Resource Shares
With and Without Distribution Factors

*preliminary results: please do not cite*

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and Krishna Pendakur
Introduction

• Topics
  – Identification of Resources Shares in Collective Household Models
    • New Identification Theorem
  – Effect of Credit, and Micro-Credit, on children’s resource shares.
    • New empirical work with cool Malawian data.
    • Show how credit take-up affects the within-household distribution of resources.
    • Correct for endogenous credit takeup.
Microcredit

• Microcredit is ubiquitous – in 2010, 137.5 million people worldwide were received microcredit.
  • See State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign.
• It is fast growing. Women receiving microcredit increased from 10.3 million to 113 million between 1999 and 2010.
• One of the founding hopes of the microcredit revolution is that lending to poor women would make women and their children better off. See Yunus and Jolis (2003).
  – Microcredit has easy appeal – access to small loans gives opportunities for entrepreneurship.
  – Microcredit might create freedom in Sen’s sense: choice and agency equal goodness.
• plausible channels to household decisions and allocations:
  – microcredit is start-up capital, or
  – availability of microcredit reduces need for buffer stock savings.
Microcredit (continued)

• Difficult to control for endogeneity of take-up.
• Pitt and Khandker (1998) use eligibility criteria (land holdings)---they find a positive causal effect of microcredit on consumption.
  – But whose consumption?
  – Morduch (1998) and Roodman and Morduch (2012) complain about exogeneity in the above...
• Experimental designs can be used:
  – e.g. Crépon et al. (2011), Banerjee et al. (2010) and Karlan and Zinman (2010).
  – Nelson (2011) has a neat natural experiment in Thailand, and finds that credit expansion increases child labour. But are kids worse off?
• These studies typically find some effects on total household consumption, but not much on specific spending categories.
• They don’t speak to the within-household allocation.
Microcredit in Malawi

• Brune et al. (2010) examined microsaving commitment accounts via an experimental design
  – found commitment accounts increased total household expenditure. (Commitment accounts do not allow funds to be withdrawn except on prespecified dates.)
• We investigate the effect of microcredit on the within-household distribution of resources.
  – How does it affect childrens’ resources?
• The data are rich and provide plausible (and cool) instruments for the endogeneity of credit take up.
• We focus on microcredit loans as being distinct from other credit.
Collective Households

• Collective Household models
  – People have utility, not households. But, you can still learn stuff from household behaviour. See Becker (1964 and on), Apps and Rees (1980s and early 1990s), Chiappori (1990s on), Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (L3, 2000s).

• Efficient Collective Households (Chiappori etc)
  – Household are economic environments--- machines that make budget constraints faced by people. Prices or budgets faced by individuals may be observed or not.
  – Assume households reach an efficient allocation (GE decentralisation result—needs no consumption externalities), equivalent to
    • $\max_{q_1,q_2} m(q,y,d)u_1(q_1) + u_2(q_2)$
  – If we knew the budget constraints (shadow prices, shadow budget) faced by individuals, we could do standard consumer surplus.
  – Pareto weight $m$ maps into a resource share $n$. 


Resource Shares

• Each person gets to spend a fraction, called their *resource share*, of the household budget.
  – Different resource shares for different people.
• They spend it on goods at within-household prices. These prices may be unobserved.
• Bigger resource share = more consumption.
• Useful for inequality, poverty, social welfare.
Identification of Resource Shares

• Distribution factors affect resource shares but not preferences/shadow prices.
• Chiappori (many papers, many coauthors) and others: if you know (or assume) the shadow prices, the derivatives of resource shares with respect to distribution factors are identified from behaviour.
  – Cannot identify the level of resource shares.
  – Don’t need price variation.
  – L3 (2012): you can get the level of the resource share if you collect data on individual consumption of all goods.
• Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (BCL 2012): with known preferences and price variation, you can identify shadow prices and the level of resource shares from behaviour.
Resource Shares Independent of Expenditure

• If BCL model holds and resource shares are independent of household expenditure:
  • Lewbel and Pendakur 2008
    – with a strong preference restriction: levels of resource shares and cost of shadow price differences are semiparametrically identified for couples without price variation.
    – Donni (many years, many coauthors) extends to cover children.
  • Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur 2012
    – With a weaker preference restriction and an assignable good: levels of resource shares are semiparametrically identified for adults and children without price variation.
  • Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur 2012 (new!)
    – With no preference restriction, a distribution factor and an assignable good: levels of resource shares are nonparametrically identified for adults and children without price variation.
Expenditure-Dependence

