Author(s)  
Michael Lovenheim, Alexander Willén

We analyze how exposure to teacher collective bargaining affects long-run outcomes for students, exploiting the timing of state duty-to-bargain law passage in a cross-cohort difference-in-difference framework. Among men, exposure to duty-to-bargain laws in the first 10 years after passage depresses annual earnings by $2,134 (3.93%), decreases weekly hours worked by 0.42 and reduces employment and labor force participation. The earnings estimate implies that current duty-to-bargain laws reduce earnings by $213.8 billion annually. Effects grow with time since law passage, are largest among nonwhites, and are not evident for women. Duty-to-bargain laws reduce male non-cognitive skills, supporting the labor market findings.

JEL Codes  
I26: Returns to Education
J24: Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J45: Public Sector Labor Markets
J51: Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Keywords  
collective bargaining
education
labor union