-order or mean-level change in personality is nearly impossible after early adulthood.
The speculation of James [1890] that “in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again” (pp. 125-126) is widely touted (see Costa and McCrae [1994], McCrae and Costa [1990; 1994; 1996; 2003], Costa, McCrae and Siegler [1999]).

However, mounting evidence suggests that the personality-as-plaster view is not correct (Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer [2006], Roberts and Mroczek [2008]).
During the early years of life, mean-level changes in measured traits are obvious and dramatic.

For example, children become much more capable of self-control as they move from infancy into toddler and preschool years (McCabe, Cunnington and Brooks-Gunn [2004], Mischel and Metzner [1962], Posner and Rothbart [2000], Vaughn, Kopp and Krakow [1984]).

But mean-level changes in measured personality are also apparent, albeit less extreme, later in life.
In a 2006 meta-analysis of longitudinal studies, Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer [2006] examine cumulative lifetime change in Big Five Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Agreeableness.

They disaggregate Big Five “Extraversion” into social dominance (assertiveness, dominance) and social vitality (talkativeness, gregariousness, and sociability).

Figure 21 shows that people typically become more socially dominant, conscientious, and emotionally stable (opposite of neurotic) across the life cycle, whereas social vitality and Openness to Experience rise early in life and then fall in old age.

Surprisingly, after childhood, the greatest mean-level change in most measured personality traits takes place not during adolescence, but rather in young adulthood.
Figure 21: Cumulative mean-level changes in personality across the life cycle

Note: Social vitality and social dominance are aspects of Big Five Extraversion. Cumulative d values represent total lifetime change in units of standard deviations ("effect sizes").
Source: Figure taken from Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer [2006] and Roberts and Mroczek [2008]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.
Figure 22: Longitudinal analysis (top panel) and cross-sectional analysis (bottom panel) of mean-level change in cognitive skills over the lifespan.

Notes: T-scores on the y-axis are standardized scores with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of ten. Source: Figures taken from Schaie [1994]. Used with permission of the publisher.
Figure 22: Longitudinal analysis (top panel) and cross-sectional analysis (bottom panel) of mean-level change in cognitive skills over the lifespan.

Notes: T-scores on the y-axis are standardized scores with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of ten. Source: Figures taken from Schaie [1994]. Used with permission of the publisher.
Figure 23: Fluid intelligence decreases and crystallized intelligence increases across the lifespan

Source: Figure from Horn [1970]. Used with permission of Elsevier.
Rank-order stability in measured personality increases steadily over the lifespan.

Figure 24 shows that seven-year test-retest stability estimates for personality plateau far from unity, at $r = .74$, about the same level as terminal stability estimates for IQ Roberts and DelVecchio [2000]. However, measured personality does not reach this plateau until at least age 50; whereas IQ reaches this plateau by age six or eight (Hopkins and Bracht [1975], Schuerger and Witt [1989]).

Figure 25 shows rank order stability of IQ over broad age ranges.
Figure 24: Rank-order stability of personality over the life cycle

Notes: The meta-analysis reflects test-retest correlations over, on average, 6.7-year periods.
Source: Figure taken from Roberts and DelVecchio [2000]. Reprinted with permission of the author.
Figure 25: Rank-order stability of IQ across the life span

Notes: The points represent ten-year, test-retest correlations over ten-year intervals. Grade level, not age, is on the x-axis. Source: Figure reproduced from Hopkins and Bracht [1975]. Used with permission of the publisher.
8.B. Evidence on Ontogenic and Sociogenic Change

- A useful dichotomy contrasts normative change, defined as changes that are typical of the average individual in a given population and caused either by biological programming (ontogenic) or by predictable changes in social roles (sociogenic), and non-normative change, encompassing both intentional change, caused by deliberate, self-directed efforts, deliberately chosen changes in social roles and atypical life events (trauma, for example).
If, as McCrae and colleagues have claimed, normative changes reflect genetically programmed processes then investment should not affect change.

The current literature in psychology claims that genetic factors are largely responsible for stability in personality in adulthood whereas environmental factors are mostly responsible for change (Blonigen, Hicks, Krueger et al. [2006]; Plomin and Nesselroade [1990]).
In a longitudinal study of twins surveyed at age 20 and then again at age 30, about 80 percent of the variance of the stable component of personality was attributed to genetic factors (McGue, Bacon and Lykken [1993]).

In the same study, change in measured personality was mostly attributed to environmental factors.

Helson, Kwan, John et al. [2002], for example, document the substantial influence that social roles and cultural milieu can have on personality development.

Their analysis is consistent with an economic model of investment and the response of measured traits to incentives.

However, recent evidence suggests that environmental factors, and in particular stable social roles, also contribute to stability in personality and that genetic factors can contribute to change (see Roberts, Wood and Caspi [2008] for a review).
Research on IQ also points to the enduring effects of genes, in contrast to more transient effects of environmental influences, which depend on a multitude of unstable variables, including social roles, levels of physical maturity and decline, and historical and cultural milieu.

Increases in the heritability of IQ from childhood (about 40 percent) to adulthood (estimates range from 60 percent to 80 percent) are well-documented in studies of behavioral genetics and possibly reflect increasing control of the individual (vs. parents) over environment (Bergen, Gardner and Kendler [2007]; McGue, Bouchard, Iacono et al. [1993]; Plomin, DeFries, Craig et al. [2002]).

Heritability estimates for Big Five traits are relatively stable across the life cycle at about 40 to 60 percent (Bouchard and Loehlin [2001]).
Behavioral genetics studies typically estimate the effect of common parental environments on adult measures of outcomes to be near zero, but Turkheimer, Haley, Waldron et al. [2003] find estimates from such studies to be biased downward by the over-representation of middle- and upper-class families.

Among poor families, Turkheimer et al. find that 60 percent of the variance in IQ is accounted for by shared environment and heritability estimates are much smaller than they are for affluent families, whereas among affluent families, the contribution of heritability is much larger.

Krueger and colleagues have recently demonstrated that other moderators also influence the heritability of traits (see Krueger, South, Johnson et al. [2008]).
Genes exert their influence in part through the selection and evocation of environments that are compatible with one’s genotype—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “gene-environment correlation” or “nature via nurture” (see Rutter [2006a]).

As individuals move from childhood to adulthood, they have more control over their environments, and thus gene-environment correlation becomes more important because shared environments become less common.
Substantial but temporary influence of environment is a basic assumption of the Dickens- Flynn model reconciling the high heritability of IQ and massive gains of IQ between generations (Dickens and Flynn [2001]).

The relatively short half-life of common environmental influences may also explain why adopted children resemble their biological parents more and more and their adopted parents less and less as they grow older (Scarr, Weinberg and Waldman [1993]).
It is important to note that the family studies of genetic influence measure only the effects of shared environments, which become less similar as children age.

Thus even identical twins may be motivated to seek out different environments over time (Rutter [2006a]).

Recent evidence that first born children grow up, on average, to have three points higher IQ than their younger siblings reinforces the point that parents do not necessarily provide identical environments in childhood (Kristensen and Bjerkedal [2007]).

Conti, Heckman, Yi et al. [2010] demonstrate how parents differentially respond to health shocks of identical twins.

As mentioned earlier, genes could affect not only the base level of personality but also how personality changes over the life cycle.

Just as people grow taller throughout childhood, people’s personalities might naturally develop, even without investment.

Steinberg [2008] speculates that typical biological (ontogenic) development explains the surge of risk-taking in adolescence followed by the decline in adulthood.

Figure 26 illustrates his conjecture about how basic intellectual ability and psychosocial maturity (related, e.g., to impulsivity, risk perception, sensation-seeking, future orientation) evolve over the life cycle.
He argues that intellectual ability peaks around age 16, whereas psychosocial maturity develops during late adulthood.

In his model, the increase in adolescent risk taking due to a restructuring of the brain’s dopaminergic system (responsible for the brain’s reward processing) in such a way that immediate or novel experiences yield higher rewards, especially in the presence of peers.

