This article studies the effect of graduating from college on lifetime earnings. We develop a quantitative model of college choice with uncertain graduation. Departing from much of the literature, we model in detail how students progress through college.
A negative relationship between income and fertility has persisted for so long that its existence is often taken for granted. One economic theory builds on this relationship and argues that rising inequality leads to greater differential fertility between rich and poor.
This paper is motivated by the fact that nearly half of U.S. college students drop out without earning a bachelor's degree. Its objective is to quantify how much uncertainty college entrants face about their graduation outcomes. To do so, we develop a quantitative model of college choice.
The English structural transformation from farming to manufacturing was accompanied by rapid technological change, expansion of trade, and massive population growth.
In this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, but distort the education decision of households. Optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions.
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) (MR) argued that changing selection of working females on unobservable characteristics, from negative in the 1970s to positive in the 1990s, accounted for nearly the entire closing of the gender wage gap.
The probability of dropping out of high school varies considerably with parental education. Using a rich Canadian panel data set, we examine the channels determining this socioeconomic status effect.
We examine the extent to which tuition and needs-based aid policies explain important differences in the relationship between family income and post-secondary attendance relationships between Canada and the U.S.
We study efficient allocations and optimal policies in a Mirrleesean life-cycle economy with risky human capital accumulation and permanent ability differences. We assume that ability, labor supply, learning effort and returns to human capital are all private information of the agents.
Several frictions restrict the governments ability to tax assets. First of all, it is very costly to monitor trades on international asset markets.