Pierre-André Chiappori
Bernard Salanié

The economic analysis of the "market for marriage" has a long tradition. Two more recent developments have made it the focus of renewed interest: new models of household behavior, and a class of tractable specifications for econometric work. These two threads have converged to generate richer predictions and empirical applications. The collective approach to household behavior has emphasized the importance of decision power within the household. Equilibrium in the marriage market clearly plays an important role in determining how it is allocated; in turn, matching models provide a natural and powerful tool to analyze marriage markets.The aim of the current survey is to provide an overview of recent advances in the theory of matching markets.

Publication Type
Working Paper
File Description
First version, April 12, 2021; Revised November 2, 2021
JEL Codes
J12: Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
D13: Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
household behavior
utility transfer
bipartite matching