He attributes declines in risk-taking due to development of the brain’s cognitive control system, specifically improvements in the prefrontal cortex which promote aspects of executive function such as response inhibition, planning ahead, weighing risks and rewards, and the simultaneous consideration of multiple information sources.
Interestingly, even in his model, sensation-seeking partly depends on the presence of peers, which corresponds to aspects of the situation ($h$) in the framework of Section 3.

This example highlights the difficulty in disentangling situational and biological changes in personality.
Figure 26: Proportion of individuals in each age group scoring at or above the mean for 26- to 30-year-olds on indices of intellectual and psychosocial maturity.

What factors other than preprogrammed genetic influences might account for mean-level changes in personality?

Personality change in adulthood may be precipitated by major shifts in social roles (for example, getting a job for the first time, becoming a parent). If social role changes are experienced by most people in a population at the same time, we will observe the effects as mean-level changes in measured personality.

If, on the other hand, these social roles are not assumed synchronously, we will observe rank-order changes.
One difficulty with many of the studies that address this question is the problem of reverse causality.

Changes in personality may drive social role changes rather than the other way around.
8.C. External Changes to Biology

- The previous subsection discuss the difficulty in disentangling biological changes in personality from environmental or situational effects.

- In this subsection we provide some evidence on causal changes in personality due to external forces that either damage parts of the brain or abruptly alter the chemistry of the brain.
Brain Lesion Studies

- Brain lesion studies provide the most dramatic and convincing evidence that personality can change.

- The most famous example is Phineas Gage, a construction foreman whose head was impaled by a metal spike and who subsequently changed from being polite and dependable to rude and unreliable (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank et al. [2005]).

- Since then, there have been many more case studies of patients with brain damage.
For example, Matar, Jurado, Garca-Snchez et al. [2001] describe the behavior of a Spanish patient whose head was impaled by an iron spike, injuring both frontal lobes.

Like Phineas Gage, his behavior changed.

After the accident, he had difficulty planning, became more irritable, and had problems regulating emotions.

Unlike Phineas, he was cheerful and did not display anti-social behavior, suggesting the personality is malleable in different dimensions, even through brain damage.
The effects of brain damage are persistent.

After five years, patients who suffered traumatic head injuries have social impairments, such as anger control, even when their performance on cognitive tasks returns to the normal range (Lezak [1987]).
Using more advanced methods, neuroscientists have delved deeper into the inner workings of the brain.

Some recent studies have investigated how two parts of the brain, the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), affect personality by regulating emotion.

Bechara [2005] discusses how emotion might allow people to assign and store value to particular outcomes in a way that is useful for decision-making.

The amygdala is thought to signal “impulsive” emotional responses to immediate environmental stimuli, such as reacting quickly to a snake.
In contrast, the VMPC is thought to signal “reflective” emotional responses to memories and knowledge.

These two parts of the brain conflict with each other when people make decisions: signals from the amygdala induce behavior that implicitly values immediate outcomes, whereas signals from the VMPC reflect long-run considerations.

The stronger signal dictates the resultant behavior.

People with damage to these parts of the brain, exhibit changes in personality.
For example, people with damage to the VMPC, the part that regulates “reflective” emotion, tend to act impulsively and seem to overvalue short-term outcomes in a way that leads to long-term financial loss and loss of friendships, despite having relatively normal levels of intellectual capacity.

These findings are consistent with McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen’s $\beta - \delta$ system (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein et al. [2004]).

However, some recent research in neuroscience challenges this theory (Monterosso and Luo [2010]).
Further experiments involving these parts of the brain highlight why attempts to separate cognitive and noncognitive traits might be futile.

For example, Bechara and Damasio [2005] study the performance of patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) in a seemingly cognitive task.

The participants were given the Iowa Gambling Task, in which they repeatedly chose between four decks of cards that represented lotteries of different value, unknown to the participant at the onset.
Throughout the experiment, the authors also measured skin conductance responses (SCRs), a known physiological reflection of emotion.

By trial and error, participants without lesions learned to choose the “better” decks of cards with lower short-term payoffs but higher average payoffs.

The normal participants also showed emotional activity both when picking their card and when receiving the rewards or penalties.
In contrast, people with lesions never learned to pick the better decks, seemingly because they could not develop emotional responses.

Patients with damage to the amygdala never showed emotional response to rewards or penalties, suggesting they never learned to value the outcomes at all.

Patients with damage to the VMPC showed emotional response only when receiving the reward or penalty but not when selecting decks, suggesting that they might not have reflective emotional responses crucial in considering future consequences.

The findings suggest that emotion helps to guide decision-making.

Numerous other studies show the role of the amygdala in signaling emotions and its relationship to cognition and behavior (Phelps [2006]).
A few recent studies show that it is possible to alter preferences and personality through experiments that change the brain’s chemistry.

For example, magnetic disruption of the left lateral prefrontal cortex can increase experimentally elicited discount rates (Figner, Knoch, Johnson et al. [2010]).

Similarly, nasal sprays of oxytocin increase trust (distinct from altruism or ability to assess probabilities) in a game-theoretic experiment (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak et al. [2005]).

As discussed in Section 5, the Big Five traits are linked to personality disorders.
Therefore, it is not surprising that administering paroxetine, a drug for treating depression, decreases Neuroticism and increases Extraversion.

More surprising is that the drug affects personality above and beyond its direct effects on depression.

Furthermore, patients who become less neurotic are also less likely to relapse even after treatment, suggesting that paroxetine might have a long-lasting impact through a bio-chemical change in the brain (Tang, DeRubeis, Hollon et al. [2009]).

Similarly, Knutson, Wolkowitz, Cole et al. [1998] find evidence that paroxetine can diminish hostile behavior through a decrease in general negative effect.
8.D. The Evidence on the Causal Effects of Parental Investment, Education, and Interventions

- Even though brain lesion studies and laboratory experiments provide convincing causal evidence that personality can be changed, they are not viable mechanisms for large scale policy interventions.

- A growing body of evidence suggests that education, parental investment, and interventions can causally affect personality traits.

- More than just ontogenic and sociogenic processes are at work.
A major contribution of economics to the literature in psychology is to develop and apply a framework to investigate how investment, including education, work experience, and self help, changes traits.

We discuss the evidence on trait changes through these mechanisms, using the theoretical framework introduced in Section 3.H as a guide.

In all of the models considered in this subsection, the development of traits arises from purposive actions of agents and not just from exogenous biological processes.
The empirical literature has not estimated investment model (16) in Section 3.H in its full generality.

It focuses on estimating productivity functions (1) specified in terms of traits $\theta$.

Due to data limitations, there is no empirical work yet to report that standardizes for effort or for situation.

To simplify the notation, we keep $h$ implicit.
• Denote the productivity traits at age $v$ by $\theta^v$.

• Substituting for actions in terms of their determinants, the performance on task $j$ at age $v$ is

$$P^v_j = \phi^v_j \left( \theta^v, e^v_j \right), \quad j \in \{1, \ldots, J\}, \quad v \in V$$

(22)

where $e^v_j$ is effort devoted to task $j$ at time $v$.

• For simplicity, break $\theta^v$ into cognitive ($\mu$) and personality ($\pi$) components: $\theta^v = (\theta^v_\mu, \theta^v_\pi)$, using the notation of Section 3.

• $e^v_j$ depends on preferences, rewards and information.
The vector of productivity traits evolves via a simplified version of (16):

\[ \theta^{\nu+1} = f^\nu (\theta^\nu, IN^\nu, h^\nu), \nu = 1, \ldots, V. \]  

\( IN^\nu \) is interpreted very broadly to include investment by parents, schools, work experience and interventions.

\( \theta^0 \) is the vector of initial endowments.

Some components of effort may be included in investment.
• The productivity of investment can depend on the age at which it is made.