- There are identification theorems that use the restriction that resource shares are independent of household expenditure.
- One can write structural models yielding this (DLP 2012, online appendix)
- About a dozen papers explicitly use this restriction; many more implicitly use them.
- What does the empirical evidence say? Tough, because the restriction is not testable in an Engel curve setting.
  - Lewbel+L3 (2012) test it in a setting with price variation, and find it is ok.
- It can be tested via stated preference.
Menon, Perali and Pendakur 2012

• “On the Expenditure-Dependence of Resource Shares” is a note which asks: do children’s resource shares depend on household expenditure?
• There is no formal structural model.
• Instead, we rely on the household head’s answer to the question: “Of the monthly expenditure of your household, what you spend in percent for your children?”.
The Data

• Household data from a survey sponsored by the Italian International Center of Family Studies (CISF).
  – Nationwide survey
  – Conducted in 2009
  – Computer assisted telephone interviews
  – 4,017 interviews, representative sample of Italian households from the population households with land-based or cellular telephone service.

• Our sample excludes:
  – Households with: no children
  – Households with: any children aged 18 or more, or four or more children;
  – Single-parent households, Multigenerational households*;
  – Households in the highest income group (topcoded)*;
  – Households reporting either 0% or 100% as the children’s resource share*;

• Final sample comprises 794 households with two adult parents and 1-3 children aged 18 or less.

• *You can bring these groups back in---it doesn’t change any result.
Two Children

Two Children

Children’s Resource Share vs Monthly Expenditure
Three Children

Resource Shares vs Monthly Expenditure

Children’s Resource Share

Monthly Expenditure, Euros
Resources Shares Seem Independent of Expenditure

• The data do not scream that resource shares vary much with household expenditure.
• Identification theorems like ours that depend on this restriction may be okay.
Identification Theorems: Notation

• People $j=m,f,c$ live together in a household.
• $y$ is household total expenditure, $d$ are distribution factors.
• Each person gets a resource share $n^j$ and so gets a shadow budget of $n^jx$.
  – $n^j$ can depend on $y,d$.
  – $n^j$ sum to 1.
• A Household’s Engel curve (budget share) for assignable good for person $j$ is $W^j(y,d)$. It is observed.
• A person’s shadow Engel curve (budget share), $w^j(y)$, describes what they would do if living alone facing the shadow price vector and budget. It is not observed.
Browning, Chiappori, Lewbel (BCL)

• efficient collective household model
  – No consumption externalities; shadow prices linear in market prices; efficient allocation is reached.

• They show identification of
  – Shadow prices and Resource shares (which may depend on $y$)
  – They do not need distribution factors $d$
  – But they need both price variation (to get shadow prices) and observed preferences $w^j(y)$ of people $j=m,f,c$ (to get resource shares).
    • Might observe $w^j(y)$ for $m,f$, but not $c$. 
BCL Engel Curves

• Given the BCL model, household demands for assignable goods are

\[ W^j(y,d) = n^j(y,d) w^j(n^j(y,d)y) \]

remember: \( w^j \) gives person \( j \)'s budget share at shadow prices.

• BCL: \( n^j(y,d) \) is identified if \( w^j(y) \) is observed.

• Not identified if \( w^j(y) \) are unknown.
  – Too many subscripts (5) of functions depending on \( y \).
Identification Without $d$ (DLP 2012)

• DLP (2012) theorems identify $n^i$ without $d$.
• Add resource shares independent of household budget and drop distribution factors: $n^i(y,d)=n^i$  
  
  $$W^i(y,d) = n^i(y,d)w^i(n^i(y,d)y)$$  
  
  $$\rightarrow W^i(y) = n^i w^i(n^i y)$$
• Still too many subscripts.
• But if $w^i = w$ so that people have identical preferences, then it is identified.
• DLP 2012 preference restrictions: They don’t need to be identical; they just need to be similar.
• Semiparametrically identified:
  – without observed $w^i(y)$.
  – even for children.
  – Intuition is easy to see with a linear model (in a couple of slides)
Identification with $d$ (DLP 2012b)

- Bring back $d$, keep $n_j$ independent of $y$: 
  $$W^j(y,d) = n^j(y)w^j(n^j(y)y)$$

- Let $y$ be discrete with values indexed by $t$: 
  $$W^j_t(y) = n^j_t w^j(n^j_t y)$$

- Since the function $w^j$ does not vary with $t$, and since $n^j_t$ sum to $1$ for each $t$, we can get a signal on $w^j$ from every $t$.

- **Theorem**: if $d$ (and $y$) have enough support points, $n^j_t$ and $w^j$ are identified from behaviour.

