Author(s)  
Christopher Neilson
Sebastian Gallegos
Franco Calle
Mohit Karnani

This paper studies screening and recruiting policies that restrict or incentivize entry to teacher-colleges. Using historical records of college entrance exam scores since 1967 and linking them to administrative data on the population of teachers in Chile, we first document a robust positive and concave relationship between precollege academic achievement and several short and long run measures of teacher productivity. We use an RD design to evaluate two recent policies that increased the share of high-scoring students studying to become teachers. We then show how data-driven algorithms and administrative data can enhance similar teacher screening and recruiting policies.

Publication Type  
Working Paper
File Description  
First version, February 4, 2022
JEL Codes  
I23: Higher Education and Research Institutions
J24: Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
C21: Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions
Keywords  
incentives
college entrance exams
administrative data