• A crucial feature of the technology that helps to explain many findings in the literature on skill formation (see Cunha and Heckman [2007; 2009]) is complementarity of traits with investment:

\[
\frac{\partial^2 f^v(\theta^v, IN^v, h^v)}{\partial \theta^v \partial (IN^v)'} \geq 0. \tag{24}
\]
Technology (23) is characterized by static complementarity between period \( \nu \) traits and period \( \nu \) investment.

The higher \( \theta^\nu \), the higher the productivity of the investment.

There is also dynamic complementarity if the technology determines period \( \nu + 1 \) traits \( (\theta^{\nu+1}) \).

This generates complementarity between investment in period \( \nu + 1 \) and investment in period \( s, s > \nu \).

Higher investment in period \( \nu \) raises \( \theta^{\nu+1} \) because technology is increasing in \( IN^\nu \), which in turn raises \( \theta^s \) because the technology is increasing in \( \theta^\nu \), for \( \nu \) between \( \nu \) and \( s \).

This, in turn, increases \( \frac{\partial f^s(\cdot)}{\partial IN^s} \) because \( \theta^s \) and \( IN^s \) are complements, as a consequence of (24).
Dynamic complementarity explains the evidence that early nurturing environments affect the ability of animals and humans to learn.

(See Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron et al. [2006].)

It explains why investments in disadvantaged young children are so productive.

Early investments enhance the productivity of later investments.

Dynamic complementarity also explains why investment in low ability adults often has such low returns because the stock of $\theta^v$ is low.
Using dynamic complementarity, one can define critical and sensitive periods for investment.

If $\frac{\partial f^v(.)}{\partial I_N^v} = 0$ for $v \neq v^*$, $v^*$ is a critical period for that investment.

If $\frac{\partial f^v(.)}{\partial I_N^v} > \frac{\partial f^{v'}(.)}{\partial I_N^{v'}}$ for all $v \neq v'$, $v$ is a sensitive period.

The technology of skill formation is consistent with a body of evidence that shows critical and sensitive periods in human development for a variety of traits.
Figure 27 shows how adult outcomes are shaped by sequences of investments over the life cycle.

The importance of the early years depends on how easy it is to reverse adverse early effects with later investment.

The literature shows that resilience and remediation are possible, but are more costly later on.

The accumulation of investments over the life cycle of the child determines adult outcomes and the choices people will make when they become adults.

To capture these interactive effects requires nonlinear models.
For the purposes of policy analysis, it is important to know at which stage of the life cycle interventions are the most effective and to move beyond the correlations between early life and later life events to understand the mechanisms of skill formation.

Cunha and Heckman [2008] and Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] estimate technologies of skill formation to understand how the skills of children evolve in response to the stock of skills children have already accumulated, the investments made by their parents and the stock of skills accumulated by the parents.
Figure 27: A Life Cycle Framework for Organizing Studies and Integrating Evidence: Period Life Cycle

\[ \theta^v \text{ capacities at } v \]
\[ \text{IN}^v: \text{investment at } v \]
\[ h^v \text{ environments at time } v \]
\[ \theta^{v+1} = f^v(\theta^v, \text{IN}^v, h^v) \]
The most general empirical specification of the technology to date is that of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010].

They allow for $Q$ different developmental stages in the life of the child: $q \in \{1, \ldots, Q\}$.

Developmental stages may be defined over specific ranges of ages, $v \in \{1, \ldots, V\}$, so $Q \leq V$.

They assume that each component of $\theta^v$ and $IN^v$ can be represented by a scalar, as can environment $h^v$. 
Letting $IN_k^v$ be investment in trait $k$ at age $v$, they estimate a CES, stage-specific, version of (23) for trait $k$ at stage $q$:

$$\theta_{k}^{v+1} = \left[ \gamma_{\mu,k}^{q} (\theta_{\mu}^{v})^{\sigma_k^{q}} + \gamma_{\pi,k}^{q} (\theta_{\pi}^{v})^{\sigma_k^{q}} + \gamma_{IN,k}^{q} (IN_k^v)^{\sigma_k^{q}} + \gamma_{E,k}^{q} (h^v)^{\sigma_k^{q}} \right] \frac{1}{\sigma_k^{q}},$$

$$\gamma_{q,m,k} \geq 0, \quad \sum_{m \in \{\mu,\pi,IN,h\}} \gamma_{q,m,k} = 1 \text{ for all } k \in \{\mu, \pi\}$$

and $q \in \{1, \ldots, Q\}$. (25)
A main finding of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] is that the elasticity of substitution $\sigma_{\mu}^q$ governing the acquisition of cognitive traits decreases with $q$.

This is consistent with other evidence that shows the declining malleability of cognition with age, i.e., that cognitive deficits are easier to remedy at early ages than at later ages.

At the same time, $\sigma_{\pi}^q$, associated with personality, stays roughly constant over $q$.

This is consistent with evidence on the emergence of psychological maturity, as shown in Figure 26.
Adjoined with measurement systems for productivity on tasks in period $V$ (equation (22)), the econometric model is a "state space" model that accounts for errors in measurements and endogeneity of inputs.

Cunha and Heckman [2008] and Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] estimate these models on panel data on the growth dynamics of individuals and show that accounting for measurement error and endogeneity is empirically important.

They focus on the substitution parameters to examine the issue of the cost of remediating early disadvantage at later ages.

Their findings shed light on the dynamic process of capability formation in a way that raw correlations do not.

They find that self-productivity becomes stronger as children become older, for both cognitive and noncognitive capability formation.

The elasticity of substitution for cognitive inputs is smaller in second stage production, so that it is more difficult to compensate for the effects of adverse environments on cognitive endowments at later ages than it is at earlier ages.
This finding helps to explain the evidence on ineffective cognitive remediation strategies for disadvantaged adolescents documented in Cunha, Heckman, Lochner et al. [2006], Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron et al. [2006] and Cunha and Heckman [2007].

Personality traits foster the development of cognition but not vice versa.

It is equally easy to substitute at both stages for socioemotional skills over the life cycle.

Overall, 16% of the variation in educational attainment is explained by adolescent cognitive traits, 12% is due to adolescent personality (socioemotional traits), and 15% is due to measured parental investments.
8.D.1. Evidence of Change in Traits from Other Studies of Parental Investment

- Cunha, Heckman, Lochner et al. [2006] summarize a large literature on child development.

- Evidence from a substantial literature suggests that the enduring effects of environment are greater earlier in life for intelligence.

- Duyme, Dumaret and Tomkiewicz [1999] studied children with IQs below 86 who were adopted between the ages of four and six into stable homes.

- In adolescence, children adopted into high-SES homes gained an average of 19.5 IQ points; children adopted into low-SES homes showed an average gain of 7.7 IQ points.
In studies of Romanian children taken from impoverished orphanages and placed into middle-class British homes, the long-term salutary effects of adoption on cognitive ability were dramatic when infants were placed before they reached six months, and markedly less so when adoption was delayed until later ages (Beckett, Maughan, Rutter et al. [2006]).

Notably, children adopted at different ages between six to 42 months did not differ at age 11 from each other in the terms of cognitive ability, with all children demonstrating an average deficit of 15 IQ points relative to children who had been adopted earlier in life.
The effects of low nutrition had no effect on cognitive outcomes at age 11, suggesting a prominent role for psychological deprivation.

As Beckett and colleagues point out, these findings are consistent with the existence of a very early critical or sensitive period for intellectual development in which particular environmental stimuli are necessary for normative axonal rewiring (see Uylings [2006] and Rutter [2006b] for reviews).
8.D.2. The Effects of Schooling on Cognitive and Personality Traits

- Despite a large literature on the effects of schooling on shaping preferences (see Bowles and Gintis [1976] and the literature it spawned), there is surprisingly little direct evidence on the effect of schooling on cognitive and personality traits.

- An exception is the analysis of Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006].

- The authors formulate and estimate an economic model that identifies the effect of cognitive and personality traits on schooling and a variety of other outcomes.

- The model controls for the effect of schooling in boosting both cognitive and personality measures and thus controls for reverse causality.
They estimate their model on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, which has measures on the components of the Armed Services Vocational Battery (ASVAB) that are used to create the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) that is widely used as a measure of cognition.