- Nonparametrically identified:
  - unlike DLP 2012, no preference restriction.
  - Like DLP 2012, assume $n^j$ independent of $y$, don’t observe $w^j(y)$.
  - Intuition is easy to see in a linear model (next slides)
Linear Individual Engel Curves

- For any given household size (number of kids) \( s=1 \ldots 4 \), let individuals \( j=m,f,c \) have Engel curve functions for their private assignable good (clothing):

\[ W^j_s(y) = a^j_s + b^j_s \ln y \]

- Here \( s \) is the number of children in the household.
- Household size \( s \) affects shadow prices, and so affects demands.
- Engel curves are linear at all price vectors, including the shadow price vectors given by \( s \).
Household Engel Curves

- For any given household size (number of kids) \( s=1 \ldots 4 \), household Engel curves for \( j \)'s private good is:
  \[
  W^j_s(y,d) = n^j_s(d) w^j(n^j_s(d)y)
  \]
- \( \Rightarrow W^j_s(y,d) = n^j_s(d) \left[ a^j_s + b^j_s (\ln y + \ln n^j_s(d)) \right] \)
- Household Engel curves are linear in \( \ln y \)
- Kids’ share is a lump shared by \( s \) kids, so their private good demand is
  \[
  W^c_s(y,d) = n^j_s(d) \left[ a^j_s + b^j_s (\ln y - \ln s + \ln n^j_s(d)) \right]
  \]
Identification without Distribution
Factors: SAP and SAT

- Kill distribution factors
- \[ W^j_s(y) = n^j_s \left[ a^j_s + b^j_s \left( \ln y + \ln n^j_s \right) \right] \]
- Too many things have \(j,s\) indices---we need restrictions (on preferences).
- Similar Across People (SAP): \(b^j_s = b_s\)
  - For a given \(s\), there are 3 slopes wrt \(\ln y\)
  - For a given \(s\), there are 3 unknowns: 2 \(n^j_s\) and \(b_s\)
- Similar Across Types (SAT): \(b^j_s = b^j\)
  - With 3 sizes \(s\), there are 9 slopes wrt \(\ln y\)
  - With 3 sizes \(s\), there are 9 unknowns: 6 \(n^j_s\) (2 for each of 3 household sizes) and 3 \(b^j\)
Identification with Distribution Factors (IDF)

- \( W^i_{j}(y,d) = n^i_{j}(d) \left[ a^i_{j} + b^i_{j} (lny + lnn^i_{j}(d)) \right] \)
- Rewrite y as an index, t.
- \( W^i_{st}(y) = n^i_{st} \left[ a^i_{s} + b^i_{s} (lny + lnn^i_{st}) \right] \)
- Still too many indices? No!
- By definition, distribution factors \( d \) do not affect preferences (\( a^i_{s} \) and \( b^i_{s} \)), so
  - For a given household size \( s \), and with 3 support points \( t \), there are 9 slopes wrt \( lny \)
  - For a given \( s \), there are 9 unknowns: 6 \( n^i_{st} \) and 3 \( b^i_{s} \)
Malawian Expenditure Data

• Same data as DLP 2012, but with a new wave added.


• About 10k households each year

• Ask about micro-credit take-up

• Linked to micro-credit availability
Data Details

- We use the Malawi Integrated Household Surveys, conducted in 2004-2005 and 2010-2011:
  - from the National Statistics Office of the Government of Malawi with assistance from the International Food Policy Research Institute and the World Bank, includes roughly 11,000 households in each wave.
  - The data are of high quality: enumerators were monitored; big cash bonuses were used as an incentive system; about 5 per cent of the original random sample in each years had to be resampled because dwellings were unoccupied; (only) 0.4 per cent of initial respondents refused to answer the survey.
- We use 5910 households comprised of non-urban married couples with 1-4 children aged less than 15, with nonmissing instruments
- We have about 30 households in each of about 200 villages
- Private assignable good is men’s, women’s and children’s clothing (including footwear).
The Data

Table 1: Malawian Wave 2 and 3 IHS Data Descriptives

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<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
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<td>dist facts d</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>business</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.316</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>199 obs</td>
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<td>0.010</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>-3.843</td>
<td>3.045</td>
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</table>
Model