In addition, the NLSY79 has two measures of personality.
The Rotter Locus of Control Scale, discussed in Section 5, is designed to capture the extent to which individuals believe that they have control over their lives through self-motivation or self-determination as opposed to the extent that the environment controls their lives (Rotter [1966]). The NLSY79 data also contain the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, which attempts to assess the degree of approval or disapproval of one’s self (Rosenberg [1965]).

The relationship between these measures and the Big Five traits of Neuroticism is discussed in Section 5.
Different traits might be more responsive to investment at different ages.

Figure 28 shows the causal effects of years of schooling attained on five components of the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT).

Schooling in the high school years has moderate but positive effects on the measures of cognition, consistent with previous research by Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004], Neal and Johnson [1996], and Winship and Korenman [1997].
- The most dramatic causal effects on cognition arise from college attendance.
- In contrast, locus of control is primarily affected by high school attendance but not college attendance.
- On measures of self-esteem, an additional year of high school and college play powerful roles.
Figure 28: Causal Effect of Schooling on ASVAB Measures of Cognition

Notes: Effect of schooling on components of the ASVAB. The first four components are averaged to create male's with average ability. We standardize the test scores to have within-sample mean zero, variance one. The model is estimated using the NLSY79 sample. Solid lines depict average test scores, and dashed lines, 2.5 confidence intervals.
Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 4].
Figure 29: Causal Effect of Schooling on Two Measures of Personality

Notes: Effect of schooling on socioemotional scales for males with average ability, with 95% confidence bands. The locus of control scale is based on the four-item abbreviated version of the Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale. This scale is designed to measure the extent to which individuals believe that they have control over their lives through self-motivation or self-determination (internal control) as opposed to the extent to which individuals believe that the environment controls their lives (external control). The self-esteem scale is based on the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. This scale describes a degree of approval or disapproval toward oneself. In both cases, we standardize the test scores to have within-sample mean zero and variance one, after taking averages over the respective sets of scales. The model is estimated using the NLSY79 sample. Solid lines depict average test scores, and dashed lines, 2.5%-97.5% confidence intervals.

Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 5]
Some other evidence supports the possibility that school can affect measures of intelligence.

Cahan and Cohen [1989] use a quasi-experimental paradigm comparing children who differ in both age and schooling to show that schooling increases intelligence test scores independently of age.

Schooler and colleagues show that complex (that is, cognitively demanding) work increases intellectual functioning among adults and vice versa (Schooler, Mulatu and Oates [1999]; Kohn and Schooler [1978]).
8.D.3. Evidence from Interventions

- As noted in the introduction, the Perry Preschool Program, did not have a lasting improvement on cognitive ability, but did improve important later-life outcomes through personality (Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010]).
- The Perry preschool program enriched the lives of low-income black children with initial IQs below 85 at age 3.
- In addition, there were home visits to promote parent-child interactions.
- The program stopped after two years.
Participants were taught social skills in a “plan-do-review” sequence where students planned a task, executed it and then reviewed it with teachers and fellow students.

They learned to work with others when problems arose.

The program was evaluated by the method of random assignment.
The program had strong effects for both boys and girls, although the effects differ by age and outcomes.

The program had a statistically significant rate of return of around 6-10% per annum for both boys and girls above the post-World War II stock market returns to equity in U.S. labor market estimated to be 5.8%.

The Perry Preschool Program worked primarily through socioemotional channels.

Figure 30 shows that the program improved scores on the California Achievement Test (CAT).

The program, however, did not have a lasting effect on IQ scores.
This evidence is consistent with the discussions in Sections 5 and 7 that show that achievement test results are strongly dependent on personality traits (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman et al. [2008]; Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2009]).

Indeed the personalities of participants improved.

Participants had better direct measures of personal behavior (a weighted average of “absences and truancies,” “lying and cheating,” “stealing,” and “swears or uses obscene words” measured by teachers in the elementary school years).
Participants improved their internalizing behavior, which, as noted in Section 5, is related to Neuroticism.

Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010] decompose the treatment effects of the Perry Program into components due to experientially-induced changes of cognition (IQ) and the measures of personality at their disposal, and to residual factors.

Personality played a more important role in outcomes, particularly in later life.
Figure 30: Perry Age 14 Total CAT Scores, by Treatment Group

CAT = California Achievement Test
Treatment: \( N = 49 \); Control: \( N = 46 \)
Statistically Significant Effect for Males and Females (p-values 0.009, 0.021 respectively)
Source: Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010].
Analyses of data Project STAR, a program that randomly assigned kindergarteners and teachers to classes of different sizes, yields similar results to the Perry Program.

Using data from Project STAR, Dee and West [2008] find that assignment to a small class is associated with positive changes in personality.

In a follow-up reanalysis, Chetty, Friedman, Hilger et al. [2010] examine the Project STAR program and find that students placed in higher quality kindergarten classes as measured by their peer’s average performance on a Stanford Achievement Test tend to have higher test scores at the end of kindergarten.

The effect fades out over time; by eighth grade, students in better kindergarten classes perform no differently on tests.

However, as with the Perry Program, the benefits reemerge later in life.
People in better kindergarten classrooms had significantly higher earnings in early adulthood.

Furthermore, kindergarten classroom quality also predicted better 4th and 8th grade behavior as measured by teacher-assessed effort, initiative, interest in the class, and disruptive behavior.

In turn, behavior predicted earnings in adulthood, suggesting that personality is the channel through which better kindergarten classrooms improve earnings.
The Perry Program and Project STAR did not primarily focus on improving personality traits, but a few programs have.

The Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) curriculum teaches self-control, emotional awareness, and social problem-solving skills and is aimed at elementary school children (see Bierman, Coie, Dodge et al. [2010]).

A recent random-assignment, longitudinal study demonstrates that the PATHS curriculum reduces teacher and peer ratings of aggression, improves teacher and peer ratings of prosocial behavior, and improves teacher ratings of academic engagement.
PATHS is an exemplar of school-based social and emotional learning (SEL) programs, whose impact on both course grades ($d = 0.33$), where $d$ is measured in units of standard deviations ("effect sizes"), and standardized achievement tests scores ($d = 0.27$), was recently documented in a meta-analysis of controlled studies involving over 270,000 children in kindergarten through college (Durlak and Weissberg [in press]).

Likewise, a random assignment evaluation of Tools of the Mind, a preschool and early primary school curricula, shows that in short-term follow-ups it can improve classroom behavior as well as executive function, defined as higher-level cognitive skills including inhibitory control, working memory, and cognitive flexibility (Barnett, Jung, Yarosz et al. [2008]; Barnett, Yarosz, Thomas et al. [2006]; Bodrova and Leong [2001]; Bodrova and Leong [2007]; Diamond, Barnett, Thomas et al. [2007]).
Similar findings are reported for the Montessori preschool curriculum (Lillard and Else-Quest [2006]).
There is also evidence that targeted intervention efforts delivered to individual children can improve aspects of Conscientiousness.

These studies are typically more short-term and, in contrast to the multi-faceted curricula described above, are designed to isolate a particular mechanism for behavior change.

For instance, Rueda and colleagues [2005] designed a set of computer exercises to train attention in children between four and six years of age.
Children in the intervention group improved in performance on computer tasks of attention relative to children who instead watched interactive videos for a comparable amount of time.

Similarly, Stevens and colleagues [2008] designed a six-week computerized intervention and showed that it can improve selective auditory attention (i.e., the ability to attend to a target auditory signal in the face of an irrelevant, distracting auditory signal).

Again, all of these programs have short-term follow-ups.
Several studies suggest that personality can be remediated in adolescence.

Martins [2010] analyzes data from EPSIS, a program developed to improve student achievement of 13-15 year-olds in Portugal by increasing motivation, self-esteem, and study skills.

The program consists of one-on-one meetings with a trained staff member or meetings in small groups.

The intervention was tailored to each participant’s individual skill deficit.