- Assignable good: clothing (including footwear) for each person: male, female, children (pooled)
- Recall the model:
  \[ W_{ij} (y,d) = n_{ij} (d) \left[ a_{ij} + b_{ij} (lny + lnn_{ij} (d)) \right] \]
  - SAP: \( b_{ij} = b_s \)
  - SAT: \( b_{ij} = b \)
  - IDF: \( b_{ij} \) unrestricted
- Demographic controls \( z \).
  - 11 variables: survey year; region of residence; avg and min age of children; girl proportion; age and education of both adults; religion, access to roads and season of expenditure recall.
  - Add linear indices to \( n_{ij} (d) \), \( a_{ij} \) and \( b_{ij} \) and add an error term \( e \).
  \[ W_{ij} (y,d,z) = n_{ij} (d,z) \left[ a_{ij} + a(z) + (b_{ij} + b(z))(lny + lnn_{ij} (d,z)) \right] + e \]
Distribution Factors

• 4 Credit-oriented distribution factors
  – Dummies for “do you have an outstanding loan”
    • Business credit (about 12% of households), including the grocer (about half of business credit)
    • Microcredit (about 3% of households), about 75% explicit women’s micro-credit, 85% of loans go to female creditors
  – Loan size “what is the total loan amount?”
    • Median-normed and logged:
      – Ln(business loan/2700Kw)
      – ln(microcredit loan/7000Kw)
Endogeneity

- These credit-oriented distribution factors might be endogenous
  - Credit take-up might be correlated with preferences for private goods if, e.g., both are driven by go-get-em-ness.
- Credit drives total expenditure
  - Instrumented estimates suggest:
    - Loans are endogenous
    - Total expenditure is 11% higher for households with (median-sized) business loans
    - Total expenditure is 20% higher for those with (median-sized) microcredit loans.
    - Even more higher for bigger loans.
- If loans are endogenous, so is total expenditure
Instruments

• GMM to deal with endogeneity
  – ‘first stage F’ for ln(expenditure) is 36;
  – but, for credit much weaker: takeup: 6 and 2; size: 7 and 4

• Instruments
  – Interviewer counts of livestock and wealth
  – Presence of a branch office, regional office or head office of a micro-finance organisation in your village
  – Village mobility indicators for husband and wife
  – Measures of income and illness shocks
  – Distances to: government primary schools, markets, banks

• The data also have interviews with the (self-proclaimed) elders in each village.
Instruments: Elder Interviews

• Compared to five years ago, have conditions in your community for access non-agricultural business credit sources become:
  – Much worse
  – Worse
  – About the same
  – Better
  – Much better

• Similar questions on: the community’s willingness to help others; level of interpersonal trust; and community poverty prevalence.
# Resource Shares

## Table 3: Estimated Levels of Resource Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GMM Estimation--d,y endogenous</th>
<th>SAP</th>
<th>SAT</th>
<th>IDF</th>
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<tr>
<td>hh size person</td>
<td>Coef</td>
<td>Std Err</td>
<td>Coef</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 child man</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 child woman</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 child child</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 children man</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 children woman</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 children children</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 children man</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 children woman</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 children children</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 children man</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
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<td>4 children woman</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 children children</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.53</td>
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</table>

Hausman test: chi2, df, (pval) 718, 84, (0.000) 5234, 83, (0.000) 130,92, (0.005)

J-test: chi2, df, (pval) 101, 84, (0.052) 112, 85, (0.027) 104, 76, (0.018)

test against IDF: chi2, df, (pval) 20.5, 8, (0.009) 12.4, 9, (0.196)
### Table 3b: Resource Shares, IDF

<table>
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<th>hh size</th>
<th>person</th>
<th>Coef</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 child</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>woman</td>
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<td></td>
<td>child</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 children</td>
<td>man</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>woman</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>children</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 children</td>
<td>man</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.33</td>
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<td>4 children</td>
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<td></td>
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Credit Effects

Table 4: Estimated Responses of Resource Shares to Credit Variables

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<tr>
<th>dist. Factor</th>
<th>person</th>
<th>Coef</th>
<th>Std Err</th>
<th>Coef</th>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Microcredit loan</td>
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## Table 4: Estimated Responses of Resource Shares to Credit Variables

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</table>
Patterns

• In general, the magnitudes are large, in fact, ‘too large’.
• Big business loans divert from mom to kids and maybe dad
  – Big business loans also make the household budget larger.
• Small microcredit loans divert from mom to kids.
  – All microcredit loans make the household budget larger.
Next Steps

• Have real-er estimates
  – Add childless couples
  – Allow resource shares to have a unobserved (and independent) distribution factors via generalised random coefficients (Lewbel and Pendakur 2012)
    • Can then compute a structural Average Treatment Effect
  – Go semiparametric (no preference restriction required for IDF)
  – Use first-wave data to get better village-level instruments, and/or more N.