Overall, the program was successful, cost-effectively decreasing grade retention by 10 percentage points.
Bloom, Gardenhire-Crooks and Mandsager [2009] analyze the data from the National Guard Youth Challenge program, a 17-month intervention for youth who have dropped out of high school.

While the program does not require military enrollment, it stresses aspects of military discipline.

The program features a two-week assessment period, a 20-week residential program often conducted at a military base, and a one-year mentoring program.
Nine months after entry, participants in the program were 12% more likely to obtain a high school, 9% more likely to be working full time, and less likely to be arrested.

Furthermore, participants had higher levels of self-efficacy (a trait related to Emotional Stability), suggesting that personality change might have helped with the improvements.

However, the 9-month follow-up period is too short to know if the program has long-lasting effects.

While these studies show that personality can be improved through intervention, a couple of other studies show less promising results when the interventions were targeted at adolescents (Rodriguez-Planas [2010], Holmlund and Silva [2009]).

She finds giving words of encouragement, an intervention that might boost short-term self-efficacy or self-esteem, before a diagnostic math test was associated with 2.5% higher scores amongst all students \((p < 0.05)\) and 8% higher scores amongst those with self-reported difficulties with math\((p < 0.01)\).

The result suggests that non-cognitive skills can be shaped, even in the very short-term.

Personality is malleable throughout the life cycle.

For example, Gottschalk [2005] shows evidence from a randomized control trial that working at a job can improve locus of control.

He uses data from the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) in which some welfare recipients were randomly offered substantial subsidies to work.

The subsidy more than doubled the earnings of a minimum wage worker, and people in the experiment group worked about 1/3 more hours than those in the control group.

After 36 months, those who received the subsidy were more likely to have an improved locus of control.
Several other studies find similar results.

Clausen and Gilens [1990] claim that female labor force participation increases self-confidence.


Others show that marital and family experiences shape personality (Helson and Picano [1990], Roberts, Helson and Klohnern [2002]).

However, these studies are all correlational in nature.

None of these studies have the random assignment features of the Gottschalk study.
Personality may even be malleable at the end of life.

Jackson, Hill, Payne et al. [2010] investigate causal mechanisms behind the association between Openness to Experience and IQ, using data from a 16-week intervention designed to boost inductive reasoning for elderly people.

The intervention consisted of lab training for how to recognize novel patterns and around 10 hours a week of solving crossword, Sudoku, and logic puzzles.

Controlling for inductive reasoning, self-reported Openness to Experience increased for participants during the training program relative to those in a waitlisted control group.

However, the elderly people were not followed after the program to determine whether the change was long-lasting nor were other important outcomes, like life expectancy, tracked.
Table 13 summarizes the evidence on the effects of interventions that is discussed in this subsection.

The evidence is consistent with effects of interventions but there are woefully few causal study with long term follow-up.
### Table 13: The Effect of Interventions on Personality

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barnett, Jung, Yarosz et al. [2008]</td>
<td>Outcome(s): <em>internalizing and externalizing behavior</em> – teacher-assessed Problem Behaviors Scale of the Social Skills Rating System (SSRS)</td>
<td><strong>Intervention:</strong> participation in a year-long Tools of the Mind preschool program compared to a generic curriculum</td>
<td><strong>Data:</strong> collected by authors; 210 children aged 3 and 4</td>
<td><strong>Control Variables:</strong> n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Methods:</strong> Students were randomly assigned to classrooms within the same school after parental consent was obtained. Teachers were randomly assigned to control and treatment classrooms.</td>
<td><strong>Timing of Measurements:</strong> Baseline – Behavior measures were taken prior to the program in October-November of 2002.</td>
<td><strong>Post-treatment</strong> – Behavioral measures taken immediately after the program in May-June of 2003.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behncke [2009]</td>
<td>Outcome(s): <em>cognitive ability</em> – performance on a diagnostic math test for a college economics class</td>
<td><strong>Intervention:</strong> verbal encouragement before the test</td>
<td><strong>Data:</strong> Collected by author; 440 students from a Swiss University</td>
<td><strong>Control Variables:</strong> n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Methods:</strong> The treatment was randomly assigned to already-established classroom sections. Students were unaware they were in an experiment.</td>
<td><strong>Timing of Measurements:</strong> Post treatment – The diagnostic test was given immediately after the treatment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bierman, Coie, Dodge et al. [2010]</td>
<td>Outcome(s): <em>teacher-assessed behavior</em> – Social Health Profile (SHP) including authority acceptance, cognitive concentration, and social competence; <em>peer-assessed behavior</em> – survey questions about behavior labeled as aggressive, prosocial, and hyperactive</td>
<td><strong>Intervention:</strong> – participation in a 3-year-long Fast Track PATHS program focused on improving self-control and positive social behavior</td>
<td><strong>Data:</strong> 2,937 children (grades 1-3)</td>
<td><strong>Control Variables:</strong> time, time squared, individual baseline, school baseline, city fixed effects, poverty level, interactions of intervention with time, time squared, individual baseline, poverty, and poverty and time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Methods:</strong> School administrators were offered participation in the experiment, knowing the school would receive treatment with a 50% probability.</td>
<td><strong>Timing of Measurements:</strong> Baseline – Behavioral measures were taken prior to the program in the fall of 1st grade.</td>
<td><strong>Post treatment</strong> – Behavioral measures were taken again in the spring of 3rd grade around the end of the program.</td>
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</table>
## Table 13: The Effect of Interventions on Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Authors</th>
<th>Outcome(s)</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Timing of Measurements</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bloom, Gardenhire-Crooks and Mandsager [2009]</td>
<td><strong>educational attainment</strong> – high school diploma, <strong>labor force participation</strong> – whether working at a job, <strong>personality</strong> – self-efficacy and social adjustment</td>
<td>Participation in the ChalleNGe program consisting of a 2-week assessment period, 20-week residential program often conducted at a military base, and a 1-year mentoring program.</td>
<td>1,018 young people between the ages 16 and 18 who have dropped out of school</td>
<td>sample member characteristics</td>
<td>During treatment – Outcomes were measured approximately 9 months after entering the study.</td>
<td>Participants in the program were 12.0 percentage points more likely to earn a high school diploma (p&lt;0.01), 9.1 percentage points more likely to be working (p&lt;0.01), and 9.6 percentage points less likely to report a self-efficacy and social adjustment score one standard deviation below the mean (p&lt;0.01). The program also improved measures of criminality and health.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chetty, Friedman, Hilger et al. [2010]</td>
<td><strong>non-cognitive skills</strong> – an index based on the teacher’s observations of the students</td>
<td>Randomly assigned kindergarten class quality as measured by difference in percentiles of the mean end-of-year test scores of the students’ classmates and the scores of the other kindergarteners at the same school.</td>
<td>Project STAR; 1,671 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade students and 1,780 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade students.</td>
<td>wave fixed effects, student gender, free-lunch status, age, race, a quartic in the claiming parent's household income interacted with parent's marital status, mother's age at child's birth, whether the parents own a home, and whether the parents made a 401 (k) contribution between 1996 and 2008</td>
<td>During treatment – Age-relevant SAT tests were administered in kindergarten and grades 1-3. Post treatment – Age-relevant SAT test were and behavioral surveys were given in 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; and 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade. College quality and attendance was at age 19. Earnings were at age 27.</td>
<td>A 1 percentile improvement in kindergarten class quality increases an index of non-cognitive skills by 0.15 percentiles in 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade (p&lt;0.05) and 0.13 percentiles in 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade (p&lt;0.05). Better classrooms were also associated with better life outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond, Barnett, Thomas et al. [2007]</td>
<td><strong>Executive Function</strong> – Dots-Mixed task, Reverse-Flanker task</td>
<td>Participation in a Tools of the Mind program instead of the regular school district’s balanced literacy program.</td>
<td>147 preschoolers</td>
<td>age, gender, years in program</td>
<td>Post-treatment – The tasks were given at the end of the program 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; year of the program.</td>
<td>84% of students in Tools were successful in the Reverse Flanker task compared to 65% in the control group. Almost twice as many students in the Tools program achieved greater than 75% accuracy on the Dots-Mixed task compared to the control group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13: The Effect of Interventions on Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Outcome(s)</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Timing of Measurements</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki et al. [in press]</td>
<td>social and emotional learning skills, attitudes, positive social behavior, conduct problems, emotional distress, academic performance</td>
<td>270,034 kindergarten through high school students</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>All studies included follow-up data at least 6 months after the intervention.</td>
<td>The mean difference in standard deviations between the treatment and control groups are as follows: social and emotional learning skills = 0.57 (p&lt;0.05); attitudes = 0.23 (p&lt;0.05); positive social behavior = 0.24 (p&lt;0.05); conduct problems = 0.22 (p&lt;0.05); emotional distress = 0.24 (p&lt;0.05); academic performance = 0.27 (p&lt;0.05). All variables are coded so that positive numbers reflect better outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gottschalk [2005]</td>
<td>Personality – four measures of locus of control based on whether the respondent agrees strongly, agrees, disagrees, or strongly disagrees with statements</td>
<td>Self-Sufficiency Project; 4,958 single parents over the age of 19 in New Brunswick and British Columbia</td>
<td>age, age squared, region, gender, speaks French, number of children</td>
<td>Locus of control was measured before the program. Locus of control was measured again 18 and 36 months after the baseline.</td>
<td>Using whether the participant received the subsidy as an instrument for hours worked, the authors find that working tends to improve locus of control by the 36 month re-interview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010]</td>
<td>externalizing behavior, internalizing behavior – measured using Pupil Behavior Inventory (PBI) of teacher reports</td>
<td>Perry Preschool Program; 123 preschool students</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>The measure of externalizing and internalizing behavior are taken ages 7-9 (2-4 years after treatment). Other life outcomes were measured at ages 19, 27, and 40.</td>
<td>The intervention improved mean externalizing behavior for both males and females (p&lt;0.05). It had a borderline statistically significant impact on internalizing behavior. The program also benefited a wide range of later life outcomes primarily through non-cognitive skills.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13: The Effect of Interventions on Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holmlund and Silva [2009]</th>
<th>Outcome(s): academic performance – average of standardized test scores in English, Math, and Science</th>
<th>Data: “xl club programme,” National Pupil Database (NPD), Pupil Level Annual Schools Census (PLASC); 2,333 and 259,189 treated and control students aged 14 in England (2004)</th>
<th>Control Variables: sex, language, eligibility for school meals, special needs status, and race</th>
<th>Unconditional on observables, the performance of the students in the xl club is 1.2 to 1.4 standard deviations lower than the control subjects (p&lt;0.01). Using OLS, the effect is -0.17. The propensity score estimates are -0.13 and -0.15. For the difference-in-difference models estimated using OLS and propensity score matching, there is no longer a significant effect of the program in either direction. Overall the program had little effect.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention: participation in the “xl programme” targeting the non-cognitive skills of secondary school students aged 14</td>
<td>Methods: logit, propensity score matching, OLS, difference-in-difference, double differences, random-growth model</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: Baseline – Standardized exams were taken at age 11 and age 14 before the start of the program.</td>
<td>Post treatment – Standardized national exams were taken again at age 16 at the end of the program (2 years after the beginning of the program).</td>
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</table>
Table 13: The Effect of Interventions on Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social and Character Development Research Consortium [2010]</th>
<th>Outcome(s): Social and Emotional Competence – self-efficacy for peer interaction, normative beliefs about aggression, empathy; Behavior – altruistic behavior, positive social behavior, problem behavior, ADHD-related behavior; Academics – engagement with learning, academic competence and motivation; Perceptions of School Climate – positive school orientation, negative school orientation, student afraid at school, victimization at school, feelings of safety, student support for teachers</th>
<th>Data: Social and Character Development (SACD) Research Program; around 6,000 elementary school students</th>
<th>Control Variables: gender, race, parental education, family structure, household income, measures of poverty, parental labor force participation, teacher race, teacher experience. (Note: the specific set depended on the outcome of interest.)</th>
<th>Fall 2003 to Spring 2005: Of the 20 outcomes, the only significant effects were that participation in any program was associated with a 0.07 standard deviation higher primary caregiver-reported altruistic behavior (p&lt;0.10), a 0.06 standard deviation lower child-reported altruistic behavior (p&lt;0.10), and a 0.12 standard deviation higher teacher-reported student support for teachers (p&lt;0.05).</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Methods: Schools were first asked to participate in the program and were then randomly assigned one of the 7 SACD programs or left with their traditional curriculum. The data were analyzed using HLM.</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: Baseline – Initial measures were collected near the start of the program in the fall of 2004. During treatment – Data were collected in the spring of 2005, the fall of 2005, and the spring of 2006. Post treatment – Data were collected near the end of the program in the spring of 2007.</td>
<td>Fall 2003 to Spring 2006: Of the 20 outcomes, the only significant effects were that participation in any program was associated with a 0.07 standard deviation lower child-reported self-efficacy for peer interactions (p&lt;0.10) and 0.16 standard deviation higher teacher-reported student support for teachers (p&lt;0.05).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intervention: 7 different programs (ABC, CSP, LBW, PA, PATHS, 4Rs, SS) aimed to build Social and Character Development (SACD) compared to the “standard practice” programs at non-treated schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>Other Analyses: The results were similar when analyzing each of the programs separately and when using growth curves. There is some evidence that programs were beneficial for high-risk students.</td>
<td>Fall 2003 to Spring 2007: There were no statistically different effects of participating in any program.</td>
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</table>
**Table 13: The Effect of Interventions on Personality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jackson, Hill, Payne et al. [2010]</th>
<th>Outcome(s): Personality – Openness to Experience</th>
<th>Data: collected by the authors; 183 adults aged 60 to 94</th>
<th>Control Variables: n/a</th>
<th>On average, participants in the program were 0.39 standard deviations higher in Openness to Experience after the program relative to people in the control group (p&lt;0.05).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention: participation in a 16-week inductive reasoning training program coupled with 10 hours of puzzle solving per week</td>
<td>Methods: Participants were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups after deciding to participate in the experiment.</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: Baseline – Openness to Experience was measured pre-treatment.</td>
<td>During treatment – Openness to Experience was measured at week 5 and at week 10.</td>
<td>Post treatment – Openness to Experience was measured at the end of the program in week 16.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Martins [2010]</th>
<th>Outcome(s): Educational attainment – grade retention</th>
<th>Data: EPIS database; 15,307 students in 7th-9th grade in Portugal</th>
<th>Control Variables: student fixed effects, time fixed effects</th>
<th>The program reduced annual grade retention by at least 10.1 percentage points (p&lt;0.001).</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention: participation in the EPIS program that boosts non-cognitive skills including motivation, self-esteem, and study skills</td>
<td>Methods: linear probability model, quasi-randomization</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: Baseline – Measures of academic achievement were taken before the intervention in 7th and 8th grade.</td>
<td>During treatment – Measures were taken each quarter that the students participate in the program through 7 academic quarters after the beginning of the program (students entered the program at different times and remained in treatment for different lengths of time but were followed if they left treatment).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Table 13: The Effect of Interventions on Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rodríguez-Planas [2010]</th>
<th><strong>Outcome(s):</strong> educational attainment – high-school completion and post-secondary education; academic achievement – math test score percentile, reading test score percentile, GPA; labor market success – earnings during the last year of the program, 3 years after the program, and 5 years after the program</th>
<th><strong>Data:</strong> Quantum Opportunity Program (QOP); 1,069 students from seven large US cities</th>
<th><strong>Control Variables:</strong> n/a</th>
<th><strong>Timing of Measurements:</strong> Post treatment – Interviews were conducted during the last year of the program, 3 years after the program, and 5 years after the program.</th>
<th><strong>During last year of the program:</strong> Participation in the program was associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the probability of graduating high school (p&lt;0.10) and 6 percentage point increase in the probability of attending college (p&lt;0.10). There were no differences in academic achievement.</th>
<th><strong>3 years after the program:</strong> Participation in the program was associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the probability of ever attending college (p&lt;0.10), 9 percentage point increase in the probability of attending college (p&lt;0.05), and a 7 percentage point decrease in the probability of having a job (p&lt;0.10).</th>
<th><strong>5 years after the program:</strong> There are no significant differences 5 years after the program.</th>
<th><strong>Findings for sub-populations:</strong> The program benefited people who were 14 or less upon entering high school significantly more than older students. It also tended to benefit girls more than boys.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention:</strong> – participation in the Quantum Opportunity Program (QOP) that was available for 5 years, centered around mentoring, developing social skills, community service, and providing incentives for academic success for 9th graders</td>
<td><strong>Methods:</strong> Students in schools participating in the program were randomly assigned to treatment or control groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stevens, Fanning, Coch et al. [2008]</td>
<td><strong>Outcome(s):</strong> attention – ERP index of selective auditory attention; language skills – Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-3</td>
<td><strong>Data:</strong> collected by the authors; 33 children aged 7 on average</td>
<td><strong>Control Variables:</strong> Test scores were normalized by age</td>
<td><strong>Timing of Measurements:</strong> Baseline – Measures were taken right before the start of the program.</td>
<td><strong>Post treatment</strong> – Measures were taken again at the end of the program (6 weeks after the start).</td>
<td><strong>Baseline:</strong> The increase in the attention was 0.81 standard deviations higher for the participants than for the non-participants (p&lt;0.01).</td>
<td><strong>Post treatment:</strong> The increase in the receptive language scores was 0.91 standard deviations higher in the participants than for the control group (p&lt;0.01). There was no significant effect on expressive language scores between the participants and the control group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention:</strong> Participation in a six-week (100 min/day) computerized training program for boosting language skills (Fast ForWord program)</td>
<td><strong>Methods:</strong> The students who received treatment were compared to a control group who did not.</td>
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Evidence from Psychotherapy

- The accomplishments of psychotherapy also support the possibility of intentional, mean-level, and rank-order change.

- In a 1980 meta-analysis, Smith, Glass and Miller summarized 475 controlled studies, concluding that individuals who undergo psychotherapy are about 0.85 standard deviations better on outcome measures than those who do not.

- The large benefits of therapy are not permanent, however: the effect of psychotherapy over control conditions falls to about half a standard deviation two years after therapy is concluded.

- Moreover, it is not clear that the effects of psychotherapy on individuals who seek change generalize to individuals who are not actively seeking treatment for a condition that causes them distress.
More evidence on the possibility of intentional change comes from the psychological literature on expertise.

Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Rmer [1993] demonstrate across domains as diverse as chess, musical performance, and digit span memory, that thousands of hours of sustained, deliberate practice lead to dramatic improvements in skill.

Ericsson points out that the top performers in nearly every field do not reach world-class levels of skill until at least ten years of deliberate practice.
Less is known about the stability of economic preferences.

To our knowledge, no longitudinal study has measured the mean-level or rank-order stability of time preference over the life cycle (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue [2002]).

A handful of cross-sectional studies using relatively small samples have examined mean-level stability, and their findings are mixed.

Green, Fry and Myerson [1994a] and Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] find that discount rates are lower among older individuals.
On the other hand, Chesson and Viscusi [2000] claim to find that older adults have higher discount rates than younger adults.

Chao, Szrek, Sousa Pereira et al. [2007], de Wit, Flory, Acheson et al. [2007], and Coller and Williams [1999] find no relationship between age and discount rate.

Finally, Read and Read [2004] find a curvilinear relationship in which older people discount more than younger people, and middle-aged people discount less than either group.

Sahm [2007] shows that risk aversion increases with age.

Table 14 below summarizes the findings for a variety of recent economic studies on the heritability, malleability and stability of preferences and personality.
In summary, the answer to the question of whether change in personality is possible must be a definitive yes, both in terms of mean-level and rank-order change.

However, change may be more difficult later in the life cycle, change may be more enduring for some (such as more emotionally stable individuals) than for others, change may require persistent and consistent environmental pressure (as opposed to transient pressure from short-term interventions), and there are powerful forces for stability (such as genes and habit) which make change difficult.
Summary of Section 8

- We have reviewed the evidence on change in personality over the life cycle.
- The evidence is strong that personality changes over the life cycle.
- The evidence on the source of the change is less clear cut.
- Three competing visions of the source of change are discussed: (a) The ontogenic and sociogenic model that describes how biology and socialization produce changes in average traits.
This approach does not explain why individuals develop with different trajectories; (b) The biological and pharmacological model that describes how alterations in the biology of the person can explain variations in personality and its evolution; and (c) The intervention/family influence model that describes how investment and environments influence changes.

No study considers all three sources of development at once, largely due to data limitations.

The evidence from the intervention and family influence studies suggests that interventions that target personality may be effective but much further evidence is required to specify the exact mechanisms through which the interventions work.
**Table 14: The Heritability, Malleability, and Stability of Preferences and Personality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Main Variable(s)</th>
<th>Data and Methods</th>
<th>Causal Evidence</th>
<th>Main Result(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Booth and Nolen</td>
<td>Outcome(s): risk aversion – choice whether to accept a real-stakes lottery vs. a certain payment</td>
<td>Data: Collected by the authors; 260 students in grades 10 and 11 from eight publicly funded schools in England (2007)</td>
<td>Controls: n/a</td>
<td>Girls from coed high schools in England were 36% (p&lt;0.01) less likely to accept a real-stakes lottery. Girls assigned to experimental group with all girls were 12% (p&lt;0.10) more likely to accept the lottery than girls in coed experimental groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explanatory Variable(s): short-term gender environment – whether the student was assigned to a coed or single-sex group during the experiment; long-term gender environment – whether the student attends a coed or single-sex school</td>
<td>Methods: probit, IV, propensity score matching</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: The measures are contemporaneous.</td>
<td>Theory: Growing up in an environment with males might cause girls to act more “feminine” and take fewer risks. Similarly, boys in coed environments might exhibit more risk-taking in coed environments to try to impress girls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burks, Carpenter,</td>
<td>Outcome(s): demand for information – whether people request the results of their IQ and numeracy tests; overconfidence – the difference between ex-ante estimate of quintile in the IQ distribution and the true quintile in the IQ distribution</td>
<td>Data: Collected by authors, administrative data from a human resources department; 1,063 trainee truckers from a U.S. trucking company</td>
<td>Controls: actual test performance, harm avoidance, education levels, ethnicity, sex, age, age squared, household income, before test belief, and post-test belief</td>
<td>Demand for information: A one quintile increase in a person's post-test belief about their test performance is positively associated with 3.0 percentage point higher probability of demanding information about the IQ test (p&lt;0.01) and a 3.9 percentage point higher probability of demanding information about the numeracy test (p&lt;0.01).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goette et al.</td>
<td>Explanatory Variable(s): self-assessment – before and after test assessments of the quintile of performance on the tests; personality – a self-reported measure of harm avoidance, social closeness, social potency, and stress reaction</td>
<td>Methods: probit, ordered probit, linear spline</td>
<td>Timing of Measurements: People are asked about their expected performance on the IQ and numeracy tests before and after they take the test. Later, they are given the option to receive the results of their tests.</td>
<td>Overconfidence: Harm avoidance and stress reaction are negatively correlated with overconfidence on the IQ test (p&lt;0.01,p&lt;0.05). Social potency is positively linked to overconfidence on the IQ test (p&lt;0.01). Stress reaction is negatively associated with overconfidence on the numeracy test (p&lt;0.01). Social potency is positively associated with overconfidence on the numeracy test (p&lt;0.05).</td>
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<td>Theory: People misjudge their own ability due to systematically biased noisy signals; value their self-assessed ability and avoid updating when the assessment is positive; or sub-consciously misrepresent their own ability for strategic advantage.</td>
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</table>
### Table 14: The Heritability, Malleability, and Stability of Preferences and Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Outcome(s)</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Controls</th>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Determinants of risk attitude</th>
<th>Stability of risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2011]</td>
<td>Risk preference – survey responses on an 11 point scale, relating to general risk preference and risk preference relating to car driving, financial matters, leisure and sports, career and health.</td>
<td>Collected by the authors/ German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP); 450 adults from Germany/22,019 people living in Germany</td>
<td>(1) sex, age, height, parental education, 2002 household wealth, 2003 household income</td>
<td>People might have a stable, underlying preference for risk across contexts.</td>
<td>Being female and age are negatively associated with willingness to take risks (p&lt;0.01). Height is positively associated with a general willingness to take risks (p&lt;0.01). Mother and father's education is positively associated with willingness to take risks (p&lt;0.01).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explanatory Variable(s): (see controls)</td>
<td>Methods: interval regression, probit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The 6 measures of contextualized risk aversion are correlated with each, other ranging from 0.456 – 0.609.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Einav, Finkelstein, Pascu et al. [2010]</td>
<td>Risk preference – order rankings of observed decisions to purchase different purchase insurance for health, prescription drugs, dental, short-term and long-term disability and 401(k) plans</td>
<td>Administrative data; 12,752 employees of Alcoa, Inc. (2004)</td>
<td>Controls: the menu of benefits the employee faced, predictable and idiosyncratic risk</td>
<td>People might have a stable, underlying preference for risk across contexts.</td>
<td>The average correlations between the various domains are 0.164. Results withstand several robustness checks.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Explanatory Variable(s): predictable risk – predictions from modeling risk based on observables; idiosyncratic risk – realization of risk in the net period</td>
<td>Methods: Spearman correlations, OLS</td>
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<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Outcome(s): trust – willingness to “invest” in a real-stakes two-player trust game; risk preference – real stakes trust game played against a computer that randomly gave payoffs; altruism – the amount transferred back by the investee in the trust game (there are no monetary incentives to do so)</th>
<th>Data: Experiment conducted by the authors; 194 male university students in Germany</th>
<th>Controls: n/a (RCT)</th>
<th>Theory: There is a notion of “trust” distinct from altruism and risk preference.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak et al. [2005]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People who receive the oxytocin nasal spray invest on average 17% more than those who do not (p&lt;0.05). Risk behavior does not differ between the two groups. Trustees do not show more altruistic behavior when given oxytocin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Variable(s):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>biological determinant of trust – nasal spray of oxytocin</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Table 14: The Heritability, Malleability, and Stability of Preferences and Personality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Outcome(s)</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Controls</th>
<th>Explanatory Variable(s)</th>
<th>Heritability of the risk measure</th>
<th>Heritability of the conservative measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Le, Miller, Slutske et al. [2010]</td>
<td>risk preference – response to a 10-point survey question about willingness to take risks in general, response to a 10-point survey questions about how conservative the subject is in making decisions to spend money</td>
<td>Australian Twin Study of Gambling; 1,875 complete twin pairs</td>
<td>none (2) gender, age, education, and marital status</td>
<td>genetic makeup – differences in outcomes between monozygotic and dyzygotic twins</td>
<td>0.192 (p&lt;0.01)</td>
<td>0.134 (p&lt;0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutter, Feri, Kocher et al. [2010]</td>
<td>social preferences (selfish – the agent maximizes their own payoff; regardless of the other person’s, efficient – maximizing the sum of the allow payoffs; maximin – maximizes the minimum of the two payoffs; FS inequality – values own payoff plus a weighted average of the difference between own payoff to the others payoffs; ERC inequality – people get disutility if their payoff deviates from the group average) – choices of allocating resources between peers in a real-stakes experiment</td>
<td>Collected by the authors; 883 students aged 8 to 17 living in Australia (2008)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>20% of girls and boys behave selfishly. An increase in one year of age is associated with a 0.044 increase in the probability of have efficiency preferences for males (p&lt;0.01), but has not effect for females.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Summary and Conclusions

- We summarize this chapter by providing provisional answers to the eight questions posed in Section 1.
How can we fit psychological constructs of personality into an economic framework? Can conventional models of preferences in economics characterize the main theories in personality psychology?
We have defined personality as a response function of agents that depends on situations (including incentives), endowments of traits, information, and resources within a conventional economic model.

Psychologists analyze a richer class of actions than economists normally consider.

We show how to integrate these actions into economic theory.

The leading models of personality psychology are special cases of our model.
What are the main measurement systems used in psychology for representing personality and personality traits, and how are they validated? How are different systems related to each other? What is the relationship between standard measures of personality and measures of psychopathology and child temperament?
In Section 5, we exposit the main systems for measuring personality, focusing primarily, but not exclusively, on the Big Five model.

We consider the strengths and limitations of the systems and the relationships among competing systems.

We show how measures of psychopathology are extreme manifestations of personality traits.

We link specific diagnoses of pathology with conventional measures of psychological traits.
What is the relationship between economic preference parameters and psychological measurements?
We review an emerging body of research that relates economic preference parameters (risk aversion, time preference, ambiguity aversion, social preferences) to the Big Five traits and to measures of self-esteem and personal control that are linked to the Big Five traits.

- Time preference is negatively correlated with IQ and the ability to control attention.
- Risk preference is negatively correlated with IQ and other measures of cognition.
- Higher IQ people are more consistent in their choices under uncertainty.
- While risk aversion is related to personality traits, the available evidence suggests that marginal ambiguity aversion is not.
- Social preferences are predicted by measured personality traits, but the evidence on this question is not strong.
How stable across situations and over the life cycle are preference parameters and personality traits?
We review the history of the person-situation debate between the social psychologists who maintain the primacy of the situation in determining behavior and the traits theorists who maintain the primacy of traits in explaining behavior.

Behavioral economists, as a group, have adopted the situationist point of view.

Extreme advocates of the situationist point of view claim that there is no personality construct.
The issue hinges on the nonlinearity of action, effort, and productivity functions.

In the presence of such nonlinearities, measured traits (e.g., actions) depend on situations and tasks.

A large body of evidence suggests that nonlinearity is an empirically important phenomenon.
Nonetheless, a large body of evidence suggests that there are stable personality traits that predict a variety of behaviors in different situations.

Personality is not an ephemeral creation of situations, nor is its manifestation invariant across situations.

Moreover, personality traits are not set in stone.

They change over the life cycle.
The evidence on the stability of preference parameters across situations and over life cycle is less ample.

There is evidence that standard separable models of preferences are inadequate descriptions of choice behavior.

There is little evidence on the stability or instability of preference parameters over the life cycle.
What is the evidence on the predictive power of cognitive and personality traits?
We present a large body of evidence that shows strong associations between personality traits and educational, labor market, health, and criminal outcomes.
What is the evidence on the causal power of personality on behavioral outcomes?
Few of the correlational studies relating personality to outcomes have a firm causal basis.

Personality psychologists do not yet attempt to establish the causal status of personality.

Recent studies in economics establish causal status of certain personality traits on outcomes under their maintained assumptions, which are inevitably subject to debate.

Research in this area is likely to flourish in the coming years.
Can personality be altered across the life cycle? Are interventions that change personality traits likely fruitful avenues for policy?
There is a small but growing body of intervention studies that establish that personality traits can be altered over long periods of time in response to interventions.

Some of the major effects of early childhood intervention programs appear to operate through their lasting effects on personality.

Family investment decisions also change personality.

The evidence to date suggests that interventions that boost personality traits can be effective in promoting adult success.
Do the findings from psychology suggest that conventional economic theory should be enriched?
• The evidence from psychology enriches economics by providing a more nuanced interpretation of human choice and actions.

• It promises to provide a deeper understanding of conventional economic preference parameters and how they arise.

• Unfortunately, at the time of this writing, this promise remains unfulfilled.

• Given the current state of evidence against conventional economic preference specifications (see, e.g., Starmer [2000] and the evidence in Section 6), this line of research is promising.